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INTRODUCTION 
 
Regular, free and fair elections are one of the most fundamental principles of any 
democracy. They are a simple, effective and convenient way by which citizens can participate 
in the proceedings of a democratic society. Even one vote cay play a crucial role in the 
collective decision-making process and tip the balance towards one side or the other. 
Although the chances of this may be slim, it would still seem illogical not to try to affect 
one’s future prospects, especially when the costs to casting a ballot are – all other things 
considered – negligible. A vast majority of citizens cares about their future and the future of 
their children, thus abstention is contrary to their interests; in this light, non-voting should be 
a rather rare occurrence. As we are well aware, however, in the real world this hardly the case.  
Declining levels of voter participation in elections have become somewhat 
representative of a considerable number of democratic states, new and old, especially in the 
decades following the 1960s. This is true not only of ballots cast in second-order elections 
(local, state, European) but of first-order ones (parliamentary, presidential) as well. Nowadays 
it is not difficult to find evidence of what most political scientists call low turnout, especially 
throughout Europe and in the United States: Here are just a few examples – in 2001 Great 
Britain 59.4%, Poland 46.2%; in 2002 France 60.3%, Czech Republic 57.9% (Eurostat 
2004);1 in 2004 the United States 56.7% (Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives 
2004). A case in point might be the record of electoral participation in what many would 
describe as Europe’s ‘exemplary’ democracy: Switzerland in comparison with member 
countries of the European Union2 is at the very bottom when it comes to turnout: 56.5% of 
voters on average participated in parliamentary elections between 1945 and 2001 which, on 
the global scale, ranks Switzerland (145) behind the so called ‘failed states’3 such as Sudan 
(144), Central African Republic (128), Democratic Republic of Congo (101), and the country 
is dwarfed vis-à-vis participation for example by Burundi (9), Angola (11) or Cambodia (14) 
(Pintor, Gratschew  and Sullivan 2002: 78-9).4 
                                                 
1 According to the statistics presented by Eurostat, there was a drop in participation in the currently 27 EU states 
from 75.6% to 69.9%, i.e. 5.7%, between the years 1994 to 2005. 
2 Obviously, Switzerland is not part of the European Union but is readily comparable in terms of political 
liberties, economy and culture. 
3 For the index of and more information on failed states visit the Fund for Peace website: 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php (accessed 06/2007). 
4 It is perhaps ironical that compulsory voting is still practiced in the Swiss canton of Schaffhausen, when one 
takes into account the nationwide low turnout. For more on the specifics of low voter turnout in Switzerland, 
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Although the question of turnout in democratic countries is complex and fragmented, 
generally speaking there has been an observable decline of voters showing up at polling 
booths in first-order elections in the last few decades (not to mention the usually low turnout 
associated with second-order elections); on the whole – if one does not take into account the 
instances of intense electoral participation in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in the 1990s5 – ‘turnout has decreased globally over the past 10 years by almost 10 percent, 
both in established democracies as well as newly-democratized developing countries’ 
(International IDEA 2002). The question thus stands: should we be worried by these 
developments?  
It stands to reason that voting and turnout are two sides of one coin – it is impossible 
to talk about one without referring to the other. In any case, it comes as no surprise that the 
question of participation – especially given the fact that it seems that turnout has been on the 
decline in most democratic countries – has been widely debated by journalists, politicians and 
academics; indeed, one could say that the importance participation plays in an election has 
become a perpetual favourite. There are those political theorists who do not think of low 
participation as something outright undesirable, a considerable amount, however, regards 
decreasing voter turnout as a direct challenge to democracy and its legitimacy (let alone the 
legitimacy of a government) – for them democracy is synonymous with high turnout. In this 
light, it should therefore come as no surprise that turnout figures which we see today can in 
certain individuals evoke a sense of crisis; a crisis which gives them not only a cause for 
concern but for action as well. 
What is the cause of these drops in turnout? This is the million dollar question. Is it 
something to do with institutional factors? Are the declines linked to changes amongst the 
electorate? Are political parties to blame? Has there been a decline in political culture 
generally due to the increased consumerist nature of contemporary society? What role does 
                                                                                                                                                        
refer to Eschet-Schwarz 1989. Another irony is that Switzerland was one of the last European countries to pass 
universal suffrage (1971), followed by Portugal (1976) and Lichtenstein (1984). On the cantonal level, however, 
Switzerland still holds the undesirable first place: women did not have the right to vote in the canton of 
Appenzell Innerrhoden until 1990. 
5 This was significantly influenced by the fall of communism and the possibility of free elections in more than 40 
years; but despite of this, participation has dropped sharply in some countries. For example, according to data of 
the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) turnout in parliamentary 
elections in Czechoslovakia was 96.3% in 1990, 84.7% in 1992, 76.3% in 1996 (at that time the country was 
already divided into two: the data refers to the Czech Republic), 74.0% in 1998, 57.9% in 2002, and 64.5% in 
2006; turnout in parliamentary elections in Estonia dropped from 78.2% in 1990 to 57.6% in 2003; turnout in 
parliamentary elections in Bulgaria dropped from 83.9% in 1991 to a mere 55.8% in 2005. Particularly Poland 
has a history of low turnout: on average 46 percent of voters participated in parliamentary elections from 1991-
2005, 58% in presidential elections from 1990-2005. For more on the participation in post-communist countries, 
refer to White and McAllister 2007, Pacek, Pop-Eleches and Tucker (forthcoming), Kostadinova 2003, Bohrer, 
Pacek and Radcliff 2000. 
 5
immigration play in the statistics? The list of questions can go on. In short, there is no simple 
answer to the question why so many people do not to vote. Indeed, there can be none as rather 
than it being a single issue, it is a combination of many factors which can differ widely from 
one country to another. In any case, whatever the causes might be, near universal turnout is 
not a utopian concept in a democratic context: enter compulsory voting.6 
Although the idea of forcing citizens to show on Election Day, and penalising those 
who do not do so, may be intuitively dismissed as something running against democratic 
principles, a closer examination reveals that this is not so – one can hardly dispute the fact 
that compulsory voting is practiced in several democratic countries across the globe: it is not 
only characteristic of somewhat newer democracies (especially the ones in South America) 
but is also an institutional arrangement in a sizeable number of mature democracies 
(Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, to name a few). Apart from this, declining voter turnout 
sparked a debate, which in some countries is still ongoing, whether or not to introduce such 
legislation – this has been the case of Great Britain, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, 
India or even Jordan. To be sure, ‘some 6 314 000 000 people, or 9.6% of the world 
population, use compulsory voting in determining their form of government’ (Evans 2006: 6) 
or, to put it another way, 17% ‘of the world’s democracies compel their citizens to vote’ and 
compulsion is present in ‘ten of the 30 OECD countries’ (Ballinger 2006: 8). In the European 
perspective ‘states with some element of compulsory voting (representing approximately 18% 
of the continent) are situated in the top 45% [of countries with the highest turnout rates], 
whilst four of the top five are compulsory voting regimes’ (Hill and Louth 2004: 10). Indeed, 
where compulsory voting is in place, it is seen as an effective barrier against the crumbling of 
the democratic system caused by voter apathy and a way how to engage most citizens in 
decision-making and how to make voting more egalitarian, and thus truly representative of a 
democracy. It thus comes as no surprise that in states where low turnout is a frequent 
occurrence, some theorists and politicians laud compulsory voting as an efficient and simple 
way out of this, in their eyes, most undesirable situation. 
                                                 
6 It is important to realise that the term ‘compulsory voting’ itself is a misnomer (Engelen 2007: 25, Keaney and 
Rogers 2006: 7, 26, Lijphart 1997: 17, footnote 3). Countries with this practice require compulsory turnout, i.e. 
the voter appearing at the polling booth, rather than forcing him or her to cast a vote. Owing to the secrecy of the 
ballot, a voter may choose to cast a blank or invalid vote. Proponents of compulsory voting point out the 
negative connotations of the term ‘compulsory’ in English which Birch (2007: 2) describes as ‘somewhat 
unfortunate’. Although there have been several attempts to call this practice by different names, for example 
‘compulsory turnout’ by Keaney and Rogers (2006: 26) or compulsory voting attendance (Hill 2006: 208), the 
term ‘compulsory voting’ has become an established expression amongst political scientists; Engelen (2007: 26) 
also acknowledges this. For purposes of this dissertation I will primarily use the term ‘compulsory voting’, 
sometimes substituting it by ‘compulsion’, or CV in its abbreviated form. Only rarely will I use ‘mandatory 
turnout’ or ‘mandatory participation’ to avoid the repetition of the same expression is close proximity. 
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Without denying the fact that compulsory voting is indeed practiced by a number of 
countries, one must point out that it remains a highly controversial issue which raises 
numerous questions about its genuine effectiveness – does higher turnout truly result in more 
legitimacy and a healthier democracy? Can it be harmful? Is voting a citizen’s right, or rather 
his duty? What role does the non-voter play: is he an immoral and selfish free-rider or can 
some form of abstention actually be constructive and ultimately beneficial for democracy? To 
be sure, these are complicated questions. And it is the purpose of this thesis to provide the 
answers and ultimately argue against the rather tempting concept of solving turnout decline by 
compulsory voting.  
It is important to realise that the question of compulsory voting is in fact a deeply 
normative one: in a nutshell, the debate centres around one question and one question alone: 
is voting my right, or is it my duty? Be one’s view on the morality of voting and non-voting 
what may, it is a matter of fact that scholarly work advocating or defending compulsion relies 
heavily on empirical arguments, i.e. concrete data that supports the philosophical beliefs. It is 
clear that an apology of CV cannot merely rely on subjective views about citizens’ obligations 
and on arguments for desirable moral behaviour. ‘Hard facts’ – numbers, graphs, statistics, 
empirical data, etc. – should form the foundations of these values. But is that the case? Due to 
the fact that the purpose of this thesis is to make a case against compulsory voting, it will 
come as no surprise that this study will at length confront the proponents of CV on their own 
ground. This work will thus carefully scrutinise the empirical data presented in support of 
compulsory voting and also make some normative claims of its own. 
In addition, though CV in itself is a narrowly defined field, this dissertation is even 
more limited in its scope in three important ways. Firstly, the examined data is confined to 
first-order elections, i.e. parliamentary and presidential; this does not mean that second-order 
elections are not mentioned at all but, as their coverage would require more space than 
allocated for this thesis, reference to them will only be scarce. Secondly, despite the fact that 
compulsory voting legislation exists in one form or another in circa thirty countries, my 
research focuses almost exclusively on democracies and especially on those that can be 
regarded as established democratic states (some countries with CV are rather new democratic 
systems – South American states – and not all countries practicing compulsory voting 
legislation are democracies – Egypt, Singapore). Lastly, as one shall see, there are different 
levels of CV systems raging from a toothless constitutional provision to stringently 
enforceable legislation: for the purpose of this thesis, I shall mainly focus on the strict 
versions of compulsory voting, which are mostly found in Europe (Belgium, Luxembourg, 
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and until 1970 the Netherlands) and Australia; accordingly, on the whole, the state of affairs 
vis-à-vis CV in South American states will not be discussed.7 Consequently, when drawing 
on comparative examples regarding the situation in states which lack CV, I rely primarily on 
within the European and North American context (and, to a very small degree, Japan). This 
thesis does not sport any sweeping case studies; in contrast I rely on numerous smaller 
examples of empirical data that is used to underline the argument being made. 
As I have mentioned above, compulsory voting is fundamentally a normative concept: 
I will therefore not limit myself only to empirical data, but I will also work with ideas from 
political theory. The thesis will thus benefit from both fields and this will only add strength to 
my argument that CV is something which might glitter, but is certainly not gold. 
As to the literature I have used during my research, it is important to keep in mind that 
the topic of compulsory voting is a narrowly defined field but as such has given rise to 
limited, yet significant contributions especially in the form of studies and essays presented at 
conferences (especially at the recent European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) 
conference dedicated to compulsory voting in Helsinki in 2007) or in scholarly journals. In 
general, the theme is the same: either to argue for or against compulsory voting, sometimes 
focusing on even narrower topics within the field. Whole monographs solely about CV are 
rare and compulsion is usually mentioned within a broader context of research, for example in 
studies about participation or elections. On the whole, present scholarly debate had been 
stirred by Arend Lijphart’s 1997 fourteen-page article entitled ‘Unequal participation: 
Democracy’s unresolved dilemma’; this does not mean that the topic has not been a matter of 
study before (by Robson 1923, Gosnell 1930, or Abraham 1955 to name a few) but the origins 
of the modern exchange can clearly be traced to Lijphart’s essay. His controversial claim that 
the United States should adopt CV to combat low turnout effectively created the discussion 
between the two opposing sides. The literature of this thesis is based on three basic pillars – 
apart from scholarly contributions from proponents of compulsory voting (e.g. Engelen, 
Halperin, Hill, Hooghe, Jackman, Keaney, Lijphart, Louth, Matsler, McAllister, Rogers, 
Wertheimer) and its opponents (Ballinger, Czesnik, Farrow, Franklin, Jakee, Lever, Sun), 
research and publications by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (International IDEA) have played a crucial role in my examination of CV. It 
should be obvious that the list presented above is far from complete. 
                                                 
7 For more information and a list of literature on this topic refer to Fornos, Power and Garand 2004. 
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The structure of the thesis is as follows: the dissertation will be, aside from this 
Introduction, divided into three principle parts with numerous smaller chapters and a 
Conclusion. The case for compulsory voting will be established in Part I. Following a brief 
historical introduction of CV, I shall present the arguments that proponents of compulsory 
voting usually put forward in their defence of CV – I divide these pro-compulsion ideas into 
five consecutive steps and deal with each point in detail; the list is as follows: (1) there has 
been a general decline in turnout which seems to be continuing; (2) low turnout is undesirable 
because it results in unequal representation; (3) the only 100% effective institutional remedy 
to dramatically boost turnout is compulsory voting; (4) the duty to vote represents only a 
minor infringement of personal freedom and puts limits on citizens as any other law would; 
(5) active participation as opposed to non-voting is responsible and morally desirable 
behaviour. I will argue that the justification of compulsory voting (backed by empirical data) 
that voting is a citizen’s duty rather than his right, revolves around two central normative 
ideas: that high participation is good because it increases legitimacy and the health of a 
democracy and that non-voting is bad because it represents immoral free-riding. The aim of 
this part is to present a concise case for compulsory voting using the arguments employed by 
its proponents. This will then present a foundation for counterarguments discussed in the 
second part. 
Part II is the core of the thesis. It is here where I formulate the case against 
compulsory voting. The counterarguments here mirror the points presented in Part One and 
there will also be five of them: (1) it is questionable that declines in turnout are dramatic as 
proponents of compulsory voting claim; furthermore, there are clear cases of genuine high 
turnout in countries without compulsory voting legislation; (2) low turnout does not cause 
unequal representation; (3) CV only succeeds at raising turnout (however, high increases in 
participation are associated only with a strict administration and serious sanctions), and does 
not bring any other benefits; (4) compulsion represents a substantial violation of individual 
freedom and has questionable legitimacy; (5) non-voting is not immoral. This part will show 
that proponents of compulsory voting can only conclusively prove one thing and one thing 
alone: that CV only increases turnout. Nothing more. As to the other assertions advocates of 
compulsion make, I will argue that their claims are unconvincing when confronted with 
detailed empirical evidence. This chapter will further cast doubt on the two basic arguments 
of proponents of compulsory voting which stem from the claim that it is a citizen’s duty to 
vote: (1) that high participation is necessarily good and that abstention cannot be a 
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constructive and integral process of democracy and (2) that non-voters are worthless immoral 
free-riders. 
Part III will discuss the emerging theory of incentive voting as a conception which has 
not been fully and officially institutionalised but which has already attracted some attention as 
offering incentives to vote has been praised by some as the ‘golden’ middle road between 
systems of voluntary and compulsory voting. Rewarding citizens for participating seems to 
circumnavigate the Scylla of the spectre of fines and penalties associated with CV together 
with the branding of non-voters as free-riders, and the Charybdis of facing low turnout and at 
the same time promotes a more positive attitude towards voting than a voluntary system. 
Could this then be seen as the new way ahead for democracy? Hardly. I will argue strongly 
against such a form of voting especially because it puts politics on par with product-
marketing, thus making voting incentives even more undesirable than CV itself. Most 
importantly it robs democracy of its meaning, turning it even more into a personal business 
venture than it has already become in many states. Surely, incentive voting is a new concept 
but if actually implemented could well prove to be the final nail in the coffin of democracy. 
Finally, the Conclusion will bring all the lose ends together. In this part I will argue 
against CV and incentive-based voting. In the Conclusion I reject the concept of compulsion: 
I argue that the necessity to put such measures into practice has not been proved, neither 
empirically, nor normatively; however, at the same time, I do not suggest that CV should be 
eliminated in countries where compulsion is embedded into the political system for various 
historical and social reasons, but notwithstanding this fact there seems to be a trend in 
abolishing such a practice (such as it happened in the Netherlands, Italy and most recently 
Austria). 
The aim of this thesis is to go beyond the shine of compulsory voting and show that it 
is something which glitters, but certainly is not gold and to warn against a potentially easy to 
establish quick-fix-all solution which, in the end, does not live up to its expectations. 
Compulsory voting, and incentive voting by that matter, should not form the backbone of any 
democratic electoral process; rather than coercing citizens or bribing them to vote, people 
should come to elections on their own accord and of their own conviction, not because they 
fear the possible sanctions. Realising the importance of voting, or more precisely the ideal of 
representation, is a necessary step towards a better democracy but a step which citizens must 
finally make on their own. Coercing democracy does not make sense and can ultimately prove 
to be counterproductive. 
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PART I – THE CASE FOR 
COMPULSORY VOTING 
  
I-1: A Short Historical Overview8 
 
 Compulsory voting as we know it today is a concept which emerged around the time 
after universal suffrage – i.e. the right to vote without taking into account gender, race, 
religion, intelligence, wealth or social status – became an established practice around the 
world. Before the beginning of the 20th century there were no real reasons to enforce 
participation as the right to vote was in a majority of countries extremely limited (usually only 
accessible to white, wealthy males) that turnout levels in those times would bear little 
relevance to the current discussion; moreover those having the right to vote usually had strong 
interests in taking advantage of such a right. With the subsequent expansion of voting rights 
for women and different minorities, the numbers of the electorate considerably increased. 
However, the increase of voters also resulted in a not-before-seen occurrence: hand in hand 
with universal suffrage the number of people who did not show up at elections significantly 
increased. The growing percentage of non-voters became a problem, the ramifications of 
which were felt as early as from the beginning of the last century (roughly a few years after 
voting rights became universal). ‘The problem of the twentieth century [and some might 
argue that the same applies for the 21st] has shown itself to be that of persuading the peoples 
to make use of the right for which they clamoured: to get them not only to vote in a 
responsible manner, but to get them even to vote at all’ (Robson 1923: 569). 
 To be sure, some countries viewed this situation very seriously, as was the case with 
Australia which, because of declining turnout, introduced compulsory voting in 1924 to 
protect its democratic system. ‘The significant impetus for compulsory voting at federal 
elections appears to have been a decline in turnout from more than 71% at the 1919 election 
to less than 60% at the 1922 election’ (Evans 2006: 5). However, Australia was not the first 
country to set up such measures nationwide – the oldest compulsory voting legislation ‘was 
                                                 
8 For a more detailed examination of the history of compulsory voting, see Birch (forthcoming: chap. 2) and 
Robson (1923), though the latter study has now become somewhat dated. 
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introduced in Belgium9  in 1893’10 (Pilet 2007: 3), followed by Argentina in 191211 – and not 
the last: Lebanon made turnout obligatory for a short while in 1952 (Scheffler 2001: 174),12 
Egypt did so in 1956 followed by Cyprus in 1960 (Gratschew 2001). Apart from Europe, 
Australia and South America, compulsory voting also has, perhaps surprisingly, a history in 
the United States: this was probably caused by the decline in turnout from the 1890s until the 
1930s as a result of which North Dakota (1898) and Massachusetts (1918) amended their 
constitutions to accommodate compulsory voting, however, mandatory turnout laws were 
never passed (Gosnell 1930: 206-7, see also Abraham 1955). In the end, whether or not states 
actually adopted compulsory voting legislation is according to Birch (2007: 22) a matter of 
‘genetic factors’ in a given country and as such was dependent on the situation in which this 
legislation was born.  
 Given the oft cited decreases in voter turnout from the 1960s onwards, it should come 
as no surprise that the issue of compulsory voting has been resurfacing recently: the recent 
debate was stirred especially by the works of the advocates of CV, for example, Wertheimer 
(1975), Lijphart (1995; 1997; 2000), Halperin (1999), Hill (2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2004), 
Matsler (2003), Watson and Tami (2004), Louth and Hill (2004; 2005), Keaney and Rogers 
(2006), Engelen (2007), Engelen and Hooghe (2007). Compulsory voting has been seriously 
mentioned as a way to boost turnout by some prominent politicians, for example by the leader 
of the British House of Commons Geoff Hoon in 2005 (BBC News 2005), the Prime Minister 
of Jordan Faisal Fayez in 2004 (Hamzeh 2004)13 and Indian deputy Prime Minister L. K. 
Advani the same year (Varadarajan 2004). The prospect of re-introducing compulsory voting 
in the Netherlands has been examined by Lijphart (1995), as well as its institutionalisation in 
the United States (Lijphart 1997, Halperin 1999, Matsler 2003), the United Kingdom (Watson 
                                                 
9 Strictly speaking, not even Belgium was first to introduce compulsory voting, only the first country to establish 
it nationwide: Robson (1923: 570) notes ‘the earliest experiments are to be found in Switzerland, the home of 
democratic inventions’; although the idea first appeared in the 18th century it became law around the 19th century 
like in St. Gallen in 1835. However, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the practice to penalise non-voters appeared 
according to Abraham (1955) as early as the 17th century in the American colonies (Plymouth Colony in 1636, 
several towns in Massachusetts in 1660, were the first). In spite of this, the first experiments with forcing citizens 
to vote were recorded from the time of ancient Athens when citizens in the agora were virtually herded by slaves 
to attend the meeting; properly understood, this however was not compulsory voting in the sense relevant to this 
dissertation. 
10 In 1893 Belgium made turnout mandatory only for men over 21 years of age; women were not required to do 
until 1949. Presently even non-Belgians residing in the country and Belgian citizens living abroad are, upon 
registration, required to vote. For a more detailed history of CV in Belgium, refer to Pilet 2007. 
11 Compulsory voting was legalised in accordance with Law 8871, dubbed the Sáenz Peña Law. Similarly as was 
the case in Belgium, women were granted voting rights in 1947 during the presidency of Juan Perón. 
12 Compulsion applied only to men, though women at that time were granted the right to vote. Lebanon, 
however, was soon to abolish this practice and in 1957 it was ‘silently dropped’ (Scheffler 2001: 174). 
13 The kingdom of Jordan, however, cannot be considered a democracy in the wider sense – Freedom House 
(www.freedomhouse.org, accessed 06/2007) characterised the state as being ‘partly free’. 
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and Tami 2004, Keaney and Rogers 2006), it has become ‘more and more frequently 
discussed’ in Poland (Czesnik 2007: 3) and also has been examined in Canada (Pasternak 
2000, Hicks 2000; 2006), New Zealand (New Zealand Press Association 2001) or Sweden 
(International IDEA 2004: 30). Although the amount of scholarly work in this field remains 
quite small when compared to other subjects of political science and theory, the current debate 
is a lively one especially because of the debate between the advocates and opponents of 
compulsory voting and because of controversies surrounding the very nature of CV. 
  
I-2: Arguments for Compulsory Voting 
Although the concept of compulsory voting is basically a legalised moral standpoint, it is 
important to distinguish it from a governmental attempt to dictate to citizens how they should 
properly behave and lead their lives. This is where empirical arguments find their way into the 
otherwise normative debate and are used to support the moral claim that it is a citizen’s duty 
to vote. Mostly they appear as Lever (2007) remarks, in a series of progressive steps which 
logically build upon each other. Although the numbering I use here in this thesis may vary, 
the manner of discourse amongst proponents of compulsory voting on the whole remains the 
same. The arguments converge, in the end, on the claim that voting is a duty, not a mere right. 
For the purpose of this study, I have singled out these ideas into a series of five points an 
overview of which is below, followed by a more detailed discourse of each step.  
The first point states that many established and even new democracies have been 
battling with diminishing voter turnout at elections and as such is the general starting point of 
any debate about compulsory voting – this step obviously takes for granted the assumption 
that participation is declining and more importantly that low turnout is an undesirable factor at 
elections. After establishing such a sense of crisis, the second point shows us what are the 
consequences of low turnout, as it is especially connected to unequal participation: the older, 
wealthier and better educated citizens are generally more likely to vote than their younger, 
poorer and not so knowledgeable counterparts. In the end, those who are better off tend to be 
more represented in parliament and thus have their interests promoted more intensely than 
non-voters have. Proponents of compulsory voting point out that this results in an unequal 
representation of interests and unequal influence of certain social classes which runs counter 
to the moral ideals of democracy. The third point discusses the institutional remedies 
available to combat low turnout – for example, proportional representation, weekend voting, 
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lowering the frequency of elections – but finds them all lacking. Proponents of CV argue that 
neither solution is likely to improve the problem of low and unequal turnout as immediately 
and dramatically as compulsory voting can. After putting forward secondary positive spill-
over effects which CV generates (for example the increase in political interest and 
sophistication, reduction of the role of money and negative political campaigning, 
partisanship, etc.) proponents of compulsion stress in point four that although certain people 
may regard CV as an infringement of personal freedom (and, to a certain extent, agree with 
this assessment), the duty to vote, or, more precisely, as they do not forget to point out, the 
duty to turn up at elections, represents only a minor and acceptable violation of this core 
democratic principle. The fifth point turns to the normative aspects of active citizen 
participation when it compares non-voting to free-riding on a public good (which is not really 
concretised but one is safe to assume that it is the democratic electoral system). To sum up, 
the five points with which I shall be working are the following: 
  
 
1. Voter turnout has decreased in many democracies worldwide. 
2. Low turnout is undesirable because it causes unequal representation. 
3. The easiest, fastest and most effective response is compulsory voting which, apart 
from the increase in turnout, brings other benefits. 
4. Compulsory voting does not represent a significant infringement of personal 
freedom. 
5. Non-voting is morally wrong: it is free-riding on a public good and therefore it is 
acceptable to enforce turnout. 
 
I shall now deal with each point in greater detail. 
 
I-2-1: Voter turnout has decreased in many democracies worldwide 
There seems to be little argument about the assertion that ‘voter turnout is not only low 
but also declining in most countries’ (Lijphart 1997: 9, see also Franklin 2004, Gray and Caul 
2000, Blais 2000, Wattenberg 2002) – to be sure, a large quantity of empirical data points in 
this direction: a fall in participation over the past 40 years is apparent in many democracies, 
be it in Europe, North and South America, or Asia (Niemi and Weisberg 2001: 31). 
According to International IDEA worldwide average voter turnout has dropped from 73% in 
the mid-1980s to 64% in the mid-1990s (Pintor, Gratschew and Sullivan 2002: 76); these 
results are congruent with other research, for example of Gray and Caul (2000: 1094-6) who 
demonstrate that in 16 out of the 18 examined democracies turnout from the 1950s to the late 
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90s has fallen by circa 10%. Indeed, Wattenberg (2002: Chap. 1) calls it a ‘worldwide’ 
problem. 
Empirical evidence shows that the United States in particular (together with its European 
counterpart in this respect, Switzerland) is ‘an exceptionally low turnout society’ (Teixeira 
1992: 8, see also Wattenberg 1998) – participation of voters in presidential elections dropped 
from 62.8% in 1960 to a mere 50.2% in 1988 (Ibid: 6). As Teixeira further points out in 
comparison with twenty other democratic countries around the world  
 
the average U.S. turnout rate of 53 percent in the 1980s ranks next to last (only Switzerland has a lower 
turnout rate). Moreover, the size of the gap between the United States and other democracies is huge. … [E]ven 
if one compares the U.S. rate with the average across all twenty democracies (78 percent), the gap is still 25 
points (Ibid: 7-8). 
 
 Vis-à-vis participation during the presidential election in November 2000 which was 
only 51.3% Matsler (2003: 954) speaks of an ‘abysmal’ result and refers to the whole turnout 
situation in the United States as a ‘national crisis’ (Ibid: 956); Hill (2006: 207-8) remarks that 
even if the high 60.7% turnout rate in the 2004 Presidential election were to remain ‘this is 
hardly cause for complacency – let alone celebration’ (for a further debate on voter turnout in 
the United States see also Burnham 1982; 1986; 1987, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Shaffer 
1981, Miller and Shanks 1996, Cassel and Luskin 1988, Cavanagh 1981, Wattenberg 1998, 
Powell 1986). 
Although the fall in voter turnout has not been as dramatic on European soil as is the 
case in the United States, it is still present and according to recent data still seems to be 
declining (Borg 1995, Jackman 1987, Jackman and Miller 1995, Topf 1995). A recent 
International IDEA (2004: 8) report demonstrated ‘that average turnout for elections to 
national parliaments in Western Europe has indeed declined since the early to mid-1990s’ 
thus only underlining the trend established after the Second World War. It also may come as 
no surprise that the euphoria of having free elections after decades of oppression from the 
communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe was short lived and in spite of ‘initial 
increases in voter turnout in newly democratized countries during the 80s and 90s, current 
turnout in those states is now at about 70 percent – lower than the 73 percent found in the 
established democracies’ (International IDEA 2002). What is even more disturbing is the fact 
that declines in turnout can be witnessed in most post-communist states ‘since the very 
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beginning of democratic transition’ (Czesnik 2007: 614, see also Kostadinova 2003: 749-51, 
White and McAllister 2007: 587-91).15 Indeed, it seems the evidence pointing to diminishing 
turnout in most democratic countries is irrefutable; this is also the case even in newer 
democracies where logic would dictate that turnout should, at least initially, remain relatively 
high. Though in Part II I will somewhat cast doubts on these claims (they are not universally 
applicable as there exists clear instances of high turnout), let us for the sake of the argument 
assume that we are indeed facing the problem of dramatically low and declining voter 
participation. 
 
I-2-2: Low turnout is undesirable because 
it causes unequal representation 
In the second step the advocates of compulsion point out why exactly is low turnout 
bad: the answer is, because it creates rifts in the democratic structure. As Lijphart (1997: 1) 
points out ‘[p]olitical equality and political participation are both basic democratic ideals. In 
principle, they are perfectly compatible. In practice, however, as political scientists have 
known for a long time, participation is highly unequal.’ High turnout levels at elections are 
seen by many theorists as a sign of the general health and well-being of the democratic system 
and they thus see declining levels of participation as a threat to the legitimacy of this system – 
for Teixeira (1992: 4) low and declining turnout threatens to break the link between the 
citizens and the policymakers, for Lijphart (1995) it is a serious problem, as is the case for 
Piven and Cloward (1988; 2000) and Mackerras and McAllister (1999), Hasen (1996) 
describes it as a ‘social failure’, for Dalton (2000b) it is a symptom of disengagement and 
dissatisfaction, Patterson (2002) calls it a ‘disturbing’ development, Hill and Louth (2005: 30) 
a ‘crisis of citizenship’ and Engelen (2007: 24) ‘the most serious threat democracies face 
today’. The importance of high turnout thus lies in the attempt to ensure equal representation 
for all parts of the society, not only for those who regularly vote. Indeed, according to 
Engelen (2007: 25) the insistence on high participation is a ‘purely instrumental’ concept as 
‘the more citizens actually express their needs, the better the regime will be able to take them 
into account’. 
                                                 
14 Poland has generally seen rather low turnout rates following democratic transition – according to Czesnik 
(2007) it is on average 46%. 
15 Pacek, Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2006) maintain that the reasons for decline are based on the stakes in the 
election, not apathy. 
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Political theorists have by now accurately established the typical portrait of the voter 
and the non-voter. People who are the most likely to cast a ballot are usually representatives 
of the older generation, are educated and have a good income; by contrast the typical non-
voter is a person who is young, less educated and poorer.16 To sum up, the two most 
important factors here are age and the socioeconomic status (as better educated people 
generally earn more) of the individual in question. 
 
 
BOX 1: WHO SUPPORTS COMPULSORY VOTING? 
 
Though it is clear that non-voters are usually young, poorer and less educated 
people, who supports compulsory voting? Though proponents of CV who write scholarly 
articles typically belong to the elite, they make up just a fraction of its supporters. Data on 
this subject is rather scarce and research usually focuses only on the situation in one 
country; thus, the following picture might be distorted but we can nonetheless roughly 
establish the main characteristics of the typical supporter of compulsory voting. 
In the case of the Netherlands (Irwin and van Holsteyn 2005: 14, Table III), 
conventional wisdom is accurate in relation to age (as older people are more prone to 
support compulsion), to alienation (where the more engaged are more supportive of CV) 
and to faith (people with religious views are traditionally supportive). However, 
interestingly enough the support for compulsion decreases with the rise in the level of 
education and is low amongst those citizens who keep themselves informed with political 
events; the differences in support amongst different social classes are, at least in the 
Netherlands, negligible. ‘Support for compulsory voting, emerges as a somewhat general 
conservative standpoint. Those over 65, with the least education, in rural areas, and from 
the most conservative religious group have the highest levels of support’ (Irwin and van 
Holsteyn 2005: 15). 
In the case of Belgium the proponents of compulsory voting also conformed to the 
religious criterion but as opposed to the Netherlands, they were also left-wing – according 
to Pilet (2007: 8) the positive outlooks of catholic and socialist parties towards CV did not 
change considerably throughout the history of compulsion in Belgium. Also Massicotte, 
Blais and Yoshinaka (2004: 37-8) put forward the thesis that ‘[m]any countries with a 
Catholic majority require electors to vote’ and point out that Latin American states, as well 
as Belgium, sport some form of compulsory voting legislation. 
 To sum up this crude generalisation of the features of CV advocates, I believe it is 
possible to establish that age plays an important role as well as a sense of community. The 
most intriguing parameter is education. Further studies are in order, but the proposition that 
support for compulsion might actually decrease with increased education is an intriguing 
concept worth examining. This thesis, however, lacks the necessary space. 
 
                                                 
16 As recent surveys suggest (Pintor, Gratschew et al. 2002, Keaney and Rogers 2006) the gender gap (though 
women are more still less likely to vote than men) and ethnical background (though certain minorities may be at 
an economical disadvantage) do not anymore play significant roles in determining whether one will turn out or 
not. Age, education and wealth play the crucial role. 
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I will first address the socioeconomic factors. Political scientists have proven quite 
clearly that people with a better education and more wealth are also more likely to vote – 
Verba and Nie (1972) called this the ‘baseline model’ which consisted of income, occupation 
and education (see also Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Powell 1980; 1986, Jackson 1995, 
Dalton 2000a, Keaney and Rogers 2006, De Ceunick, Devos, Reynaert, Valcke and Verlet 
2007) – and that ‘in most European countries the working class turnout trails upper class 
turnout by about 10%’ (Rogers 2005). From a worldwide perspective (thus not accounting 
only for democratic countries) it is also quite unproblematic to discern the connection of 
better education and wealth on the one hand and higher voter turnout on the other – according 
to International IDEA’s statistics the turnout rate for a state with literacy of 95% or more is on 
average 72%, whilst countries with literacy rate of less than 95% the average voter turnout is 
about 68% (Pintor, Gratschew  and Sullivan 2002: 86, fig. 16);17 similarly, the higher GDP 
per capita the higher the turnout (Ibid: fig. 17). It is thus evident that ‘inequality of 
representation and influence are not randomly distributed but systematically biased in favour 
of more privileged [wealthier and educated] citizens’ (Lijphart 1997: 1) and thus is evident, as 
Lijphart sums up, that ‘low voter turnout means unequal and socioeconomically biased 
turnout’ (Ibid: 3). 
Apart from the socioeconomic factors age is also very important in determining voter 
discipline: generally, the young are less likely to vote than the older generations18. As 
Ballington argues (2002: 111), ‘[o]ne classical finding of election research appears well 
documented in the sense that voter turnout is indeed lowest among young voters (18-29 
years)’19 and Topf’s (1995) research finds a positive correlation between the increase of age 
and turnout in European democracies.20 Blais and Dobrzynska (1998: 246) found out that 
turnout declines by almost two points when the voting age (from 21) is lowered by a year (see 
                                                 
17 Franklin (2002b: 15-16) somewhat casts the causality between education and voter turnout into doubt – he 
points out that perhaps it is people who take an interest in the world around them are more likely to vote and 
these citizens may, because of their inquisitive nature, seek out extended education. According to him this may 
be one of the reasons why countries with more an educated population (Switzerland, USA) do not necessarily 
have higher turnout than countries with fewer well-educated citizens. 
18 A partial explanation may be attributed to the fact that whereas in the 1960s most voters had to be 21 years old 
to cast a ballot, voting-age has nowadays been lowered on the whole to 18. For an assessment of this, see Dalton 
and Gray (2003: 32). Furthermore, is the case of the United States there was a surge in young voters in 1972 but 
this was due to legislation which for the first time made 18–20 year-olds eligible to vote in most federal states. 
Thus, if one actually removes this surge from the statistics, overall youth turnout remains more or less the same. 
19 For a further study on the relationship between age and young voter turnout from an international perspective, 
refer to International IDEA 1999. 
20 As opposed to most other theorists, Topf finds no positive connection between participation and education. 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995: 48) agree with this assertion because voting according to them requires 
from the individual only time, not knowledge or money. Education connects with political ‘engagement’, i.e. 
interest in politics, efficacy and party identification and does not have a direct effect on voting. 
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also Wattenberg 2006, Franklin, Lyons and Marsh 2004, Blais, Gidengil and Nevitte 2004). 
Instances of low voter turnout amongst young people can be found around the globe in 
countries such as the United Kingdom, United States, Russia, South Africa and young voter 
abstention has been a consistent occurrence in Latin America. 
 
 [T]he gap between the rates at which the different age groups [in Britain] vote has grown consistently 
since the 1970s. To take just one example, while in 1970, there was an 18 point difference between the 18-24 age 
group turnout rate (72 per cent) and the 65-74 age group rate (90 per cent), by 2005 the gap was 40 points 
(Keaney and Rogers (2006: 11) quoting Sanders, Clarke, Stewart and Whiteley 2005). 
 
Age and socioeconomic status are thus the two most important factors which 
determine, whether citizens show up at Election Day and vote. But, to make matters worse, if 
both factors ‘are heavily associated with not turning out, the evidence suggests that where 
these attributes come together, they tend to compound each other’ – in other words, those who 
are the most likely to stay at home are the young, poor people with only basic education, 
whereas ‘if he or she is only young or only poor (Keaney and Rogers 2006: 13). From the 
three factors – age, education, wealth – it is, at least in the case of the United Kingdom, age 
that is ‘the single most significant of socio-demographic factors – more significant even than 
socioeconomic status’ (Ibid: 11) – Keaney and Rogers quote a survey by Ipsos MORI21 
according to which in the 2001 election only 39% of people aged between 18 and 25 voted, 
compared to 70% of those over 65 and the gap was even greater in 2005 when 37% of young 
citizens voted, compared to 75% of those over 65. ‘Putting it another way, in the last election 
young people were half as likely to vote as older age groups’ (Ibid). The impact of such 
behaviour when ‘older people and richer or better educated people tend to vote in much 
higher numbers than young and poor or less qualified people’ (Ibid) is thus obvious: the lack 
of votes from the latter groups means that key decisions are being taken on their behalf by 
better educated, wealthier and older citizens who will logically pursue policies which they 
have an imminent interest in; the end-result of such a situation will be that the younger, less 
educated and poorer generations end up being underrepresented – thus, as Engelen and 
Hooghe (2007: 3) point out, unequal turnout leads to ‘unequal influence’. Lijphart (2001: 75) 
notes that low turnout makes it easier for politicians to ‘reduce government aid to the poor, 
than to cut entitlement programs that chiefly benefit the middle class’. The young and/or poor 
                                                 
21 Ipsos MORI website: http://www.ipsos-mori.com/ 
 19
are thus trapped in a vicious circle where, because they choose not to attend elections and 
vote, their voices become even more marginalised. 
Apart from these consequences the proponents of compulsory voting point out that 
there are three other issues which stem from this trend and which can have a potentially lethal 
impact on the democratic system The first is that the older generation, a considerable amount 
of whose members regarded voting as a duty, is slowly dying out but at the same time is not 
being replaced by a young generation that would contribute in the same politically active way 
as their parents. To be sure, today’s youngsters are the future’s old generation and there seems 
to be no reason to think that, once they turn fifty, they will all of a sudden cast away their 
lifelong habit of non-voting. It is probably more likely that they will retain their behavioural 
pattern even when they will grow older as voting behaviour is difficult on the whole to change 
(Smeenk, De Graaf and Ultee 1995, Hill 2004). Franklin (2004: 205), although he notes that 
there may be a transition between non-voters and voters, he presents evidence according to 
which ‘transitions between them [voters and non-voters] occur much more seldom after the 
first three elections’ (see also Franklin, Lyons and Marsh 2004); so, it seems that in Keaney 
and Rogers’ words (2006: 11) ‘declining to vote is not just a ‘phase’ that young people pass 
through – it is a habit set to last’. 
The second claim is that unchecked, the advocates of CV assert, such developments 
could prove to have dangerous consequences as they could result in the further distancing of 
elected officials from citizens; in the end, the gap between the politicians and the people may 
widen to such an extent that officials will be unable to understand and rationally grasp the 
needs of this ever growing part of society; as a result, they will probably focus their energy on 
those voters, who are most likely to vote. The situation could escalate to such a state where 
‘the powerful vote and powerless stay away’ and that ‘elections, instead of serving as a check 
on the interests of the powerful, will merely offer another route for their advancement’ (Ibid: 
9). ‘Abstainers thus become locked into a self-fulfilling cycle of quiescence, alienation and 
government neglect’ (Hill 2006: 216), whereas traditional voters ‘are engaged in the obverse 
cycle of high efficacy, participation and state inclusion’ (Ibid: footnote 27). So, in the end, 
instead of a democracy there could be some twisted system which could be described as ‘a 
democratically elected oligarchy’, or as the Power Inquiry (2006: 42) dubbed it, a ‘quiet 
authoritarianism’. 
 The third implication of low and unequal turnout and follows from the argument that 
the older and/or more educated and wealthier people are more likely to vote at elections is, 
according to the proponents of compulsory voting, that it is especially the left and centre-left 
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parties that are at a disadvantage. Based on data collected from 40 year’s worth of elections 
Pacek and Radcliff (1995; 2003) demonstrate that there is a direct link between turnout and 
the number of votes cast for left and centre left parties and their electoral fortunes – according 
to their research each increase in voter turnout by one percent the share of the vote for left and 
centre left parties increases by almost one third of a percentage point; in former communist 
countries the differences may be even more pronounced (two or three-times more) as Bohrer, 
Pacek and Radcliff (2000: 1168-9) demonstrate. Elections can thus be especially challenging 
to social democratic and left-of-centre parties whose voters (young, less educated, poor) are 
usually less disciplined and more likely to abstain than those of conservative parties.22 Pacek 
and Radcliff are not the only ones to comment on such a trend: Jackman (2004: 6) points out 
that the poor, less educated people and the young have a tendency in general to vote for left 
and centre-left parties23: ‘as socioeconomic based differentials in turnout diminish, support 
for parties of the left increases’ and this ‘results in higher welfare spending and more state 
interventions in the macro-economy and labor markets.’24 This being said, proponents of CV 
claim that it is evident that the greatest battle will be fought over these voters – the right of the 
political spectrum will thus have to accommodate their demands if they wish to pull over 
some of the left’s ‘traditional’ voters. It is assumed that the overall direction of policies will 
be ‘further to the left than would otherwise result, pulling party competition … in that 
direction also’ (Jackman 2004: 7). 
 
I-2-3: The easiest, fastest and most effective response is compulsory 
voting which, apart from the increase in turnout, brings other benefits 
 It is obvious that voter turnout remains a baffling enigma for political scientists as it is 
rather difficult to establish the exact causes of declines in turnout; the answers theorists 
provide are based on detailed observation but may not apply in each case. Apart from 
socioeconomic and demographical factors, it is clear that ‘participation depends on many 
aspects, including the salience of the issues … the attractiveness of parties and candidates, 
and political culture and attitudes’ (Lijphart 1997: 10). To make matters even more 
                                                 
22 This need not necessarily be true for all left parties: for example voters of communist parties in Central and 
Eastern Europe are usually well disciplined; by the same token supporters of the extreme right also usually turn 
up at elections. In this sense, it is especially because of the radical nature of the political parties in question that 
they have such disciplined voters. 
23 By the same token, people with higher education are generally attracted by more liberal, right-wing policies. 
24 O’Toole and Strobl (1995) find that compulsory voting marginally increases spending on health, housing and 
transfers, whilst in a voluntary voting regime there is greater expenditure on defence and economic services. 
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complicated turnout, as Franklin (1996: 218) observes ‘varies much more from country to 
country than it does between different types of individuals.’ The good news for those who see 
declining voter turnout as a potential threat to democracy is the fact that there are several 
institutional remedies at hand which can help rectify this situation and increase turnout. 
Taking into account what has been said above, there seems to be no clear recipe to boost 
turnout when concrete factors affecting voting vary so widely from country to country; it 
therefore seems ‘much more promising to improve the institutional context than to raise levels 
of education and political interest’ (Lijphart 1997: 10) – in other words, it makes sense to 
focus on the institutional system and rules instead on trying to change the voting habits of 
individuals as this can be demanding, time consuming and difficult to isolate.  
If we thus concentrate on and examine the institutional solutions, we find that there are 
numerous reforms available, ranging from user-friendly registration (in systems where it is 
necessary for voters to register with the relevant authorities prior to casting a ballot like in the 
United States), to the simplification of voting by widening the use of postal ballots, electronic 
voting, holding elections over the weekend or on more than one day, switching from 
majoritarian to proportional representation, reducing the number of elections in a given period 
of time or combining second-order elections with first-order ones25, and thus reducing ‘voter 
fatigue’. However, the proponents of CV claim that the problem with such institutional 
reforms is that the overall increase in turnout is relatively minor and, though not completely 
insignificant, does not result in dramatic increases in participation which they envision: 
Franklin (1996: 226-30) for example establishes that postal ballots increase turnout by 4% – 
though Southwell and Burchett (2000: 76) claim a 10% increase in turnout26 – and weekend 
voting by 5-6%; according to Lijphart (1997: 11) ‘[r]ecent comparative studies have estimated 
the turnout boost from PR [proportional representation] is somewhere between 9 and 12%’ 
and that for example in the United States ‘[f]ifteen percentage points appears to be the 
maximum benefit that thorough registration reform could achieve’ (Ibid: 10); this is obviously 
the ideal case scenario. Realistically speaking, the increase which the above mentioned 
institutional remedies can bring about, hovers probably around the 10% mark and the increase 
in participation caused by some of these reforms may only be a short-lived solution (such as 
                                                 
25 For further details refer to, for example, Franklin 2004. 
26 For a further discussion refer to and Karp and Banducci (2000: 223) though these authors maintain that mail 
ballots ‘will not mobilize groups that traditionally participate at lower rates’ but cause a turnout increase of 3.6% 
amongst college graduates thus not having an effect on the socioeconomic differences, whilst Magleby (1987) 
suggested turnout increased for all socioeconomic groups. More research needs to be done, as studies are limited 
to single states only (Oregon in the case of Karp and Banducci 2000 and Southwell and Burchett 2000 and 
California in the case of Magleby 1987). 
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weekend voting or postal ballots) as traditional non-voters initially try something new but 
over time revert back to their old habits and decide stay at home during the next election when 
the novelty wears off. Furthermore, despite the fact that ballot boxes will stay open on Sunday 
or that registration will be made as easy and efficient as possible, there is no clear guarantee 
that there will be a significant increase of turnout and it also does not mean that there will be a 
decrease in the inequality of voters. As the proponents of compulsory voting point out, the 
above mentioned institutional solutions thus lack any assurance that they will be effective; 
indeed, Hill and Louth (2004: 25) go as far as to call such reforms ‘piecemeal’. 
This is where compulsory voting makes its appearance, it looks as the perfect solution 
which leaves other reforms in its wake. The advocates of CV point out particularly its 
effectiveness and success in tackling both low and unequal turnout (Lijphart 2000: 150), hail 
the solution as being easy to understand by the electorate (why is voting important and what 
are the penalties when one does obey the law), valuable in its widespread impact on virtually 
all citizens (its effectiveness ‘can hardly be doubted’ (Franklin 1999: 206)) and also its 
practically immediate benefits once implemented (high turnout is achieved instantly).27 Hill 
(2006: 212) maintains that CV is a ‘cheaper and more elegant solution’ than any other 
institutional remedy28 and Engelen and Hooghe (2007: 1) claim that ’compulsory voting is 
able to restore, rather than harm democracy’. 
The estimates how much does CV increase turnout vary: according to Lijphart (1997: 
12) ‘compulsory voting has been found to raise turnout by 7 to 16 percentage points’29, Norris 
(2002: 75) mentions 7.7% higher participation levels of the voting age population and a 
‘remarkable 14.2%’ increase of registered citizens, Baston and Ritchie (2004: 35) quote a 7-
17% increase, Katz (1997: 240) writes it is worth ‘at least 10%’, and International IDEA 
(2002) found that ‘countries enforcing compulsory voting have on average a 10-15% higher 
turnout than other countries’30 (for other analyses see also Jackman 1987: 411-12, 416; Blais 
and Carty 1990: 176-7; Hirczy 1994, Jackman and Miller 1995: 474, 476; Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998: 250; Franklin 2002a: 158-60).31 For the purpose of this thesis, I believe it 
                                                 
27 Franklin at the same time points out that low turnout is not a disease but rather a symptom of something being 
amiss. 
28 Feeley (1974: 242) is a bit more careful in his approach and calls compulsory voting a ‘reasonable, although 
not ideal solution’. 
29 Lijphart bases his estimate on calculations of turnout made by several authors, most of which exceed the 10% 
mark. 
30 The lowest estimate is about 3% and the highest 30%. The difference in numbers depend on many factors such 
as the pre-compulsion rate of turnout, the level of education, road network, distance of polling stations, whether 
the system is unicameral or bicameral, etc.  
31 The opponents could for example counter-argue that out of the top ten countries with the highest voter turnout, 
only six have compulsory voting legislation; however, such a statement will not hold under closer scrutiny. As of 
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is safe to assume that CV will increase turnout by around 10%. However, in some cases sport 
much higher numbers and the jumps in electoral participation after the introduction of 
compulsory voting are obvious and quite dramatic – for example, in Australia from 57.9% at 
the 1922 election to 91.3% at the 1925 election (an increase of 33.4%), in Uruguay from 
66.9% in 1966 to 88.2% in 1971 (21.3%), in Chile from 32.1% in 1961 to 50.0% in 1965 
(17.9%); in other countries where there already was high turnout, the ensuing result was not 
so striking – in Belgium turnout rose from 84% in 1892 to 94.6% in 1894 (10.6%). 
Participation after the initial jumps remains constant, as long CV legislation is kept in place. 
Indeed, very high (and lastingly high) participation figures in Australia lead Jackman (1999: 
30) to claim that compulsory voting has ‘rendered the study of turnout virtually irrelevant’32 
and Hill and Louth (2005: 26) argues that the Australian regime is the ‘most efficient, 
effective and equitable compulsory voting system in the world’, a system that states with 
voluntary voting can only ‘envy’ and Hill presents the system as worthy of possible emulation 
via her compulsory voting template (2002c). High turnout rates obviously depend on the 
maintenance of the CV system so, it is logical that the abolition of compulsory voting 
logically leads to clear drops in turnout (due to this proven fact I find Hill and Louth’s above 
claim that compulsion forges new voting behavioural patterns as rather unconvincing, but 
more of this later). A case in point could be taken from the example of the Netherlands, 
where, when compulsory voting legislation was in force 
 
it kept turnout above the 90 per cent mark for all socio-demographic groups. With its removal, an 
immediate consequence was an increased variation between subgroups. This points to the long-asserted social 
‘levelling’ effect of compulsory voting whereby all, rather than just the privileged and well-established sectors of 
society, are enabled to have their voices heard at election time (Louth and Hill 2005: 27). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2002 the top ten countries (countries with compulsory voting are bold-faced) according to voter turnout are: 
Australia, Singapore, Uzbekistan, Liechtenstein, Belgium, Nauru, Bahamas, Indonesia, Burundi and Austria 
(compulsory voting was abolished in 2004). Admittedly, Uzbekistan ranks 23rd worst on the failed states index, 
Indonesia 32nd and Burundi 15th (For additional information refer to footnote 3). There is no data for the 
Bahamas, Liechtenstein or Nauru. On the other hand Australia ranks 140th, Singapore 133rd, Belgium 138th and 
Austria 136th, on the failed states index, i.e. these countries are anything but failed states. 
32 For a historical background of CV in Australia, refer to Mackerras and McAllister (1999: 218-21). 
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General Election Turnout in the Netherlands, 1946-2006
Source: International IDEA
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Indeed, the declines in participation lead Lijphart (1995: 22) to claim that ‘[b]ecause 
compulsory voting is a simple and effective remedy for a serious problem of democracy I 
have become convinced that, in democracies that do not have it, it should be adopted’ and in 
the case of the Netherlands, re-adopted. 
 Empirical evidence thus undoubtedly supports the thesis advanced by proponents of 
compulsory voting that CV it has a ‘strong positive effect on turnout’ (Black 1991: 106) and 
that it is currently the fastest, most effective and easy way to increasing turnout. Furthermore, 
apart from having considerable impact on first-order national elections, compulsory voting 
also addresses the problem of low voter turnout especially in second-order elections (local, 
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state, European)33 where CV generates according to Hill and Louth (2004: 10) a ‘powerful 
effect’, and in Lijphart’s words (1997: 13) is ‘strikingly effective’. As Lijphart demonstrates 
on elections to the European Parliament from 1979 to 1994 ‘the mean turnout was 84.2% in 
the countries with compulsory voting but only 46.4% in those with voluntary voting – a 
difference of almost 38 percentage points’ (Ibid); Smith (1999: 118-9) provides data which 
shows that turnout in European elections in countries with CV can be more than 30% higher 
than is states with voluntary voting. Needless to point out that where compulsory voting is 
institutionalised, voter turnout in second-order elections more or less mirrors participation in 
national elections – although it is on the whole lower than in first-order elections, these 
differences are only marginal (no more than two percent, and usually only several tenths of a 
percentage point), which is statistically insignificant. 
 
 
BOX 2: SECOND-ORDER ELECTIONS 
 
Though this thesis deals with second-order elections only in passing, they should 
still be mentioned. Second-order elections commonly show lower levels of participation 
than national elections; this is mostly because they are perceived as less important than 
parliamentary or presidential. For example, elections to the European Parliament suffer 
from considerable voter apathy (see Reif and Schmitt 1980, Reif 1984; 1985 and more 
recently Norris 1997 and Reif 1997): in the 2004 elections only 45.7% of potential voters 
from the then 25 EU member states cast a vote (Eurostat 2004; though Marsh 1998 points 
out the increasing importance of European elections on national politics). Although now 
somewhat dated, Gosnell (1930: 142-76) in his Why Europe Votes demonstrated the 
phenomenon of stark fluctuations in participation in first-order and second-order elections 
(though there were no European Parliamentary elections at that time), and these differences 
on the whole seem to hold even today. 
However, more recently, several studies have been dealing with the so-called 
‘turnout twist’; they examine cases where lower-order elections actually have higher 
turnout than national ones. Horiuchi (2005) shows that in Japan municipal assembly 
elections actually record higher voter turnout than national Lower House elections. His 
findings further illustrate that the ‘turnout twist’ appears in other countries as well (even in 
Europe) and that views held by many theorists may be partially distorted by the situation in 
the United States and Britain where second-order elections commonly report lower turnout 
than first-order ones. 
 
The increase in voter turnout especially amongst the poorer, less educated and younger 
classes (who would under a voluntary system would not vote extensively) is the most 
immediate and positive impact that compulsory voting has on political life in a country, but it 
                                                 
33 It is perhaps not without interest that Australia has voting is compulsory only in first order elections (Lijphart 
2001). 
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is not the only one, its proponents claim (as suggested by Hill and Louth’s assertion that CV 
generates new positive voting behaviour). Apart from rectifying low and unequal turnout the 
advocates of compulsion maintain that there are several other advantages which accompany 
the introduction of CV (see Wertheimer 1975: 292, Gordon and Segura 1997: 132, Faulks 
2000: 114, Berggren 2001, Hill 2006, Keaney and Rogers 2006). It is important to bear in 
mind that compulsory voting builds upon the empirically supported assumption that almost 
every citizen will make an appearance at an election – high turnout, which is a direct result of 
compulsory voting, thus should also generate a number of spillover effects. Although the 
proponents of CV do not name them in any specific way, I believe it is possible to broadly 
classify them into three distinct groups: procedural, party-oriented and voter-oriented 
spillover effects. 
 Procedural spillover effects are those which governmental institutions respond in 
order to accommodate the creation and/or maintenance of a compulsory voting system. It is 
claimed that CV forces governments to simplify voting as much as possible and create ‘voter-
friendly’ procedures (Hill 2002a, Verba, Nie and Kim 1978: 288, Keaney and Rogers 2006: 
23). Jackman (2004: 8) notes that countries with compulsion ‘typically reciprocate with 
institutional mechanisms reducing compliance costs (e.g., weekend voting, ease of 
registration, widespread use of absentee and postal ballots).’ Hill (2006: 215) argues that in 
states with CV such as Belgium or Australia ‘voting is a relatively painless process’, 
Mackerras and McAllister (1999: 223) suggest that Australia is probably ‘the most voter-
friendly country in the world’ as ‘politicians and electoral officials have gone to considerable 
lengths’ to simplify voting and Birch (2007: 9) asserts that such states ‘have reason to make 
voting as easy as possible for the citizenry, as this will lessen the costs of enforcement, and it 
will enhance the popular acceptability and legitimacy of the institution’ though (importantly) 
notes that these procedural effects are not necessarily constrained to countries practicing 
compulsion. There have also been some suggestions that compulsory voting drives 
government to examine more unorthodox voting mechanisms, such as voting over the 
internet, which is still in most countries in the testing phase. 
 Party-oriented spillover effects work with several assumptions, the most important of 
which is probably the hypothesis that under a voluntary voting system political parties spend 
significant amounts of time and money in their attempts to coax citizens to attend elections – 
and do not focus more importantly on ‘winning the support of undecided voters’ (Keaney and 
Rogers 2006: 29, see also Lijphart 2001: 76) – and this can very well border on the populist 
and generally be at the expense of a qualitative debate about political issues.. Such worries 
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are, however, irrelevant in countries with compulsory voting where political parties can stop 
expending energy and finances to persuade citizens to vote and instead debate problems of 
genuine national concern – compulsion would thus allows ‘party workers … to concentrate 
more on talking with voters about issues and policies that are represented by their party’ 
(Blackburn 1995: 111) and this in turn helps promote overall political education of the whole 
society. Keaney and Rogers (2006: 29) sum up: 
 
Where turnout is compulsory … parties can generally rely on their supporters turning out. This can 
reduce the cost of electioneering and/or encourage parties to concentrate on winning over people who do not 
support any political party – people who often feel alienated from the political system. This in turn can increase 
the public’s sense of political efficacy and their confidence in the political system. 
 
The financial aspect is also quite important and follows form the argument of 
universal turnout. ‘When almost everybody votes, no large campaign funds are needed to 
goad voters to the polls’ Lijphart (1997: 14) argues and in this sense cites Gosnell (1930: 185) 
who claims that such ‘elections are therefore less costly, more honest, and more 
representative’. Furthermore, as a by-product of near-universal turnout, parties will tone down 
their usual pre-election aggressive rhetoric, normally seen in voluntary voting systems, as 
negative campaigning may cause the alienation of voters: Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) 
demonstrate the demobilising effects of negative campaigning on voters, particularly on the 
undecided ones. Attack advertising only appeals to partisan voters, i.e. those harbouring 
sympathies for a particular political party; elections are then more often fought on party lines. 
As a result of compulsory voting, its proponents argue, political parties must address 
independent voters, so ‘when almost everybody votes, attack tactics lose most of their lure’ 
(Lijphart 1997: 15). Due to the decline in negative campaigning it is even claimed that 
populism could even gradually vanish from the realm of politics. 
Voter-oriented spillover effects stem from the duty of voters to participate in the 
electoral process. Some proponents of compulsion assume that CV ‘may stimulate stronger 
participation and interest in other political activities’ (Lijphart 1997: 14). Compulsory voting 
thus may act as an incentive for citizens to be more interested and informed about the 
candidates standing for office and programmes of various political parties as opposed to non-
voters who ‘have little incentive to accumulate information’ – this in turn should promote 
political self-education and sophistication (Gordon and Segura 1997: 132, see also Berggren 
2001). Due to the fact that they are obliged to turn out, most of them will pay closer attention 
 28
to the issues which are being debated in the country as opposed to the where elections are 
voluntary. Also in due time, it is hoped that citizens will learn to live with the new turnout 
laws and will begin to appreciate them as in Australia, where people ‘regard voting as a fairly 
undemanding civic duty and tend to accept the compulsion to vote as both reasonable and 
legitimate’ (Hill 2001: 130) – this might in time engender the creation of a voting norm 
amongst the members of the electorate (Hasen 1996, Hill 2000; 2004, Matsler 2003 ,34 
Keaney and Rogers 2006) ‘that erodes only gradually in time’ (Engelen 2007: 27) if 
compulsory voting were to be abolished (much as it has become proper citizen behaviour to 
recycle plastic bottles and paper-waste); indeed, it may also serve as a way of ‘integrating the 
community’ (Sear and Strickland 2003: 4 quoting Blackburn 1997: 109-12). 
 
 
BOX 3: LIKEABLE COERCION? 
 
The advocates of CV out that in countries with compulsory voting legislation 
citizens generally voice their support for such laws: according to Mackerras and McAllister 
(1999: 221) compulsory voting in Australia ‘is popular among voters’ and from the earliest 
opinion poll ‘never less than six out of every 10 voters have supported compulsory voting’ 
and at the time of their research around 70% of citizens agreed with its maintenance; 
Aitkin (1982: 31) also noted that the system is not seen ‘as an imposition on the electorate’ 
nor that it creates resentment (for a further discussion on the levels of support for the 
system of compulsion in Australia, see also Goot (1985: 198-200), Lovell et al. (1998: 
299) Hill and Young (forthcoming) cited in Hill (2007: 4). Hill (2007: 10) explains that the 
‘relationship between Australians and the state has normally been an amicable one, often 
characterised as either Benthamite, utilitarian or social democratic in nature [as opposed to 
the Lockian liberal stance]… Australians have historically perceived the state in quasi-
idealist terms as a benign provider of goods rather than an unwelcome imposer of 
restrictions.’ 
In case of the Netherlands, support for CV demonstrated to be rather unsteady. 
Irwin and van Holsteyn (2007) show that whilst compulsory voting was in effect the 
support for it varied: whilst a survey in 1946 showed that 66% favoured abolishing the 
practice, in 1966 about 69% voiced their support, a year later it was 70% but in 1969 53% 
of citizens were against compulsion. Irwin and van Holsteyn argue that several factors 
could have affected such attitude swings, as the wording of the question or noticeable 
efforts in the political sphere to institutionalise voluntary voting. CV was finally abolished 
in 1970 (Ibid: 3) and by the year 1999 only 35% supported the re-introduction of 
compulsion, though Irwin and van Holsteyn still claim that this is a surprisingly strong 
backing (see also Irwin and van Holsteyn 2005: 8-16). 
 
                                                 
34 Matsler (p. 955) suggests that the introduction of compulsory turnout in the United States would ‘foster a 
social norm of voting’ and its violation would ‘elicit social condemnation’; he praises Italy for having such a 
voting norm without actually legally forcing citizens to vote. 
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This, it is argued, could help revive genuine interest in democracy and bring back 
participation to its previously high levels. According to Hill and Louth (2004: 26), CV 
generates a long-term positive affect on participation across the electorate as ‘voting seems to 
be a kind of habit and laws are an extremely effective way of shaping new patterns of 
behaviour. 
 
I-2-4: Compulsory voting does not represent a significant 
infringement of personal freedom 
 A rather serious argument that proponents of compulsion need to address is the 
objection that obliging people to vote is an infringement upon personal freedom. The 
advocates of CV are painfully aware of this evident problem; indeed, as Lijphart (1997: 16) 
acknowledges the fact that it cannot be denied that ‘compulsion of any kind limits individual 
freedom’ but at the same time maintains that forcing people to vote ‘entails only a very minor 
restriction.’ The supporters of compulsion argue that compliance with the duty to vote is 
something which has to be learned (the voting norm I have just mentioned), much as any 
other change in current legislation: they claim it amounts roughly to the same thing as paying 
mandatory health insurance, sending children to school, wearing a helmet while driving a 
motorcycle, jury duty, taxation or recycling (Feeley 1974: 241, Engelen 2007: 30). 
Furthermore, they point out that voting requires considerably less time and ‘[c]ompared to 
some of the obligations the state imposes on its citizens, the obligation to turn out every 
couple of years is a very light one’ (Keaney and Rogers 2006: 7) In this light Engelen and 
Hooghe (2007: 4) claim that ‘[g]iven the importance of democracy, we believe a government 
has every right and reason to demand this much from its citizens’ and they ‘believe that 
compulsory voting is a legitimate way of increasing turnout, since it does not violate any 
fundamental liberties and does not entail an all too onerous burden’. Proponents of CV on the 
whole readily acknowledge the fact that some citizens may feel that they are being 
illegitimately pushed into doing something they do not wish to do, but argue that even if 
compulsory voting does impose some commitments on behalf of the electorate ‘obliging 
people to enter a polling station or fill out a postal voting form every couple of years hardly 
represents a major infringement of freedom’ and that an ‘element of compulsion is generally 
held to be acceptable so long as the resulting public good is of sufficient value’ (Ibid: 9, 30). 
By the term ‘resulting public good’ Keaney and Rogers are most probably referring to the 
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increased legitimacy and health of a democracy; such an increase of legitimacy seems 
certainly worth the cost involved, be it financial,35 administrative or psychological – 
supporters of CV point out that a government elected by a majority – albeit with the use of 
some level of coercion – is more democratic than an executive body which is voted into office 
by less than half of those registered to vote.36 Furthermore, as it has been pointed out in the 
Introduction, it is important to remember, the advocates of CV argue, that compulsory voting 
is a misnomer (Engelen 2007: 25; Keaney and Rogers 2006: 7, 26; Lijphart 1997: 17, footnote 
3) – citizens are not required to vote but merely to turn up: it ‘is only registration and 
attendance at a polling place’ which is compulsory (Hill 2001: 130, see also Engelen and 
Hooghe 2007: 1, Hill 2006: 222). This means that they are free to spoil a ballot if they wish to 
do so or use the ‘none of the above’ option where available to them.37 Thus, due to the secret 
ballot the ‘right not to vote remains intact’ (Lijphart 1997: 17) and thus is congruent with 
democratic practice. 
 
  
BOX 4: WHOSE VOTES ARE NOT REQUIRED IN A CV SYSTEM 
 
It is important to note that even in countries with compulsory voting not everyone 
is required to vote – for example, in Australia the ill and the infirm are exempt from this 
duty as are those citizens who find themselves abroad on Election Day; however, there 
exist also cases when whole groups of people are excused as ‘age exemptions are also 
common: for instance, Brazil makes voting optional for citizens between the ages of 16 
and 18, citizens over the age of 70, and for illiterates’ (Jackman 2004: 3); people over 70 
do not also have to vote in Argentina (Canton and Jorrat 2003: 189), Greece and 
Luxembourg and citizens older than 65 are exempt from turning out in Ecuador. In Egypt 
(by no means a democratic country) compulsory voting applies only to men. 
As to the questions concerning the possible penalties for infringement of the law, 
proponents of compulsory voting point out that they are on the whole ‘fairly mild’ (Hill 2006: 
219) and that citizens are not automatically sanctioned to pay the penalty, but to explain their 
behaviour; this is the case in Australia where in order to avoid a $20 fine, one must provide 
the authorities with a ‘valid and sufficient’ reason which apart from a religious duty to abstain 
                                                 
35 Hill (2006: 217) notes that the ‘Australian Electoral Commission estimates that Australian elections cost 
around five dollars per vote’. Thus if there were 12,419,863 votes in the federal election of 2007 the total cost of 
CV would be circa 62.1 million dollars. 
36 For example, turnout in the United States first-order elections often borders around the 50 percent mark and 
sometimes even drops beneath this level – this was the case in the presidential elections of 1996 and 2000 
according to the statistics of the Federal Election Commission. At that time only 49.08% and 47.30%, 
respectively, of voters turned out. 
37 Matsler (2003: 974) especially argues for this blank ballot in the case of introducing CV in the United States 
because it enables citizens to exercise ‘the right not to speak’ which is congruent with the First Amendment 
which guarantees the right of free speech. 
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include ‘physical obstruction, whether of sickness or outside prevention, or of natural events, 
or accident of any kind’ (Australian Electoral Commission 2004: 4) and Aitkin and Kahan 
(1974: 447) note that in practice all explanations except those as ‘I forgot’ or ‘I was busy’ are 
readily accepted.38 Mackerras and McAllister (1999: 224) point out that in Australia never 
more than 1% of the electorate (often much less) ever faces penalties or a court hearing 
(according to them 0.9% of non-voters actually end up in court) and in Belgium less than 
0.25% of non-voters are prosecuted (Hasen 1996: 2170) and though classified as a regime 
with a strict level of enforcement seems to be much more lenient than one would expect – 
Pilet (2007: 2) points out that in 1985 ‘only 62 out of 450,000 voters that did not respect the 
obligation to vote were sanctioned’, i.e. 0.015%. 
 
I-2-5: Non-voting is morally wrong: it is free-riding on a public good and 
therefore it is acceptable to enforce turnout. 
 The final point is to bring in the moral dimension to the whole argument: the claim 
goes that non-voters are actually free-riding on voters: non-voters thus selfishly, indeed, one 
could even go as far as to say parasitically, exploit the democratic electoral system without 
making any effort to uphold it. This is perhaps the most important step in the whole apology 
of compulsory voting and such a claim ‘can be found in every argument for compulsory 
voting, although it is rarely spelled out in any detail’ (Lever 2007: 11). Proponents of CV use 
the empirical evidence in the four preceding points as concrete foundations for their ultimate 
normative claim at the very end, i.e. that voting is a citizen’s duty, not merely a right. So, 
building on the notion which, compared with other duties the state demands of its citizens 
(military service, paying taxes, jury duty, etc.), and working with the thesis that voting 
represents only a minor infringement of personal freedom, Lijphart (1997: 17) can argue that 
‘nonvoting is a form of free riding and that free riding of any kind may be rational but is also 
selfish and immoral’, as does Engelen (2007: 30) a decade later; Hill (2006: 210) also notes 
that compulsory voting is a ‘reliable way of ensuring that every citizen bears their share of 
responsibility for the election of representatives’. The commentator of The Guardian Marcel 
Berlins during the discussion whether to introduce CV in the United Kingdom argued in 
exactly the same vein: ‘Critics argue that … we have a right … to abstain from participating 
in the democratic process. No we don’t. What we’ve got is a duty as citizens to play our part 
                                                 
38 As Orr (1997: 289-90) notes, the Australian Electoral Commission has successfully fought off legal motions 
that would make the list of plausible excuses available to the public. 
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in shoring up democracy’ (Berlins 2006, my italics). Berlins, much as any other proponent of 
compulsion acknowledges the existence of a moral duty to vote in order to maintain the 
democratic system which, because a large number of people under voluntary systems do not 
vote, needs to be in his view supported by law, in this case compulsory voting legislation. 
Lever (2007: 11-12), though herself far from being an advocate of compulsion, neatly 
summarises the arguments of her opponents in the following way: 
 
The key idea … is that a democratic electoral system is a public good, in that all citizens get to benefit 
from it, even if they do nothing to contribute to it.  Because it is a public good, it is possible to free-ride, or to 
enjoy the benefits of that good, without contributing oneself and, indeed, most people will have an interest in 
doing precisely that.  Non-voters, therefore, can be seen as free-riders, selfishly and immorally exploiting voters. 
… So, far from compulsion being unjustified, or even morally neutral, it seems positively desirable, as a curb on 
selfish and exploitative behaviour.  
 
 Although, as Lever notes, what the public good is, is not specifically mentioned by the 
proponents of CV, it is most likely to refer to the democratic system, understood in the ideal 
sense as a competitive system of interests the promotion of which is resolved by free and fair 
elections, or, in Lever’s terms, the democratic competitive electoral system. And for 
advocates of compulsion for a system to be truly competitive, equal participation must be 
guaranteed. Empirical evidence of the existence of such a public good is readily at hand – we 
can safely assume that the presence of the free-rider is proof enough to establish the existence 
of a public good; the free-rider must exploit some public good without contributing to it in 
order to be branded a free-rider.  
 The intensity with which theorists of CV stress the need for active citizen participation 
is clearly evident – in one respect, coercing people to vote is not something that they are 
happy about, nonetheless, it is a sad fact that not all citizens are conscious of their duties to 
the society or willing to perform them. This is why some scholars feel, as Lever (2007: 12) 
points out, it is necessary to have compulsory voting legislation which only serves as the best 
means that is available is ‘to combat the evil twins of low turnout and unequal turnout, and to 
do so with no significant costs’. Thus, clearly, for proponents of CV, voting is not just a right, 
but a citizen’s duty – as Lijphart (1997: 17) claims, ‘[a]fter universal suffrage, the next aim 
for democracy must be universal or near-universal use of the right to vote’ (see also Lijphart 
2001: 77 and Engelen 2007: 24). The attempt to make participation universal is thus the next 
logical step in the attempt to create a better democracy for future generations. 
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 BOX 5: List of Countries with Compulsory Voting 
 
Country Sanctions* Level of Enforcement 
Argentina 1, 2, 4 Weak 
Australia 1, 2 Strict 
Austria (Tyrol) 1, 2 Weak 
Austria (Vorarlbera) 2, 3 Weak 
Belgium 1, 2, 4, 5 Strict 
Bolivia 4 N/A 
Brazil 2 Weak 
Chile 1, 2, 3 Weak 
Costa Rica None Not Enforced 
Cyprus 1, 2 Strict 
Dominican Republic None Not Enforced 
Ecuador 2 Weak 
Egypt 1, 2, 3 N/A 
Fiji 1, 2, 3 Strict 
Gabon N/A N/A 
Greece 1, 5 Weak 
Guatemala None Not enforced 
Honduras None Not enforced 
Italy 5 Not enforced 
Liechtenstein 1, 2 Weak 
Luxembourg 1, 2 Strict 
Mexico None/5 Weak 
Nauru 1, 2 Strict 
Netherlands - Enforced until 1970 
Paraguay 2 N/A 
Peru 2, 4 Weak 
Singapore 4 Strict 
Switzerland (Schaffhausen) 2 Strict 
Thailand None Not enforced 
Turkey 2 Weak 
Uruguay 2, 4 Strict 
Venezuela - In practice 1961-1999 
Source: International IDEA 
 
*Key to sanctions: 
1. Explanation. The non-voter has to provide a legitimate reason for his or her failure to vote to avoid further sanctions, 
if any exist. 
2. Fine. The non-voter faces a fine. The amount varies by country: three Swiss francs in Switzerland, between 300 and 
3,000 schillings in Austria, 200 pounds in Cyprus, 10 to 20 pesos in Argentina, 20 soles in Peru, and so on. 
3. Possible imprisonment. The non-voter may face imprisonment as a sanction (we do not know of any such 
documented cases). This can also happen in countries such as Australia where a fine is common. In cases where the non-
voter does not pay the fines after being reminded or after refusing several times, the courts may impose a prison sentence. 
This is, however, imprisonment for failure to pay the fine, not imprisonment for failure to vote. 
4. Infringements of civil rights or disenfranchisement. In Belgium, for example, it is possible that the nonvoter, after 
not voting in at least four elections within 15 years, will be disenfranchised. In Peru, the voter has to carry a stamped 
voting card for a number of months after the election as proof of having voted. This stamp is required in order to obtain 
some services and goods from certain public offices. In Singapore the voter is removed from the voter register until he or 
she reapplies to be included and submits a legitimate reason for not having voted. In Bolivia, the voter is given a card 
when he or she has voted as proof of participation. The voter cannot receive a salary from the bank if he or she cannot 
show proof of voting during three months after the election. 
5. Other. In Belgium, for example, it might be difficult to get a job within the public sector. In Greece if you are a non-
voter it may be difficult to obtain a new passport or driver’s license. There are no formal sanctions in Mexico or Italy but 
there may be possible social sanctions or sanctions based on random choice. This is called the ‘innocuous sanction’ in 
Italy, where it might for example be difficult to get a place in childcare for your child, but this is not formalised. 
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 I-3: Summary – Voting is a Citizen’s Duty 
Is voting a right, or a duty? For proponents of compulsory voting the answer is clear. 
But why is it a duty? Because, as CV stresses, active participation of citizens (which is 
generally expressed by turnout at elections) is crucial and beneficial to a democracy – the 
more people have their voices heard, the more legitimate and egalitarian, and thus the more 
democratic and healthier the system is; it is therefore in the interest of all members of the 
community to vote. 
It is quite logical that this mere normative claim will not suffice in making people 
change their minds about voting: this is why proponents of CV present concrete empirical 
data to support their moral argument. As I have demonstrated above, this is usually done in a 
series of points, all of which ultimately add weight to the normative concept that it is indeed a 
citizen’s duty to vote. In this thesis I have singled out five steps: the first tells us that there has 
been a general decline in turnout, which is serious because it means that the legitimacy and 
health of a democracy is in jeopardy; the second shows us what are the implications of these 
changes: mainly that low turnout creates unequal representation; the third point confronts us 
with the possible solutions, however one arrives at the conclusion that changing cultural 
relations is a long term enterprise with uncertain results and that institutional reforms – apart 
from compulsory voting – usually fail to produce any dramatic outcomes; the fourth step 
deals with questions surrounding the suspect undemocratic nature of CV, and though it finds 
the practice somewhat limiting vis-à-vis personal freedom, the argument goes that 
compulsory voting poses a very minor infringement as it is comparable (and some would 
argue even less of a restriction) to any other law; the fifth and final step brings in the moral 
dimension to the whole argument when it is claimed that – due to all of the arguments 
presented above – it is a citizen’s duty to vote. 
However, in the real world, not all people choose to do so, or, as supporters of CV see 
it, not all people understand what is it they owe the community – these citizens, these free-
riders (whether their abstention is caused by conscious choice, apathy, ignorance, laziness is 
irrelevant) must be taught to be responsibile and it is specifically because of these individuals 
that it is necessary to create legislation which renders participation obligatory (because, 
compulsory voting, after all, is a misnomer). For proponents of CV these selfish and immoral 
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people, because they do not participate in political life, harm their fellow citizens and 
ultimately themselves; it is therefore acceptable (indeed, morally required) to coerce these 
free-riders to perform their civic duty, i.e. to force them to vote, and to do so without any 
negative effects on regular voters who would go to the polling booths even if there was no 
mandatory turnout legislation. Furthermore, accusations that compulsory voting infringes on 
liberty are not valid, as the personal costs involved are vis-à-vis other laws, negligible. 
At first glance the argument appears pretty straightforward: a democracy is alive and 
well as long as its citizens play their part and turn out in large numbers at Election Day. If 
turnout is low and unequal it is reasonable and even in the public interest to make turnout 
obligatory, especially because its enforcement amounts only to a minor inconvenience to the 
citizens. In states where such legal instruments are in place and for its supporters, compulsory 
voting represents an effective barrier against the crumbling of the democratic system caused 
by voter apathy. The whole concept of mandatory turnout goes one step further in answering 
the question, how intensely authorities should compel citizens to express their opinion – from 
encouragement to compulsion.39 From a certain perspective, one could say that compulsory 
voting seems to be promoting a minimalist stance on participation – CV theorists would 
probably agree that active participation in all manners of public life is desirable but sensibly 
acknowledge that all out enforcement of participation is highly unrealistic; they therefore 
‘limit’ their efforts to ‘where it matters’: in other words, to elections which are of national 
importance. 
 
[T]he case for compulsion is meant to be democratic in two ways.  Its concern with low and unequal 
turnout reflects democratic ideas about the nature and value of representation, equality and legitimacy. Thus, 
Lijphart notes that equality typically requires floors, below which people cannot fall, as well as ceilings that 
prevent them rising too high above their fellows. ‘One person, one vote’ he explains, puts a ceiling on voting, 
and the importance of this ceiling is well-acknowledged …However, Lijphart complains, most democracies do 
not place a floor under electoral participation, and in its absence electoral participation has become seriously 
unequal.  Compulsory voting, he thinks, can be seen as such a floor and, therefore, as the egalitarian counterpart 
to ‘one person, one vote’. Moreover, Lijphart believes – as do other recent proponents of compulsion – that 
compulsory voting will have social democratic consequences, in addition to strengthening democratic rights and 
duties. Thus, whether we look at the concerns that motivate it, or the outcomes that it hopes to achieve, the case 
for compulsory voting is designed be democratic and to be clearly distinguishable from authoritarian or 
totalitarian alternatives (Lever 2007: 3 quoting Lijphart 1997: 12-3). 
                                                 
39 Opponents of CV might be inclined to substitute the word ‘compulsion’ with ‘coercion’ or ‘forced 
participation’.  Proponents of compulsory voting would probably strongly disagree with the use of such terms, 
especially because of the negative connotations they have. 
 36
  
So, in short, proponents of compulsory voting thus see CV as a safeguard of 
democracy: not only does it strengthen democratic ideals of equality, legitimacy and 
representation it also helps citizens to strengthen the democratic right to vote by making 
people utilise their full potential as members of the electorate whilst at the same time 
engendering from the duty to vote a voting norm – in other words it is meant to be democratic 
not only in the ideals it represents but also because of the outcomes it generates.  
 From the arguments presented above, it is evident that proponents of compulsion seem 
to cover all the angles and put forward a strong case in favour of making voting obligatory. 
High civic engagement is undeniably good for a democracy; it seems that a little personal 
inconvenience is a small price to pay for hearing the voices of virtually all citizens and for 
handing one’s children a better and more mature democratic system. This is the normative 
ideal behind CV – compulsion in itself is only a means to an ends, i.e. that the citizens realise 
that voting is not their right but their duty. Democracy is worth fighting for and is well worth 
the possible sacrifices involved (personal, financial, and societal). The best choice one has in 
setting things right and efficiently increasing participation currently is compulsory voting, its 
advocates would argue. But is that really the case? As I have already stated, I myself oppose 
such a view. The reasons why will be covered in the second part of this thesis. 
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PART II – THE CASE AGAINST 
COMPULSORY VOTING 
II-1: Introduction 
As the first part of this dissertation demonstrated, proponents of CV put forward a 
strong case in favour of compulsory voting: it cannot be denied that compulsion increases 
turnout, especially amongst the younger and poorer citizens. Its effects are immediate and 
dramatic. It looks like the perfect solution. So, why does it seem so peculiar within a 
democratic context? Why have we not witnessed among democratic states a surge of this type 
of legislation? What is wrong with compulsory voting? This is what I now set to find out. 
The first part of this thesis presented the five steps CV proponents usually use in their 
apology of compulsion; I have pointed out that, although it is a fundamentally normative 
concept, CV advocates present the moral case only at the end, whilst the first four steps by 
using empirical data clear the way for the final normative push that voting is a citizen’s duty, 
not merely his right. In order to argue against CV, I will once again list the five steps for 
compulsion presented in Part One: 
 
 
1. Voter turnout has decreased in many democracies worldwide. 
2. Low turnout is undesirable because it causes unequal representation. 
3. The easiest, fastest and most effective response is compulsory voting which, apart 
from the increase in turnout, has other benefits. 
4. Compulsory voting does not represent a significant infringement of personal 
freedom. 
5. Non-voting is morally wrong: it is free-riding on a public good and therefore it is 
acceptable to enforce turnout. 
 
At first glance the argument looks pretty solid; there seem to be no apparent 
inconsistencies among the individual points: the first four form the empirical basis, the last 
one the normative thrust of the argument. However, appearances can be deceiving as a 
detailed examination will reveal. The foundations upon which compulsory voting is built is 
more sand than firm ground – upon closer scrutiny it is evident that proponents of compulsion 
base their arguments on questionable data which represent more wishful thinking than hard 
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facts. Making excited generalisations about the miraculous effects of CV, as some theorists 
seem to do, can even be misleading; indeed, I maintain the only thing one can readily prove is, 
that compulsory voting raises turnout. Nothing more. 
 
II-2: The Case against Compulsory Voting 
When viewed from a broader perspective, compulsory voting, the idea that voting is a 
citizen’s duty, revolves around two key normative ideas which form the assertion that voting 
is a citizen’s duty. These concepts are sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly present in 
every debate about CV: (1) high participation is good because it increases legitimacy and the 
health of a democracy and equalises turnout and, thus, (2) non-voting is bad because it means 
immoral free-riding. These two points form the basis for the moral justification of compulsory 
voting. This thesis will not only dispute these normative statements but also the empirical 
points thus putting into doubt the whole concept of compulsory voting. Once the fallacy of the 
empirical steps is revealed, the whole normative argument will be undermined and 
questioned. 
To argue against the five points presented by advocates of compulsion (above) I 
present five counterclaims which mirror the assertions made by the proponents mandatory 
participation. They are the following: 
 
1. The decrease in voter turnout is more ambiguous than CV advocates claim. 
2. Low turnout does not cause unequal representation. 
3. Compulsory voting only raises turnout. 
4. Compulsory voting violates liberties and does not increase legitimacy. 
5. Non-voting is not free-riding. 
 
 
Before I address each point in further detail, I will briefly summarise my arguments in 
the following paragraphs. First, I will take a closer look at declining voter turnout, along with 
the probable causes. I will argue that, although there has been a decrease in turnout in 
democratic countries around the world, the picture is no so clear cut as advocates of 
compulsion lead us to believe (there are cases of record-high turnout, especially when citizens 
feel the stakes are high and there is a sense of ‘purpose’ in the election) and that one needs to 
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appreciate the many different factors lie behind these declines (not all of which are voter 
apathy). 
The second point will argue against the claim that low turnout causes unequal 
representation. Despite the evidence presented in Part I that non-voters usually are the poor, 
the uneducated and the young, I will demonstrate that the chances of left and centre-left 
parties remain virtually the same, regardless whether turnout numbers are high or low. In 
other words, the chance that full participation would change electoral outcomes is highly 
unlikely. 
The third step will show that there are important differences between compulsory 
voting regimes, ranging from nominal legislation to strict enforcement. This chapter will 
show that only the serious administration of CV causes the dramatic increases on turnout (at 
the present this is furthermore restricted only to four states), and that some compulsory voting 
countries do actually have lower average turnout than some democracies employing voluntary 
voting. Indeed, in this light, it is not compulsion that increases turnout but the imposed 
sanctions. The second part will discuss the claim that there are other benefits to compulsory 
voting rather than just high turnout, which I have already classified in Part I as procedural, 
voter- and party-oriented spillover effects. I shall prove that these assertions are not based on 
any empirical evidence again reinforcing the idea that CV only raises turnout, but nothing 
else. 
The fourth point is the boundary between the empirical and the normative arguments: 
it will deal with the political concepts of individual freedom and legitimacy; it will find that 
CV is lacking on both points. As to the question of individual freedom, I will argue against 
the claims that compulsory voting is just like any other law; this is because that its 
repercussions can be much more severe than a minor fine, because it is possible to end up in 
gaol in certain countries as a direct or indirect result of not voting and some states allow for 
the disenfranchisement of non-voters which in a democratic society should be an 
unacceptable practice. Although CV proponents often point out that the term ‘compulsory 
voting’ is a misnomer and that the practice should be referred to as ‘compulsory turnout’ 
(Keaney and Rogers 2006: 7, 26), I demonstrate that such an assertion is hypocritical: after 
all, the advocates of compulsion are interested in votes citizens cast, not their presence at the 
polling booths and in some countries, notably in Australia, it is really voting, that is required, 
not turning out. I believe that CV compromises the right not to vote, understood as the right to 
abstain, which I maintain is as crucial as the right to vote within the modern democratic 
framework. 
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As to the notion of legitimacy, I will argue that there are some serious problems 
accompanying compulsory voting and the high turnout it generates. First of all, I claim that 
CV tackles only the symptoms not the real causes behind low turnout, thus making everything 
appear in order on the surface, whilst doing nothing about the serious issues that are left 
untreated. Secondly, CV needs to address the considerable number of protest and random 
votes that are directly tied to the practice of compulsion. Though proponents of CV tend to 
trivialise the whole matter, there is no doubt that it has significant consequences for the 
concept of legitimacy. Thirdly, I will argue against the first normative claim, i.e. that high 
participation is good because it protects the legitimacy and health of a democracy. In fact, I 
will demonstrate that this is not so and that it is actually healthier and more legitimate to have 
lower, yet genuine turnout than artificially high turnout which brings to the polling booths 
people who are uninterested, uninformed and who oppose the system and such individuals 
hardly make reasoned decisions and CV, as there are no positive secondary effects vis-à-vis 
political culture, does not improve the situation in any way. Furthermore, the more people 
attend, the more extremist views get represented either in local or national assemblies. In the 
end we thus must decide, whether we are looking for quality in democracy, or quantity. I 
certainly subscribe to the former. I believe that the fixation on achieving high turnout at 
almost any cost, may not no longer be suited for democracies of the 21st century where it 
seems a new trend of voting when it really matters seems to be evolving. One should consider 
the fact that electoral decline can be one of the symptoms of broader societal changes. 
The fifth and final step argues that non-voters are neither the irresponsible children nor 
the immoral free-riders that CV proponents claim they are. This inconsistency in terms 
certainly does not help the case for compulsion. Secondly, I will point out that sweeping 
generalisations that all non-voters are immoral simply does not take into account different 
types of engagement. Indeed, to put voting on the highest pedestal simply ignores the fact that 
there are other valuable contributions an individual can make to a society. Finally, in this 
section I will also argue that high participation (expressed by voting) cannot be regarded as a 
universal public good and therefore the claim that non-voters are free-riders cannot hold. I 
will examine the normative implications of the assertion that it is a citizen’s duty to vote, 
whilst maintaining that it is foremost his right. It will be argued that, as opposed to the right to 
vote, a duty to vote cannot be regarded as a universal democratic principle but something 
idiosyncratic to several countries. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the case for the 
urgency of making voting compulsory has not been proven and that voting is a negative right 
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and construing the concept positively can have serious implications which can border on the 
totalitarian. 
 
II-2-1: The decrease in voter turnout is more ambiguous 
than CV advocates claim 
 
II-2-1-a: Introduction 
Any apology of CV typically begins by claiming that less and less people are showing 
up at elections. To be sure, the preachings about the dangerous declines in voter turnout have 
become somewhat of a mantra amongst numerous political scientists. To be sure, at first view 
empirical data of the past few decades seems to support such claims (as I have discussed in 
the Introduction and Chapter One). Because of this trend some theorists paint bleak pictures 
heralding the end of democracy as we know it – as Czesnik (2007: 5) observes ‘whenever few 
people participate in the … election, political scientists launch a debate on democratic deficit’ 
and when there is a slump in turnout ‘there is much ado about crisis of democracy’. Surely, it 
would be difficult and false to deny that voter turnout has been somewhat decreasing but, on 
the other hand, it would be equally false to say that the changes are drastic or not to concede 
that ‘turnout change is not always in the downward direction’ (Franklin, Lyons and Marsh 
2004: 115). In this light it should be remembered that it is low turnout that commonly makes 
news and becomes the centre of attention rather than reports of high participation numbers. 
‘Stable turnout is not news’, remarks Franklin (2002b: 2) and points out that rises in 
participation receive little publicity. Indeed, high turnout may not be as uncommon as we 
sometimes tend to take for granted. It thus may come as a surprise to find out that it ‘did rise 
in the 2000 US presidential election … [it] also rose markedly in the German election of 
1998, in the Norwegian election of 1997, in the Swedish election of 1994, and in the British 
election of 1992 (Ibid: 5-6).’ International IDEA data clearly show that on a global scale 
turnout increased from 1945 until the 1980s with an average of 68% and has been declining in 
the 1990s only marginally to 64%.40 Franklin (2002b) establishes that over the course of the 
next 30 years turnout might decline another 6% (judging by the four percent from the 1990s 
to the first decade of the 21st century) – an overall slump of 10% (as this is caused by the 
                                                 
40 International IDEA, ‘Turnout over time: Advances and retreats in electoral participation’, in Voter Turnout: A 
Global Survey, http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter_turnout1.cfm (accessed 04/2008). 
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generational exchange of today’s young voters who tend to vote less than their parents). 
However, I do not feel that these decreases in participation necessarily mean that we have a 
crisis of democracy on our hands as some authors would lead us to believe as for them low 
participation means the disengagement and dissatisfaction of citizens with the political system 
(see for example Teixeira 1992, Dalton 1999, Wattenberg 2000; 2002), especially so in 
second-order elections (Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson 1998 for a European perspective)41 – 
surely the United States has in general been a low-turnout society for more than just the past 
few decades. 
However, as Franklin (2004: 4) writes, that ‘[m]ost of the commentators who decry 
declining turnout seem to assume that the development is consequential – either that falling 
turnout is bad in itself or that it is an indicator of bad things happening to the society.’ 
However, as he further points out, the fall in participation ‘might be incidental to deliberate 
changes made in a country’s electoral system or other political arrangements.’ In other words, 
certain reforms may cause the oscillation in turnout rates; it does not follow automatically, as 
we shall see, that a decrease in participation means the increasing alienation of citizens from 
the political system. I find this an important comment. 
Indeed, trying to establish why voters do not come to elections is sometimes more of 
an attempt of divination than presenting readers with hard evidence – after all, the reasons 
why people do not vote not only vary from country to country but can also vary from election 
to election, not only from a temporal point of view (different factors in different time periods), 
but also a hierarchical one (first-order vs. second-order elections). Of the factors which have 
the most profound impact on participation, Powell (1980) found it to be the socio-economic 
environment, compulsory voting, strength of party alignments and automatic registration and 
later (2000) claimed that proportional representation has a clear advantage over the 
majoritarian model, Jackman and Miller (1995) cite electoral laws and political institutions 
(proportional representation, compulsory voting, multi-party system) and Franklin, van der 
Eijk and Oppenhuis (1996) in the context of European elections cite compulsory voting and 
proportional representation. Blais and Dobrzynska (1998: 251) sum up existing research 
nicely when they claim that turnout ‘is likely to be highest in a small, industrialized, densely 
populated country, where the national lower house election is decisive, voting is compulsory, 
and the voting age is 21, having a PR system with relatively few parties and a close electoral 
                                                 
41 Franklin and van der Eijk (1996) and Franklin (2001) however dispute any link between attitudes and falling 
turnout in European elections. 
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outcome’; they concede that such a country does not exist but where most of these conditions 
are met, turnout can exceed 90%, where not, it may be less than 60%. 
To be sure, to claim that the decrease in turnout is not a prelude to a catastrophic 
scenario (as I will do later on) is a tough nut to crack. However, before I do so, I believe it 
will prove useful for further discussion to examine at some length the underlying reasons for 
the decrease in turnout to which – by applying a universal solution which artificially increases 
turnout – compulsory voting is blind as it does not take into account important differences in 
various democratic systems. 
This chapter will look at three categories and their underlying factors affecting voter 
turnout. Taking into account the different conditions which can affect voter behaviour I 
believe we can plausibly formulate three broad categories which have the greatest impact on 
voting at elections: (1) socioeconomic factors, (2) institutional factors, and (3) political-
cultural factors. The following examination will question a number of assertions which CV 
proponents take for granted. 
  
II-2-1-b: Socioeconomic factors 
The first category has already been extensively examined in Part One. I have pointed 
out that the main factors which have the most significant affect on voter behaviour are in this 
respect age, education and wealth – as I have established, it is mainly the younger and poorer 
citizens who often do not appear at the polling booths. Indeed, these causes are commonly 
cited by CV advocates who also point to the unequal representation age and socioeconomic 
status generates. There is no further need to repeat these details here, therefore I will move on 
to the next set of factors. 
 
II-2-1-c: Institutional factors 
Institutional factors have been briefly mentioned in Part One. It is here where I can 
cover them in greater detail, however, it must be kept in mind that their aim is to increase 
turnout and it is rather their absence than their presence that tends to have a negative effect on 
participation. For political scientists searching for the answer to the question how to increase 
turnout institutional factors are rather important – not only are the results readily measurable 
but as Lijphart (1997: 10) points out ‘rules and institutions are … more amenable to 
manipulation than individual attitudes’; he further adds that ‘in order to expend voting in a 
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country with low turnout it is much more promising to improve the institutional context than 
to raise levels of education and political interest’. Indeed, Jackman (1987: 406) demonstrates 
(as Powell (1986) did before him) that ‘different institutional arrangements have a major and 
predictable impact on national rates of voter turnout’ and that it ‘makes good intuitive sense’ 
that turnout should respond to institutional patterns – the institutional arrangements are in fact 
something what one could call ‘the rules of the game’ (see also Franklin 1996). Both Jackman 
and Powell view institutional arrangements (Jackman ascribes them a ‘critical role’ – 1987: 
419) as the main causal factor of turnout within a given country, not national differences of 
political culture, as opposed to Gray and Caul (2000), Flickinger and Studlar (1992) or 
Almond and Verba (1963; 1989) who see institutional factors as of only a secondary 
importance as, due to the fact they remain constant, cannot explain variations of turnout in 
industrial democracies. Almond and Verba (1989: 134) claim that ‘if the norm of participation 
is not widespread, institutional change in the direction of fostering participation will not in 
itself create a participatory democracy’; in this light Jackman (1987: 417) cites Crewe (1981: 
239) who pointed out that Almond and Verba’s study from 1963 
 
found that interest in politics, attention to political affairs in the media, feelings of civic duty and of 
individual political efficacy, and trust in political as opposed to other solutions to individual and communal 
problems, were consistently highest in the United States, followed by Britain, then Germany, and finally Italy-
exactly the reverse of their rank order for postwar turnout!42 
 
Also Berinsky (2005) is sceptical about institutional changes maintaining that these 
reforms bring to the polls people, who would have voted anyway, i.e. that institutional factors 
stimulate turnout amongst those most likely to vote and claims that such reforms actually 
increase socioeconomic biases (see also Southwell and Burchett 2000, Karp and Banducci 
2001). ‘Electoral reforms, on their own, cannot ameliorate the present socioeconomic biases 
in the composition of the voting public because the increase in turnout these reforms bring is 
the result of the retention of transient voters, not the stimulation of nonvoters’ (Berinsky 
2005: 483). According to Berinsky, the mobilisation of new voters must take place not by 
institutional reforms (or at least not solely by them) but that it is ‘political interest and 
engagement that drives citizens to the polls (p. 484). ‘Put another way, instead of making it 
                                                 
42 Similarly Engelen and Hooghe (2007: 16) found that interest and turnout do not seem to correlate to one 
another: though interest and turnout was low in Portugal and the situation was opposite in Denmark, in 
Switzerland and Great Britain had low turnout despite high interest, while Belgium and Greece had low interest 
but high turnout (both, though, have compulsory voting legislation). 
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incrementally easier for citizens to participate in politics, we should make people want to 
participate’ (Ibid). As one can see, the discussion whether turnout is a matter of institutions or 
culture is still ongoing. I do not wish to get into a detailed polemic in this thesis, rather to 
present both views as I feel both institutional arrangements and cultural factors play an 
important role in the determination of turnout. 
Apart from compulsory voting (probably the strongest institution to have an effect on 
turnout) the institutional factors that can affect voter turnout are generally registration, 
absentee voting, weekend voting, electoral fatigue, and proportional/majoritarian 
representation. I will now deal with each institutional factor in more detail.  
 
II-2-1-c-1: Registration 
Registration is a crucial part of the electoral process as it is an instrument which 
implements the right to vote. Although the right to vote is a universal principle in most states 
across the world, there are still countries where disenfranchisement is existent, but ‘tends to 
be more a matter of degree and of practice than of a legal phenomenon’ and the ‘most often 
excluded or non-included populations, by law or de facto, are peasants, ethnic minorities, 
women, the illiterate and the poor’ (Pintor and Gratschew 2002: 26). Due to the fact that the 
focus of this thesis is on democratic countries, I will not address the problems of 
disenfranchisement (at least in the connection to registration; I will deal with this topic in 
conjunction with CV) as this practice appears primarily in states which cannot be considered 
democracies; this, however, does not mean that in certain forms such a practice does not exist, 
even amongst democratic countries, like, perhaps surprisingly to most readers, in the United 
States or Britain.43 
From a systematic point of view, Pintor and Gratschew (2002: 25) classify voter 
registration into four broad categories: 
 
a) compulsory versus voluntary registration; b) continuously updated registers (e.g., much of Western, 
Central and Eastern Europe, Australia, Peru, Guatemala) versus ad hoc voter registers or a new register put 
                                                 
43 Disenfranchisement is matter of fact in Saudi Arabia where women are banned (amongst other things such as 
driving) from voting but as I have mentioned this even occurs in democracies, where such a practice should be 
unacceptable: for example, it is practiced in Puerto Rico by the United States where any American citizen who 
moves to the islands loses his right to vote in any U.S. legislative and executive election at the national level, 
although all citizens of Puerto Rico are by the Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917 considered U.S. citizens. For a further 
discussion on this topic, see Torruella (1985) and Román (2002). 
In the United Kingdom convicted criminals lose their right to vote though at the present this practice is under 
review following a ruling on its illegality in October 2005 by the European Court of Human Rights (BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4315348.stm, accessed 02/2008). 
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together for each election (e.g., many emerging democracies, Canada before 1997); c) registration through state 
initiative versus responsibility placed upon the individual citizen; and d) voter-specific registers (standard 
practice) versus not a separate register of voters (e.g., Sweden, Denmark). 
 
 Generally it is safe to assume that countries where registration is voluntary (e.g. 
Brazil, France, United States) and thus where citizens are not automatically enrolled (e.g. 
most European countries, Canada), tend to have lower turnout (see also Mitchell and Wlezein 
1995). By the same token in these states additional bureaucratic/methodical difficulties –for 
example costly registration, complex registration forms, the need to register a long time ahead 
before an election – can considerably depress turnout. 
The United States is often cited as an example of a country where registration is not 
only left upon the voters but where difficulties and obstacles linked with registering are a 
problem (usually this is not the case in European democracies). Whereas the former claim is 
true44, the latter one is no longer valid as much reform has been made on this front – whereas 
more than a generation ago Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980: 61) could have claimed that in 
the U.S. ‘registration is usually more difficult than voting’ and citizens must undergo a 
‘complicated procedure’ (according to their research a liberalisation of registration rules could 
bring a 9.1% increase in turnout; see also Powell (1986: 35) according to whom registration 
criteria depress turnout by 14%) this is no longer the case.45 From the time of their 
publication voter registration has become easier in the United States46, especially because of 
the National Voter Registration Act in 199347, so much so that Highton (2004: 512) claims 
that ‘there is now little room for enhancing turnout further by making registration easier’. 
However, this is not completely true, as there is still scope for improvement, particularly by 
promoting Election Day registration; at the present only eight federal states have some form 
                                                 
44 Powell (1986) estimates that automatic registration could boost turnout by 14%, Burnham (1982: 139-40) 
concluded that leaving registration on citizens lowers turnout by 8-10%; however, Burnham did not think that 
the elimination of procedural barriers would increase turnout, has he blamed the decline in participation on the 
degeneration of political parties and the interest of the elites to maintain the status quo. 
45 Wolfinger and Rosenstone were not the only ones to identify complicated registration procedures as factors 
which have a negative impact on turnout – see also Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) or the earlier study of Gosnell 
(1927). 
46 For more on the issues associated with registration in the U.S. see Teixeira (1992), especially chapter four. 
47 The so-called ‘Motor Voter Act’ in force from 1995 made registration easier by providing uniform registration 
services through drivers’ license registration centres, public assistance and disability agencies and through mail-
in registration. For more details go to http://www.motorvoter.com/motorhome.htm (accessed 07/2007) and 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/nvra/activ_nvra.htm (accessed 02/2008). For a scholarly discussion see 
Wolfinger and Hoffman 2001. 
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of same-day voter registration.48 According to the U.S. think tank Demos such states recorded 
turnout higher by 10-12% during presidential elections of 2004 and elections in 200649 – 
available scientific research thus supports predictions of increased turnout.50 Data on hand 
suggests that creating voter-friendly registration, in the case of the United States, did indeed 
have a positive impact on turnout (even for voters between 18 and 24 years of age – 
Fitzgerald 2003) but at the same time has had no effect in levelling the socioeconomic 
discrepancies amongst the electorate as the ‘proportion of registered voters remained steady’ 
 usually the 
respons
76% whilst Franklin (1996: 218) using percentages based on the number of registered voters 
                                                
(Berinsky 2005: 483). 
 Another important phenomenon to keep in mind when talking about turnout and 
registration statistics (and, indeed, electoral turnout in general) is the fact that turnout rates 
can be calculated by using two varying techniques: either as percentages of registered voters 
or as percentages of voting age populations (VAP). It is obvious that in countries with 
automatic enrolment of the electorate the numbers of registered voters are generally the same 
as the voting-age population – thus measuring turnout based on registration is used in Europe 
because eligibility to vote and registration are virtually the same and is
ibility of the authorities (Powell 1986: 21) with the exception of France. 
Statistically to measure turnout by using the number of registered voters in countries 
with voluntary registration, such as the United States, can be misleading – as McDonald and 
Popkin (2001: 964) explain that if ‘registered voters were to be used as the denominator in the 
United States, comparisons between elections and among states would be confusing, because 
registration laws vary substantially’ and add that is ‘virtually impossible to gather accurate 
registration figures due to outdated registration rolls’. That is why, according to Lijphart 
(1997: 7) ‘the only proper turnout percentages both in absolute terms and for comparative 
purposes are those based on voting-age populations’; such numbers, however, may not always 
be available. The differences in results when using these two different methods can be quite 
substantial and thus give us very different numbers which can give the wrong message about 
the state of turnout in a given country: for example in his study of thirty democracies Powell 
(1980) using data based on voting-age population established that the average turnout rate was 
 
48 These seven states are Idaho, Iowa (as of January 2008), Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, 
Wisconsin and Wyoming. Connecticut enables voters to register on the same day of the election but only for 
presidential elections. On average, American voters must register at least one month ahead of elections. 
49 http://www.demos-usa.org/pubs/EDR%20-%2004%20Election%20info%20sheet%20011005.doc (election 
2004, accessed 07/2007); http://www.demos.org/page507.cfm (election 2006, accessed 07/2007).  
50 Percentage rates for same day voter registration oscillate between 8-15% (Teixeira 1992: 122, Wolfinger, 
Glass and Squire 1990); Teixeira, however, does not measure merely same-day registration but arrives at his 
result by taking into account other factors, such as weekend voting. 
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found that in 37 countries average turnout was 83%.51 And with calculations based on voting-
age data there can be another two types of inaccuracies which can further distort the results as 
Lijphart (1997) points out – the first is the inclusion of aliens with no voting rights and the 
second is, that even those who spoil or cast a blank ballot are statistically considered as 
voters. 
 McDonald and Popkin (2001) did in the case of the United States an interesting study 
regarding turnout. In their research they used neither voting-age population (VAP) nor 
registered voters to measure turnout but construct their own voting-eligible population (VEP). 
They point out that using the VAP as a basis for analysis proves to be misleading (contrary to 
Teixeira 1992: 25) as it includes ineligible (non-citizens, disenfranchised criminals, mental 
incompetents and those who do not meet residency requirements) and excludes eligible voters 
(members of the armed forces and Americans living abroad); their VEP index removes non-
citizens and felons whilst at the same time adding military personnel and U.S. citizens 
residing in foreign countries. McDonald and Popkin (2001: 965) by using the VEP index 
come to the conclusion that ‘noncitizens and ineligible felons, are segments that are 
increasing faster than the rate of population growth’ – the former has risen from 2% in 1966 
to 8% in 2000 and the latter before 1982 formed 0.5% of the VAP, in 2000 this was 1.4%. 
The authors find that there ‘are virtually no identifiable turnout trends from 197252 onward, 
and within the South there is a clear trend of increasing turnout rates’ (Ibid: 968). The 
apparent decrease of participation is given due to the way VAP is calculated, which is blind to 
the fact that the ineligible population has been increasing, not turnout amongst those eligible 
to vote. Comparing VAP and VEP numbers, the trend is clear – from 1948 to 2000 using the 
VAP the average national turnout rates were 48.68% whilst using the VEP they are 50.56%; 
the differences are the most noticeable from 1980 onwards where the margin oscillates from 2 
to 5% (and almost 6% in 2000) in favour of VEP. However, in spite of these corrections 
McDonald and Popkin agree that the United States has lower turnout than other democratic 
countries but point out that this is almost certainly due to the ‘institutional structure of the 
political system [federalist organisation, separation of powers and frequency of elections], not 
the psychology of the voters or the tactics of the parties and candidates’ (Ibid: 970). 
                                                 
51 Perhaps the timescale examined by both theorists may have also been significant – Powell looked at turnout 
during the 1960s and 70s, whilst Franklin studied participation from the 1960s to 1995. Due to high participation 
during the 60s logic would dictate that were Powell to extend his examination for another generation, the 
average turnout could be lower than 76%. 
52 This is the year the voting age was standardised to 18 by the 26th Constitutional Amendment – as a result this 
caused a noticeable slump in turnout between the years 1968-1972 (see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 57). 
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From the above discussion it is obvious that empirical data can be altered by numerous 
factors and that the method which one chooses to gain data may play an important factor in 
the result one arrives at. 
 
II-2-1-c-2: Absentee voting 
Making voting easier by using absentee forms of voting can also have a positive effect 
on turnout, or can depress participation in states that do not use such measures (Lijphart 2000, 
Wattenberg 2002). In particular, citizens tend to cast absentee ballots if the distance to the 
polling booths is considered to be an obstacle to the voting process (Dyck and Gimpel 
2005).53 In the U.S. 22 states permit absentee voting and this method seems to be becoming 
increasingly popular: Berinsky (2005: 474) notes that in the California 2002 general and 2003 
gubernatorial elections, absentee votes accounted to more than 25% of all ballots. In general, 
one can distinguish between three different methods the voter has to cast a ballot without 
actually turning up at the polling station: (1) postal voting, (2) proxy voting, (3) voting over 
the internet.54 
The possibility to vote by mail (postal voting) has generally positive effects on 
turnout, though especially CV proponents would argue that the increases are only mediocre: 
Franklin (1996: 226) claims that postal ballots increase turnout by 4%, as does Watson and 
Tami (2004); however Southwell and Burchett (2000: 76) maintain that these ballots boost 
participation by as much as 10%55.  
Proxy voting, i.e. when an elector chooses to delegate someone to vote on his behalf, 
is only possible during elections; it is mainly used, for example, in large corporations or 
sometimes in political assemblies. For the purpose of this thesis, the impact of proxy voting is 
insignificant. 
                                                 
53 Dyck and Gimpel also point out that early-voting and polling booths in untraditional places like shopping can 
have positive effects on participation. For more on early voting see Stein (1998) and Gronke, Galanes-
Rosenbaum and Miller (2007) for a debate disputing the positive effects of early voting on turnout. 
54 Another matter is when the polling station actually ‘comes’ to the voters: Hill (2007: 11) summarises the great 
pains Australian officials go to ensure virtually all people can vote  
55 For a further discussion refer to and Karp and Banducci (2000: 223) though these authors maintain that mail 
ballots ‘will not mobilize groups that traditionally participate at lower rates’ but cause a turnout increase of 3.6% 
amongst college graduates thus not having an effect on the socioeconomic differences, whilst Magleby (1987) 
suggested turnout increased for all socioeconomic groups. More research needs to be done in this field, as studies 
are limited to single states only (Oregon in the case of Karp and Banducci 2000 and Southwell and Burchett 
2000 and California in the case of Magleby 1987). 
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Democracies are still at the very beginning of unlocking the full potential of voting 
over the internet.56 At the present, e-voting is still rather rare, especially on the national level 
in parliamentary and presidential elections; however, this type of voting has been, for 
example, commonly used in the business sphere and political parties have also tried to benefit 
from this easy and cost-effective way – the French UMP party first enabled its members to 
vote over the world wide web in 2002, most recently in the 2007 presidential candidate 
primaries (Election-Europe 2007).57 Internet voting has also been used for example in Britain, 
the United States, Switzerland and has been well established for several years in Estonia. 
However, apart from Estonia, internet voting remains very much in the testing phase around 
the globe. 
The main reason why postal voting and voting over the internet are not in such 
widespread use, are still probably security fears: the secrecy of the ballot may be 
compromised and there is also a danger of election fraud. However, secrecy and security 
concerns have always been a part of the electoral process and can be compromised even 
during the traditional ways of counting ballots.58 The danger might indeed be higher when 
voting takes place by mail or over the internet but this might be more of a perceived danger 
than a real one given the established tradition of ‘going out to vote’. The fact that, for 
example, there has been a case of electoral fraud with postal votes in Great Britain in 
European and local government elections in 2004 is neither here nor there – it only shows that 
electoral fraud has not disappeared but accommodated itself to the changing conditions of 
voting. However, this problem is not a focus of this thesis and therefore I will not delve on it 
any further.59 
  
                                                 
56 I specifically do not use the term electronic voting as it may be misleading: electronic voting can not only be 
understood as voting over the internet, but primarily refers to voting using electronic means, i.e. automatic 
machines which include the use of punch cards or optical scan voting systems. To avoid confusion I use the term 
‘e-voting’ or ‘internet voting’. 
57 Election-Europe is a French non-governmental organisation campaigning for a more inclusive approach to e-
voting in France. 
58 Apart from security concerns there have been attempts to criticise absentee voting from the position that this 
practice limits erodes the community. Although the vast majority of people who argue against postal and internet 
voting would perhaps not sign up to the idea of compulsory turnout, their views are not completely incongruent 
with some arguments for compulsion, as one commentator (Johnston 2004) of the conservative British 
newspaper The Daily Telegraph demonstrated. He argued against postal voting by saying that ‘the simple fact 
that you must make a small effort to cast your vote at a specific place alongside your neighbours encourages the 
view that this a collective exercise.’ In other words, Johnston makes it clear that there has to be a sense of a 
collective and community, and this is facilitated through voting side-by-side your neighbour. Similarly 
Southwell and Burchett (1997: 53) point out that some critics of mail ballots ‘lament the loss of camaraderie or 
the polling place and emphasise the importance of such socialising experience for their children’. 
59 For more on internet and postal voting consult ACE The Electoral Knowledge Network website, 
http://www.aceproject.org (accessed 02/2008). 
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II-2-1-c-3: Weekend voting 
Another way how to increase voter turnout is to hold elections on weekends or during 
a national holiday, rather than weekdays.60 A yet different proposal is to stretch elections over 
the course over more than just one day. Currently, ’70 percent of established democracies’ 
hold elections over the weekend (Wattenberg 1998: 7) and some of them over the course of 
more than one day. 
Although these institutional changes have a ‘voter-friendly’ approach, doubts can 
easily be cast on their actual effectiveness. First of all, holding elections on weekends and/or 
holidays may as much of an incentive as a disincentive to vote – citizens may be tempted to 
use the day off (national holiday or weekend) rather for their own pastimes instead of voting 
(casting a ballot can hardly be described as a hobby amongst the general public).61 Another 
problem is that the importance of elections may be overshadowed by the prospect of a bank 
holiday. Different countries approach voting day differently – for example, in the United 
States as well as Britain national elections usually take place during working days and 
workers do not get any free time to cast a vote (in surveys a considerable amount of people 
cite the lack of time as a reason for non-voting) – this is partially blamed for the decline in 
voter turnout. It seems that the best bet is a system where both benefits can be implemented, 
i.e. more voting days, one of which will be a free day during which people can vote. In this 
light, for example the Czech Republic seems to incorporate the best of both worlds: elections 
are held on two separate days (2pm to 10pm on Friday and from 8 am to 2pm on Saturday); 
however, even with these seemingly ideal conditions, the country experiences rather 
oscillating turnout.62 Also surprising could be the fact that in ‘India, which keeps its polls 
open 4 days more than normal, this corresponds to a turnout that is 20 percent lower than in 
countries with only a single day of polling’ (Franklin 1996: 227). 
Franklin (1996: 227; 2002a) establishes the overall increase in participation thanks to 
weekend voting to 5-6% – in the wider perspective, however, this seems as something which 
is not that crucial in the determination of electoral turnout but is only one of a number of 
factors. However, to determine the exact significance of weekend voting or the impact of 
elections held on several days would require a meticulous empirical study, the likes of which 
                                                 
60 Wattenberg (1998: 7) describes the tradition to have an election on Tuesdays – as is the case in the United 
States, as ‘not user-friendly’. 
61 Wattenberg (1998: 22) proposes to hold elections on Veteran’s Day in November in the U.S. 
62 According to the Czech Statistical Office’s official election website (www.volby.cz, accessed 07/2007) in 1996 
76.41% of voters attended the parliamentary elections, in 1998 74.03%, in 2002 58% and in 2006 64.47%. 
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are not possible it this thesis. Determining the exact effects of weekend voting could be an 
interesting topic for further research. 
 
II-2-1-c-4: Voter fatigue 
Voter fatigue describes a condition of apathy amongst the electorate when voting 
becomes too common; this condition is especially true for countries with a high level of direct 
democracy which translates into the involvement of citizens in frequent decision-making or 
where elections take place frequently. As a result, first-order and especially second-order 
elections63 suffer from low rates of participation64 – current research supports the thesis that 
frequent elections lower turnout (Franklin 1996; 2002a; 2004, Gray and Caul 2000, Gray 
2003, Norris 2002, Wattenberg, 2002, Rallings, Thrasher and Borisyuk 2003).  
Switzerland with its many referenda and overall low voter turnout is frequently cited 
as an example of electoral fatigue as well as the United States – whereas American citizens on 
average are required to vote as much as two to three times a year, Swiss voters should show 
up six to seven times a year,65 and according to some estimates even more than a dozen times 
(Dalton and Gray 2003: 31).66 Indeed, as Wattenberg (1998: 20) remarks, ‘there can indeed 
be too much democracy’ (italics in original) and Dalton and Gray (2003: 37) point out that the 
public is now more often asked to make informed decisions in sometimes quite specialised 
areas, and all this is taking place in a decentralised governmental framework; this leads them 
to conclude that ‘[m]ore democratic choices may not be the same as better democratic 
choices’. 
But the high number of elections is something which is not confined only to 
Switzerland or the United States, at least not any more: recent research indicates that the 
overall number of elections in the West has increased substantially over the past couple of 
decades – for example, in the European Union citizens not only vote their representatives for 
the European Parliament but there has been a clear trend of regionalisation and 
decentralisation of power in the member states in accordance to the two EU principles of 
                                                 
63 The difference between first-order and second-order elections has been contested by van der Eijk, Franklin and 
Marsh (1996); the authors claim that first-order elections (parliamentary, presidential) can at times demonstrate 
some features of second-order elections and vice versa. 
64 Second-order elections generally seem to suffer from electoral fatigue and low interest – see BOX 2 on page 
for further details. 
65 For more on how frequency of elections can depress voter turnout in the U.S. and Switzerland, respectively, 
see Boyd 1981 and Wernli 2001. 
66 Dalton (1996: 46-7) showed that the differences between the number of votes can be huge: residents of 
Cambridge, England were asked to vote 4 times between 1985 and 1990 whilst the citizens of Irvine, California 
were called to the polling booth 44 times in 1992 alone. 
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subsidiarity and proportionality.67 Furthermore, as Franklin, van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 
(1996) show elections to the European Parliament held soon after national elections see a 
clear reduction in voter participation and Franklin (2003) additionally demonstrates how 
European elections depress national ones though he acknowledges this is ‘a price that needs to 
be paid for a necessary development [the curbing of the democratic deficit] at the European 
level’ (Ibid: 15) but should also be kept in mind when adding more institutions under control 
of the voters. 
Whilst Europe is still in the process of increasing the decision-making powers of its 
citizens, American voters already had the opportunity to have their voices heard in many 
matters from national (presidential, Congressional elections) to local importance (local 
referendums, electing school boards, judges, sheriffs etc.). ‘Since 1960 there has been a 
significant expansion of the electoral marketplace on almost every dimension. More people 
have access to the polls, vote more often, at more levels of government.’ (Dalton and Gray 
2003: 34). So whereas creating more voting opportunities for the public in the U.S. is nothing 
new, the expansion of various elections in Europe is a relatively recent phenomenon. As such, 
‘contemporary publics are making more choices at more levels’ (Ibid: 29), especially in the 
E.U. where voter opportunities have been not as many as in the United States.68 
The above examples neatly illustrate the paradoxical situation which develops from 
the drive to make institutions and government more answerable to the public – it quite on the 
cards that the democratisation of institutions (in terms of citizen decision-making) is a 
significant factor in generating voter fatigue. It has been suggested that the best way to limit 
voter fatigue without making significant cuts in the fields where citizens co-decide, is to 
reduce the number of elections (or referenda) by combining second-order elections with first-
order ones; it is logically assumed that once citizens do turn out at the polling station most of 
them will rather cast more than one vote than going to the ballot box, for example, in a week’s 
time.69 It seems therefore logical and also in line with rational choice theory that ‘concurrent 
elections will increase turnout since the benefit of voting now increases while the cost 
remains almost the same’ (Lijphart 1997: 11). It must be stressed that there is a fine line 
between circumventing voter fatigue and answering calls to increase the fields and institutions 
                                                 
67 These twin principles first appeared in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and basically mean that the central 
powers of the European Union will act only when ‘the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore … be better achieved by the Community’. Decentralisation 
was in part an answer to calls for the EU to curb the democratic deficit. 
68 Jackman (1987: 408) points out that unicameralism can have a positive effect on turnout, as is the case of New 
Zealand.  
69 Franklin (2002a; 2004) demonstrates that even national elections held in close proximity to one another also 
tend to record lower turnout rates. 
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are answerable to citizens – too much engagement can lead to cases of voter fatigue and too 
little participation can raise demands for the government to decrease the democratic deficit. 
However, even though frequent elections may decrease voter turnout, any expansion of 
decision-making makes the system more democratic. Indeed, in my eyes, the increase in co-
decision powers of the electorate is more important than high turnout at every election, 
regardless whether it is a first-order or second-order one. Low participation in itself need not 
be such an evil as proponents of compulsory voting argue – I will address this claim later on 
in the thesis. 
 
II-2-1-c-5: Proportional vs. majoritarian representation 
It is empirically proven that proportional representation (PR) generally engenders 
better turnout as elections calculated in this way are more likely to give voice to minority 
parties and secondly does not waste votes as the first-past-the-post system (Westminster, 
majoritarian) does; Norris (2002: 66) writes that ‘the basic type of electoral system is a 
significant indicator of turnout, with PR systems generating higher levels of voting 
participation than plurality/majoritarian systems’. 
In this light Burnham (1987: 106-7) found that single-member constituency systems 
had about 10-15% lower turnout than PR systems, Blais and Carty (1990) mention 7% higher 
turnout in countries using proportional representation, Powell (1980) claims in his study of 
thirty countries that PR systems have a 7.3% increase in turnout, Lijphart quotes a 7.5% 
increase (1999: 284-5), and Franklin (1996) establishes that participation in these countries is 
12% higher (see also Karp and Banducci 1999, Rose 2004, Blais 2006). ‘Proportional 
representation tends to stimulate voter participation by giving the voters more choices and by 
eliminating the problem of wasted votes …; this makes it more attractive for individuals to 
cast their votes and for parties to mobilize voters even in areas of the country in which they 
are weak’ (Lijphart 1997: 11).70 In the American context, Rose (1978: 45-6) points out that 
U.S. voters have ‘less choice than voters in any other Western nation’ because of the two-
party system and proportional representation would be thus better for the minorities to have at 
least ‘some representation’ (italics in the original, see also Wattenberg 1998: 20-1).71 PR thus 
seems to act as a genuine incentive for those citizens who would otherwise not have voted 
                                                 
70 Lijphart points out that the positive effects on voter turnout are more or less only felt in first-order elections; 
PR seems not to have any significant impact on second-order elections, like local or European Parliament 
elections. 
71 In this sense it is important to remember that many countries put thresholds, for example 5%, for parties to be 
eligible to be represented in parliament. Thus, a proportional system does not automatically mean that all 
minority voices will be heard. 
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under the Westminster (or majoritarian) election model (see also Franklin 1999: 211, Blais 
and Carty 1990). 
The sense of wasting one’s vote is particularly evident among citizens living in the so-
called safe-seat constituencies, i.e. in districts where the majority of its representative in 
parliament may be so large that it becomes futile to vote for an alternate candidate as he or 
she has realistically speaking no chance of winning.72 Indeed, in countries like the United 
Kingdom whole elections are often decided on a small amount of swing constituencies where 
majorities can be as little as a handful of votes – in this light Gosnell’s writes (1930: 14) that 
‘the character of the British system of representation does not favor a high participation in 
every election district. In those constituencies, in which one party is sure of victory, many 
electors regard voting as useless.’ Katz (1997: 240) remarks that ‘at the individual level only 
those voters who live in marginal districts are likely to feel that their votes are effective. 
Among PR systems, the higher the effective district magnitude, the more each voter is likely 
to feel that their votes are effective.’  
Proportional systems, although they do not waste votes as majoritarian systems do,73 
are not necessarily without their faults: as Brockington (2004: 472) points out, it is often 
claimed that PR brings about a paradoxical situation where incentives are matched by 
disincentives: there are more choices for voters (numerous political parties) but the resulting 
government is usually determined by negotiations amongst the elites – the voters do not have 
any say in the future governmental constellation and it may differ significantly from their 
expectations (unclear prospective choice) and it is also difficult for them to assign blame if 
things go wrong (complicated retrospective evaluation) (see also Powell 2000). Furthermore, 
it must be remembered that, unlike the Westminster model, there is no guarantee that the 
winner of the election will form a cabinet and furthermore most governments are dependent 
on coalitions – even a single party may thus cause the fall of the government, for example 
something rather common in post-war Italy. In addition, PR systems do not always guarantee 
that every minority will be represented as there are commonly thresholds to get into 
parliament, raging from 1 to 10% (Blais and Massicotte 1996: 62). 
Secondly, it has been suggested that the sheer numbers of political parties may be too 
large and actually act as a disincentive to turnout because it makes the system more 
complicated ‘and more difficult … for electors to make up their mind’ (Blais and Dobrzynska 
                                                 
72 One of the reasons why voter turnout in the British general elections of 2001 and 2005 had been low was 
because many citizens regarded the voting process as a foregone conclusion. 
73 For more on the problem of vote-wasting and the advantages of PR in this respect, see Douglas 1993, 
Banducci, Donovan and Karp 1999. 
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1998: 249) – this is why the authors cite only a 3% increase in turnout in their estimates; also 
Jackman (1987: 408), Jackman and Miller (1995) and Norris (2002: 69-72) found that 
systems with a substantial number of parties can depress turnout despite the generally positive 
effects of PR. Brockington (2004: 485) however contests such claims (though he concedes 
that empirical data on the subject is mixed) and shows that it is mainly the issue with the 
forming of a coalition that is the principle depressant in PR systems: ‘the negative impact of 
large party systems on turnout is directly related to the nature of coalition governments that 
they produce’, i.e. when there are more parties in the coalition than those needed for a 
parliamentary majority – in this case the voters of the major parties tend to drop out of the 
elections. 
In this respect the majoritarian system is much simpler: it is possible to distinguish 
between the winners and the losers in the election and decision-making can be facilitated by a 
narrower choice of (and perhaps ideologically very different) parties that have a realistic 
chance of gaining a majority in parliament. Furthermore, comparative research has shown 
that, on part of the political parties, the majoritarian system stimulates greater mobilisation 
and more personal campaigning by the candidates running for office than PR (Karp, 
Banducci, Bowler 2006); the parliamentarian elected for a particular constituency can be 
directly petitioned by all citizens living in the district74 – these factors may decision-making 
easier for the electors. In addition, strong independent individuals not linked to any party have 
a good chance of becoming members of parliament which is almost impossible in the 
proportional model. 
 
II-2-1-d: Political-cultural factors 
Whereas socioeconomic and institutional factors can be fairly accurately measured, 
determining the political-cultural factors which might have an effect on turnout is much 
hazier. This difficulty arises particularly due to the fact that variables which have an impact 
on participation are not only different from country to country but most of the times vary from 
one election to the other. 
                                                 
74 Another important factor that may have an affect on turnout is the size of the electoral district – generally 
‘smaller districts are generally associated with higher voter participation’ (Norris 2002: 68). The probable causes 
are the greater level of ‘intimacy’ between the representatives and their voters: there might be more knowledge 
of what sort of a person the parliamentarian is, what are his views, the daily interaction with other people, etc. 
On the electoral scale smaller districts have the ability to bring in the level of contact of closer contact of rural 
politics into state politics. This is probably the reason why Malta has good turnout results without making voting 
compulsory. 
 57
Proponents of compulsory voting often cite apathy as a common cause for low 
turnout; upon closer examination, however, it becomes evident that the term ‘apathy’ lacks a 
clear definition and is quite a vague concept in itself – again, it describes the state of affairs, 
not its symptoms. Voters can be apathetic for numerous reasons: personal problems may 
make voting difficult, people may not wish to go out because of bad weather, they might wish 
to spend their free time in a different manner, they may not find any candidates worthwhile, 
etc. There are many possible explanations similar to the ones I have mentioned, however, 
there is no space to examine them here. Instead of focusing on personal whims (which differ 
from individual to individual and are hardly possible to summarise empirically) it is more 
useful to concentrate on changes in political culture and identify key factors which can have 
an affect on turnout, positive or negative. In this light, current research seems to suggest four 
main causes of diminishing voter participation: (1) the disillusionment with traditional 
politics, (2) the lack of political education, (3) issues contested at the election, and (4) the 
loosening of the connection between voting and duty can be identified as generic depressants 
of participation in democratic societies.75 I will now deal with each issue in more detail. 
 
II-2-1-d-1: Disillusionment with traditional politics 
The steady drop of trust in politicians, political parties and governmental institutions 
(the declines are obviously linked to one another) has been evident throughout the democratic 
world in the past decades – the trend is obvious. For example Pharr, Putnam and Dalton 
(1999; 2000; 2001) show that trust in politicians and institutions has declined in the trilateral 
countries (Western Europe, North America and Japan) and this decline can be traced as far 
back as the 1960s in some nations (see also Dalton 1999; 2004 and Dalton and Wattenberg 
2000). This does not mean that that there are not exceptions where trust has actually risen but 
such instances – like the Netherlands or Denmark – are few and far between. Indeed, ‘there is 
a general pattern of spreading public distrust of politicians and government among the citizens 
of Trilateral democracies’ (Pharr, Putnam and Dalton 2001: 299) and a very similar picture 
can be witnessed in Australia (see Burchell and Leigh 2002). Such a situation leads Dalton 
(2004: 191) to argue that ‘[c]itizens in nearly all advanced industrial democracies are 
increasingly sceptical towards politicians, political parties and political institutions’ and as a 
result abstain from the electoral process (see also Clarke and Alcock 1989, Finkel 1985, 
Sabucedo and Cramer 1991). 
                                                 
75 Although this may not be a complete list of all possible reasons caused by shifts in political culture and may 
not be applicable to all states, these seem to be the most likely causes. 
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Different authors provide different reasons why citizens lose trust in politicians and 
political parties but all agree that it is most likely caused by a variety of factors and the 
interaction between them rather than any single issue. Leigh (2002) makes a list of seven 
reasons why people tend to lose trust in politicians – the World War II effect, poor leadership, 
the removal of incumbent governments, economic growth, declining interpersonal trust, 
declining respect for hierarchical institutions and the media. Newton (2006: 860) argues that 
while social capital is a necessary foundation for democratic support, economic and/or 
political performance is equally important and the erosion of trust occurs if countries perform 
badly despite high levels of social capital. ‘In general, social capital may encourage effective 
democratic government, which may encourage positive attitudes towards the operation of the 
system of government, but the link may be broken by poor performance’ and real-world 
problems. Dalton (2004) amongst the reasons which can engender distrust cites politicians’ 
behaviour and government performance, although he gives these factors only secondary 
importance, and focuses more on the decrease in political support on part of the citizens, the 
specialisation of public interests and the media. 
Scandals involving politicians, embezzlement of state funds, affairs, corruption, in-
party bickering and power games are always deemed newsworthy,76 especially because many 
citizens think of their elected representatives as people who should lead by example. So, to a 
certain extent the media can be blamed for the decline in trust, but only up to the point. After 
all, journalists are expected to provide the public not only information but to also act as 
watchdogs – without investigative journalism and easy access to news and information, 
particularly because of the internet, many scandals and corruption cases would have gone 
unnoticed. Nowadays news is much easier to come by – rather than there being more scandals 
than in the past, it seems that more of them are disclosed to the public by mass media. 
Furthermore, over the past generation there has been a shift in what the public regards as 
acceptable behaviour; as a result, politicians are likely to be held accountable for acts which 
would in the older days have gone mostly unnoticed. In addition, the dissemination of 
information was mostly under the control of political parties, whereas nowadays this has 
become the domain of mass media (Dalton 2002a: 188). 
 All of these events are probably symptoms of a broader evolution in democratic 
societies. To come back to what was mentioned above in the section on voter fatigue it is 
                                                 
76 By the same token reports of low turnout grab attention and, indeed, it has become almost an acknowledged 
truth that elections are plagued by low turnout and high participation, though admirable, has become regarded as 
something uncommon. I have already pointed this out in the first point of Part Two questioning decreasing 
turnout. 
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important to realise that – approximately at the same time when trust in parties and politicians 
began to wane – democracies experienced the widening of the spheres in which the citizen 
could politically express himself but at the same time would not be dependent on a political 
party to do so; it is important to point out that in the past party membership was the way to be 
meaningfully and efficiently politically engaged. Current research demonstrates that even 
though voters do not turn out at elections or trust their politicians this does not mean that they 
are disengaged from public life as many people still show a genuine interest in politics. A case 
in point might be that according to a Eurobarometer poll (2007: 51) 82% of young citizens 
living in the European Union (i.e. the age group which has been characterised in Part One as 
most likely not to vote) on average voiced their interest in politics and current affairs in their 
country.77 However, in order to have their voices heard, young citizens in only three out of 27 
E.U. countries chose at the top place to join a party (as a result of those who were politically 
active only five percent chose to work for a political party) – mostly the preferred option was 
to participate in a debate, sign a petition or to attend a demonstration. Even in the United 
States younger generations ‘are fed up with government and politics as usual, especially at the 
national level. They are less likely to support established political institutions, such as 
political parties, than are other citizens’ (Owen 2000: 638). So, whereas in the past decades 
trust in politicians has declined ‘[a]dherence to the norms and ideals of the democratic process 
have apparently increased over this same time period’ (Dalton 2004: 200) – we thus have 
reasons for optimism as the disenchantment with government and the political elites thus does 
not result in the loss of interest in politics or the loss of interest in democracy. Whether this 
directly translates into voting at elections is, obviously, a different matter.78 
Dalton (1984; 2006), Dalton, Flanagan and Beck (1984), Crewe and Denver (1985) 
and Inglehart (1990, chap. 11), are just some theorists who suggest that what we are currently 
witnessing is a fundamental transformation of citizenry and that the ‘old order is crumbling’ 
(Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984: 451) in industrial democracies as we are living through a 
rise of cognitive mobilization as an alternative to partisan mobilization – first of all voters are 
                                                 
77 Young people the most interested in politics and current affairs in their country were Greeks (89%), the least 
engaged were Romanians (68%) – even this is a relatively high result and seems to go against the premise that 
proponents of compulsory voting work with. Then again, it does not follow automatically that the fact that young 
people are interested in politics will result in high participation of this particular age group in elections. Another 
common truth is that respondents usually exaggerate when answering a poll, showing themselves in better 
colours. Refer to BOX 6. 
78 For a more detailed study of political inactivity see Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995: 129). The authors 
summarise the most cited reasons for political inactivity: lack of time (39%), a belief that self and family came 
before politics (34%); that politics had ‘nothing to do’ with the important aspects of the respondents life (20%); 
that politics ‘can’t help with my personal or family problems’ (17%); ‘as an individual I don’t feel I can have an 
impact’ (15%) and ‘for what I would get out of it, politics is not worth what I would have to put into it’ (14%). 
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becoming more educated and politically sophisticated, and secondly political information due 
to mass media, the internet and other channels is easier to come by (Dalton 1984; 2006). 
Whereas authors as Almond and Verba (1963; 1989), Eckstein (1966) and Putnam (1993)79 
argued that the government needed supportive citizens (i.e. educated, politically active and 
interested in current affairs, trustful and respectful of authority but at the same time able to 
criticise the elites) to function properly, nowadays it seems these people are being replaced by 
the critical citizenry. This process has to do with the extension of the fields in which citizens 
can become meaningfully active in the society, without the need to become party members for 
example by joining an NGO or various interest groups. Indeed, the rise of NGOs in the 
second half of the 20th century is unparalleled: this growth is especially remarkable in the 
spheres of the environment and human rights issues, although there has been development in 
other, more specialised areas as well. ‘There are now over 200 US NGOs associated with 
human rights issues, a similar number in the UK and across Europe, and expanding numbers 
of such organizations within the developing world’ (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 
1999: 67). As I said, specialist organisations do not solely deal with human rights’ issues or 
environmental problems – a case in point might be that in the United Kingdom the Royal 
Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) ‘alone now has more members80 than all the 
political parties put together’ (Keaney and Rogers 2006: 19). For example the British Power 
Inquiry (2006: 35) in what it dubbed the ‘Myth of Apathy’ found that ‘amongst the 
supposedly most apathetic … 37 per cent were members of, or active in, a charity, community 
group, public body or campaigning organisation.’ 
At the same time the traditional political party cannot (or does not want to) handle 
such a degree of specialisation without fundamental reform – indeed, the highly specialised 
some NGOs operate in may very well be unattainable on a partisan level. The expected result 
is that political parties lose support as it happened in Britain: where the ‘last couple of 
decades have witnessed a profound decline in people’s identification with a political party, 
and most researchers are in agreement that this process of ‘party de-alignment’ has been a 
very important factor in driving down voting rates’ (Keaney and Rogers 2006: 16). 
Continuing with the British example, in 1964 seventeen out of 20 people had at least a fairly 
strong identification with a political party. By 2001 only 11 out of 20 did so, and by 2005 the 
                                                 
79 Putnam puts forward four requirements for his civic community: political equality, citizen engagement, trust 
and tolerance, and the existence of civic associations. 
80 According to the RSPB’s website, it ‘is the largest wildlife conservation organisation in Europe with over one 
million members’. This quote is from ‘Introducing the RSPB’ 
(http://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/Introducing%20the%20RSPB_tcm5-58645.pdf, accessed 07/2006). 
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figure had fallen to less than 10 out of 20. The percentage of those who had a ‘very strong’ 
party identification fell from about 45% in 1964 to a mere 9% in 2005 (Sanders 2005: 5-6). 
The fall in party support is not just typical of the United Kingdom but a general 
phenomenon which we may witness in a number of advanced democracies as a study of 
parties and politics in 20 OECD nations shows (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Indeed, even 
Australia with its compulsory voting system has experienced the weakening of the link 
between party loyalties and the electorate; ‘reported rates of party identification in 1987 and 
1990 were at least as high as in 1967, but appear to have fallen by roughly 10 percentage 
points in the eleven years between 1990 and 2001’ (Jackman 2003: 275, esp. Table 16. 1) 
though on average identification remains high in comparison to other English speaking 
countries (United States, Great Britain, Canada and New Zealand).81 Another aspect 
connected to the decline in party loyalties and the associated losses in turnout is also closely 
linked to the loss of the powers of the unions, as Gray and Caul (2000: 1100-4) suggest. In a 
respect, this is just the other side of the coin, which deals with the loss of voters for left 
parties. According to them the diminishing importance of these groups together with 
traditional labour parties (both groups being closely connected) that were successful in 
bringing peripheral voters to the polls has reflected on the overall level of turnout as ‘nations 
that saw a decrease in unionization [10 from a total of 18 in their study] also saw the greatest 
average decline in voter turnout’ (Ibid: 1103). 
It is as though ideologically driven mass parties and labour unions seem nowadays to 
be a remnant of an earlier period representing no longer much great allure for voters as was 
the case in the past (providing that they indeed have any other reasonable choice). Nowadays, 
we thus have an active, critical and politically engaged civil society living in a system which 
is still governed by traditional political parties. Although parties do reform and some are 
successful at doing so (Tony Blair’s New Labour up to a point) the fact of the matter is that 
they are generally unable to (or not willing to) meet the expectations of the citizens which 
have risen faster than politicians can react. In effect, this is a good thing as criticism may 
instigate positive change. According to Dalton (2004) the critical citizenry strongly adheres to 
democratic principles and it is precisely this commitment which can be one of the factors that 
contribute to the erosion of trust. As a result of disillusionment citizens are not only less 
                                                 
81 Mackerras and McAllister (1999: 229-30) actually dispute this and claim that compulsory voting ‘fosters 
widespread loyalties towards the major parties’ (Ibid: 230) as only 12% of voters claimed not to have a 
partisanship in the 1996 election. I believe that the reasoning of this claim is difficult to prove as compulsory 
voting may very well distort the results. 
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willing to support political parties but also the establishment (for example by paying taxes or 
serving on a jury).  
 
Scepticism about politicians and political parties generally tends to discourage participation in 
conventional forms of electoral politics. If one thinks that parties are unresponsive to public demands, why 
should one try to influence parties or engage in partisan politics? Thus, it is not surprising that the erosion of 
political support is paralleled by a decrease in election turnout in most OECD nations. At the same time, these 
critical citizens are more likely to engage in elite-challenging forms of political action: signing petitions, 
attending demonstrations, and engaging in other protest activities. While partisan activities might be 
downplayed, there is a greater willingness to work with NGOs and public interest groups (Dalton 2004: 200). 
 
 It seems that the public has thus become much more discriminating than in the past 
and citizens have as a result shifted their interests away from political parties and trade unions 
to particular causes with which they can more readily identify. This could be caused in 
Keaney and Roger’s words (2006: 14) by the ‘replacement of traditional forms of political 
participation voting, by newer types, like boycotting goods, signing petitions and going on 
demonstrations, which are more in tune with the increasingly individualistic and consumerist 
nature of society’.82 
According to recent theories it seems that an increase in political knowledge 
(discussed in more detail below) can also affect the relationship between voters and political 
parties in two opposing ways: those who become independent can either be seen as 
sophisticated or as ignorant citizens. Dalton’s theory about the rise of the critical citizenry and 
the de-alignment with traditional politics (represented by political parties), or cognitive 
mobilization, seems to be strongly connected to the notion of political knowledge. Indeed his 
thesis only works when one thinks of the critical citizenry as a mass of sophisticated 
independents, who, thanks to advances in education and information technology, ‘now 
possess the political resources and skills that better prepare them to deal with the complexities 
of politics and reach their own political decisions without reliance of affective, habitual party 
cues or other surrogates’ (Dalton 2006: 3). This could also explain the reasons why political 
parties are becoming increasingly unpopular – it is because those abandoning them can make 
rational choices on their own; in eight democracies, political parties were trusted the least as 
only 22% of respondents expressed their confidence in them. Wattenberg (2002) argues that 
                                                 
82 However, Keaney and Rogers point out that people who are the most likely to take part in the new forms of 
political participation are those who vote on a regular basis anyway (see also Berinsky 2005). Obviously, they 
approach the subject from the point of view of compulsory voting; I do not believe that there is always causality 
between the two. 
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upheavals in the party system of G7 countries were behind the drops in turnout after the 1960s 
(and more recently behind the decline in most OECD nations with the exception of 
Scandinavian countries), the impacts of which we still feel today. Whether this trend will 
revert in time or political parties will slowly adjust is difficult to foretell with certainty. In any 
case, Dalton’s thesis sheds new light on the declines in participation and at the same time 
gives us some cause for optimism as it shows that people are not switching of, but are 
becoming more discriminating in their choices. 
The opposite approach to explaining the de-alignment of citizens with politics is to 
maintain that like Campbell et al. (1960: 143) do that the independents are not sophisticated 
citizens but rather people who lack political knowledge: ‘Independents tend … to be 
somewhat less involved in politics. They have somewhat poorer knowledge of the issues, their 
image of the candidates is fainter, their interest is relatively slight, and their choice between 
competing candidates … seems much less to spring from discoverable evaluations of the 
elements of national politics.’ This approach sees weakening partisanship as a sign of political 
disengagement. According to these theorists the truly engaged citizens support the established 
electoral system and so logically the system of political parties (partisan mobilization). 
Amongst the proponents of this stance one aside of Campbell et al. could mention Dimock 
(1998) or Milner (2002, chap. 3) whose reasoning, vis-à-vis the situation in the United States, 
is in line with Putnam’s (2000) thesis about the disintegration of social capital and the 
subsequent loss of engagement on the part of those with a lesser interest in politics. Turnout 
would then depend on the level of political knowledge as this theory assumes that, although 
critical at times, the citizens are generally supportive of the established democratic practices 
(government, elections, political parties, etc.). Although this explanation seems plausible, 
available evidence suggests otherwise: given the overall increase in education in democratic 
societies which often translates itself into political interest, and given the recent declines in 
turnout in some countries, I find it doubtful that this means that the non-voters are 
unsophisticated. Logically, this does not make sense (see also the chapter on political 
knowledge below). So, from the above debate it is evident that even though there most likely 
is a relationship between the disillusionment with politics and turnout, there is no consistent 
connection between turnout and the interest in politics as such. In other words, this runs 
counter to the claim that proponents of compulsory voting make, that in many countries there 
is a strong apathy towards politics and with lower education, that this translates itself into 
declining turnout. Available data seems to suggest that citizens are quite interested in politics 
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and political happenings, and that it is the disillusionment with the politicians and political 
parties which is taking its toll on participation as is the rise of the discerning critical citizenry. 
 
 II-2-1-d-2: Lack of political knowledge 
Whereas electors claim to be keen on politics, there seem to be substantial questions 
regarding their actual knowledge in these matters.83 It has been suggested that the lack of 
political education and the knowledge and information about current issues can affect the 
citizen’s choice whether to vote; Lassen (2005) shows that citizens who are politically 
informed are 20% more likely to vote – this reflects the words of Lijphart and other 
proponents of compulsory voting about the educational bias of voters as discussed in Part 
One, i.e. that better educated citizens are more likely to come to the poll. ‘The less a voter 
knows about government, the more likely it is that the person will judge representatives by 
their personal character instead of their political performance, and the less a voter knows, the 
less likely it is that he or she will vote’ (Popkin and Dimock 1999: 142, see also Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone 1980, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Larcinese (2007: 401) calculated on 
the example of British general elections of 1997 that informed voters are ‘6% more likely to 
participate’. Logically, younger voters will on average be less politically knowledgeable than 
their older counterparts – more confidence in one’s knowledge of matters political also means 
an increased likelihood of voting and therefore communication – both on the interpersonal 
and media level is important (Lin 2003, Kaid, McKinney and Tedesco 2007). 
Indeed, Milner (2002) maintains that it is more the level of civic literacy (political 
knowledge and reasoning) that accounts for the variations in turnout rather then the self-
professed claim to be interested in politics or any other subjective indicators; civic literacy is 
according to him the best predictor for the level of political participation in a given country. It 
therefore may prove useful to examine some of the research on the level of political 
knowledge in established democracies (most of which has been conducted on American soil). 
Scientists seem to be divided whether there has been a growth of political knowledge over the 
past decades or whether we are witnessing a status quo. The main differences are apparent 
when contrasting the situation in the United States and other democratic countries.  
 
 
                                                 
83 This does not necessarily mean that political knowledge is gained only in schools or through family 
interaction. For a discussion on this see Jerit et al. (2006) who focuses on the role of mass media and its effects 
on political knowledge rather then traditional studies which focus on race, class, education or gender. 
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 BOX 6: THE ENLIGHTENED ELECTORATE 
 
Such subjective claims are usually prone to inflation, for example because citizens 
might think that it is expected of them to be interested in politics and do not wish to lose 
face in front of interviewers, a variation of the so-called Hawthorne effect. (Clausen 1968, 
Katosh and Traugott 1981, Silver, Anderson and Abramson 1986).  Norris (2002: 175) 
citing studies from the United Kingdom, Sweden and the United States points out that such 
behaviour is rather common calling it a ‘systematic tendency to over-reporting’ and that 
the results may be off as much as 20% vis-à-vis expected and actual turnout; Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone (1980: 115) claim that the gap between surveys and reality was never less 
than 5 percent and at times came close to 20%, Karp and Brockington (2005: 825) report 
that the gap between official and reported turnout in presidential elections in the 1990s ‘is 
over 20 percentage points’, Traugott and Katosh (1979) claim that in the U.S. election of 
1976 this difference was 11%, Sigelman (1982: 49) found this difference to be 11.5% in 
the 1978 national election. Jackman (1999) found a similar pattern in Australia: according 
to his research, the reported voting rates of 88.8% in the event of the abolishment of 
compulsory voting are inflated (due to the fact that people responding to voluntary surveys 
are generally more interested in politics and thus more prone to vote) and would actually 
be more in the region of 50-60%. Karp and Brockington (2005: 827) who researched the 
over-reporting phenomenon in five countries note that ‘the likelihood of overreporting 
should decrease as the proportion of nonvoters increases’ as in ‘national settings with 
higher levels of participation, the tendency to overreport turnout may be greater than in 
settings where low participation is the norm’ (Ibid: 838). 
Although at times the gaps between reported and actual turnout may actually be 
rather large, Singelman (1982: 55) summarises his research by the remark that ‘our 
understanding of the factors that influence voting appear to be largely unaffected by the 
misreporting phenomenon’ and even when taking into account these fluctuations ‘one does 
not detect major compositional changes in the electorate’. 
For further studies on the over-reporting of turnout, see also Katosh and Traugott 
(1981), Swadle and Heath (1989) for the case of Britain or Andersson and Granberg 
(1997). 
 
Research by Campbell et al. (1960), Nie, Junn, Stehlik-Barry (1996) and Milner 
(2002: 44-7) found that the public in the United States is not very knowledgeable when it 
comes to politics and large portions of the electorate are either misinformed (Kuklinski et al. 
2000) or uninformed. When compared to the level of knowledge in Europe and other 
democracies, the U.S. does not fare very well as Delli Carpini (1999) and Milner (2002: 43-7) 
show. Popkin and Dimock 1999: 142) argue that ‘nonvoting in America … results from a lack 
of knowledge about what government is doing and where parties and candidates stand, not 
from a knowledgeable rejection of government or parties or a lack of trust in government’, 
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) state that despite the increases in educational level and 
information technology, political knowledge in the U.S. remains more or less the same as it 
was in the 1940s; Bennett (1995) produced similar findings on a narrower time-scale and 
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Converse (1964) claims that American political knowledge is fragmented and does not form 
an organic whole which would translate into reasoned ideas about electoral issues. This seems 
to be true despite the fact that in 1952 
 
over two-fifths of the American electorate had a primary education or less, and only a tenth had at least 
some college education. By 2000, the proportion of the electorate with some college education outnumbers 
voters with only primary education by a ten-to-one ratio, and those with some college-education make up almost 
two-thirds of the electorate (Dalton 2006: 2-3). 
 
Statistics of the U.S. Census Bureau (2006: 2) provide more insight when it comes to 
education and turnout – the number of voters who registered for the presidential elections in 
1996, 2000 and 2004, respectively, was 70.9%, 69.5% and 72.1%; of these 82.3%, 85.5% and 
88.5%, respectively, actually voted. In contrast, however, out of the overall voting-age 
population turnout was only 58.4%, 59.5% and 63.8%, respectively. The educational levels 
proved to be linked to turnout: ‘At each successive level of educational attainment, 
registration and voting rates increased. The voting rate of citizens who had a bachelor’s 
degree (78 percent) was about twice as high as that of citizens who had not completed high 
school (40 percent)’ (Ibid: 5). 
Within the American context Milner (2002: 49) notes that political ignorance is 
nowadays strongly tied to age: the younger are those most likely not to vote and illustrates 
this to the fact that this was not the case in the 1940s through to the 1970s; at that time young 
voters were as well informed, if not better, then their parents. And although individually, 
well-educated persons are more likely to vote ‘[e]arlier generations were less educated but 
more politically knowledgeable (and voted more)’. 
But what do these statistics prove? This evidence only supports the thesis that better 
educated citizens are more likely to vote; at the same time it seems to suggest that the rise in 
the overall level of education does not necessarily herald an increase in political knowledge, 
although one would and should expect some link between the two – people who are least 
likely to understand the intricacies of (American) politics are also least likely to be properly 
educated and by the same token registered to vote. But how does one account for the 
discrepancies between the level of education of voters and the fact that, for example, many 
U.S. citizens cannot distinguish the policy differences between the Democratic and 
Republican parties (Bennett 1995) or that less than half of all Americans know both the name 
and the party association of their representative in Congress (Jacobson and Kernell 1981)? 
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Why these results, when it has been proved that educated ‘citizens [more of which are in 
America nowadays] display substantially greater levels of understanding of the principles of 
democratic government, have a much better ability to identify incumbent local and national 
leaders, and can more frequently give the correct answer to questions about current political 
facts’ (Nie, Junn, Stehlik-Barry 1996: 31)? 
One cannot expect one easy answer. As Delli Carpini (1999: 14) puts it ‘there is no 
single portrait of the American citizen: a substantial percentage is very informed, an equally 
large percentage is very poorly informed, and the plurality of citizens fall somewhere in 
between’. I believe it is important to take into account that studies surveying political 
knowledge are carried out on the overall population, more than a quarter of which is not 
registered to vote. As a result, this segment of the population may depress the levels of overall 
political knowledge in the United States and add to its rather unimpressive statistics. Thus the 
gradual rise in the educational level of American citizens does not contradict Bennett’s or 
Delli Carpini’s and Keeter’s findings about the status quo of political knowledge in the United 
States, because the statistics seem to measure the political education of all Americans, but not 
all Americans are voters. Voting thus seems to be more concentrated with elitist behaviour. 
Indeed, as Delli Carpini (1996: 32) points out ‘it is nearly meaningless to talk about how 
much ‘the public’ as an entity knows about politics. While political knowledge levels are, in 
many instances, depressingly low, they are high enough among some segments of the 
population, and on some topics, to foster optimism about democratic possibilities.’ Some 
population groups (African-Americans, women) tend to possess political knowledge relevant 
to the issues which relate to them rather than a general broad political outlook, and this leads 
Delli Carpini (Ibid: 33-4) to suggest that political knowledge is generally concentrated 
amongst certain groups. ‘[D]ifferent socioeconomic groups are drawn to politics through a 
variety of distinct pathways, but … in the long run, differences in the ability, opportunity, and 
motivation to learn about politics in general outweigh differences in the ability, opportunity, 
and motivation to learn about specific domains of politics.’ 
When put into comparative perspective, citizens in other democracies around the 
world seem to have a better – though this does not necessarily mean high – understanding of 
politics than people in America. Milner (2002: 44) also points out this fact vis-à-vis turnout 
and shows that citizens with political knowledge are very likely to cast a ballot: ‘national 
differences in voter turnout reflect the fact that political knowledge figures for Great Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, though low, appear to be considerably higher those for 
similar surveys in the United States’. Partially, this may be attributed to the fact that, for 
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example, in Europe the institutions seem to be more forceful when engaging the electorate. As 
a result information is easier to come by and thus voters have an incentive to be more 
engaged. 
The differences between the United States and other parts of the world may also be 
attributed to the rise of independents already discussed above. As it has been established, the 
citizens who feel alienated from political parties may either be the ignorant simpletons or 
sophisticated independents. Could it be that independents in the United States belong to the 
former type (partisan mobilisation) and those in other democracies seem to belong to the latter 
one (cognitive mobilisation)? Research is inconclusive on this part: Dimock (1998) in line 
with Campbell et al. (1960) asserts that the decline of partisanship in America has taken place 
amongst the more politically ignorant and less sophisticated parts of the electorate. Milner 
(2002: 40) also seems to think that American non-partisans could well be ignorant citizens 
and cites an example between the United States and Sweden – whereas from the 1960s in the 
U.S. ‘turnout and levels of political knowledge have been declining together’ and as a result 
those who switch their political party allegiance are likely to be poorly informed about 
politics; however, the independents in Sweden are not always apathetic or ignorant citizens 
and therefore campaigns are geared towards the involved and knowledgeable independents. 
Indeed, within the European context Inglehart (1990: 366) and Dalton (2000a: 26) find that 
the percentage of sophisticated independents (most of which come from the younger 
generations) has increased significantly over the past decades. ‘The percentage of non-
partisans in the pooled European analyses increases from 30 per cent in 1976 to over 40 per 
cent in the 1990s’. 
Dalton (2000a: 32-3) presents a rather different view of non-partisans in the United 
States: according to him the rise of the critical citizenry in Europe has been evident in 
America as well: according to him the number of sophisticated independents (whom he calls 
‘Apartisans’) rose from 10% in 1952 to 18% in 1992, while during the same period the 
number of ignorant non-partisans rose by only 3%. The rise of sophisticated non-partisanship 
in America is, according to Dalton (Ibid: 30-1), especially true amongst the young, who are 
also more educated and politically sophisticated people (see also Beck 1984); such findings 
however seem to contrast with Milner’s claim that political ignorance is prevalent especially 
amongst the young in the U.S. Apartisans – who currently form about one fifth of the 
American public – thus challenge the Campbell’s (1960) traditional portrayal of the ignorant 
non-partisan. 
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[T]he modernization of American society over the past five decades has transformed the public. 
Expanding educational levels, increased access to political information … and even the growing role of 
government have produced a process of cognitive mobilization that expands the political skills and resources of 
the average citizen. ... Consequently, …an increasing share of the public approaches politics with a greater 
ability to judge the candidates and issues independent of habitual party loyalties (Dalton 2006: 15). 
 
As one can see, research remains undecided on the level of sophistication of the 
American non-partisans. However, this does not disqualify the strength of the argument that 
there is a strong link between education and voter turnout. So how does one account for the 
fall of turnout apparent throughout democracies when education has become more widespread 
and available? Perhaps the problem could be related to the fact that education does not 
necessarily equal political knowledge. It is evident that the lack of education has a negative 
impact on turnout and little or no knowledge in political matters can depress participation 
even further. It is equally true that the increase in education does not automatically mean an 
increase in political knowledge, but this at the present should only be treated as a weak link as 
such claims would need to be verified by further research. 
Presented evidence also seems to suggest that the increase in knowledge can lead to 
the disillusionment with the current political system and to the adoption of a more critical 
attitude, as discussed in the passage above about the critical citizenry. We might be 
witnessing broader changes in society with the rise of a new citizenry who are unsatisfied 
with the system. As a result of these critical approaches and evident dissatisfaction with how 
things are run, citizens may choose to boycott traditional parties based on ideological lines 
(evident from the increase in previously mostly unheard of independent candidates and new 
specialised political parties such as the Greens) which results in plummeting turnout (it is 
perhaps that knowledge brings the unwillingness to blindly follow the main political parties 
and this results in a decline in turnout). Again, it is perhaps too early to establish whether this 
is true as more research and time is needed to establish this with certainty. However, there is 
no mistaking that the lack of political knowledge (and knowledge in general) is a factor which 
has a negative impact not only on turnout but other factors as well.84 
 
II-2-1-d-3: Interest in the election 
Voter turnout can be seriously affected by the overall mood of an election, whether 
voters feel that there are serious issues at stake, the polarisation of the political scene, 
                                                 
84 For example Nie, Junn, Stehlik-Barry (1996: 31-8) argue that political education has an important impact on 
political tolerance. 
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‘closeness of the race and the decisiveness of an election’ (Franklin 2002b: 25, see also Blais 
2000, Franklin 2002a, Abramson, Diskin and Felsenthal 2007). As Balinger (2007: 9) points 
out ‘the US Presidential election of 2004 (which produced the highest turnout since 1968) and 
the French Presidential election of 2007 indicate that a polarised electorate, and the sense that 
something is stake at the election, can raise turnout to historically high figures’. Even in a 
generally low turnout country like the United States there can be cases of high turnout, like 
the 1992 Louisiana gubernatorial primary contested by an ex-Ku Klux Klan member 
(Franklin 1996: 221). By the same token the prospect of fair and free elections can prove to be 
a strong incentive for citizens to show up – this was the case after the fall of communism in 
Eastern Europe, after the abolition of the apartheid regime in South Africa and more recently 
in the 2005 Iraqi election which people attended despite the generally unfavourable security 
situation. Such instances when percentage figures suddenly rise are not as uncommon as 
many people tend to think and even though there has been somewhat of a decline in turnout 
around the globe, citizens can be brought out of lethargy when confronted with, what they 
deem, crucial issues. By the same token, when pre-election polls seem to suggest that the 
contest is a foregone conclusion many voters may feel unmotivated to cast a ballot – it is 
believed that this feeling played an important role in the UK general election of 2001 and 
2005; at that time many voters, correctly, believed that the Labour government will have no 
problems in keeping its majority in the House of Commons and many had the impression that 
the whole of Britain became a ‘safe seat for Labour’.  
 The nature of election campaigning and the polarisation of the political scene can also 
have a strong effect on turnout: Aarts and Wessels (2002) demonstrate on the examples of 
Norway, the Netherlands and Germany that political interest has the strongest impact on 
turnout, even more than education. According to them the polarisation of ideas is important in 
bringing citizens to the polling booths as it ‘makes a difference whether political parties offer 
alternatives or not or whether a race is close or not’ (p. 11). In a much similar vein, Pacek, 
Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2006: 21-2) argue that the increases and decreases in turnout in 
post-communist countries have more to do with the fact that ‘citizens appear to be choosing 
which elections to participate in on the basis of the stakes of the election’ instead of being 
disenchanted and that they ‘will participate in greater numbers in elections where there is 
more at stake’ (Ibid: 6).85 This coincides with the research of Franklin, Lyons and Marsh 
                                                 
85 The authors also use this ‘stakes-based’ approach to explain the initially high participation levels in the first 
elections after democratisation and the subsequent decline in turnout – participation is always higher when there 
are fears of the loss of democracy. 
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(2004) who focus their study on the falling turnout amongst younger voters: the authors find 
that it is mainly the interest in the election, that drives young cohorts to the polling booths not 
the character of society or its members – the authors maintain that due to the fact that 
elections have become less competitive, less likely to bring about policy change.  
Another aspect which I have talked about and related to the issue of polarisation is the 
effect of attack advertising on turnout, which in Part One was claimed that it can have a 
negative effect on voter turnout. This is the view supported by the research of Ansolabehere 
and Iyengar (1994; 1995) on the example of the United States – they maintained that ‘attack 
ads can be and are used strategically for demobilization’ (1995: 9) and as such depress 
turnout. It seems somewhat logical that attack advertising should act as a deterrent for voters, 
however, detailed examination reveals that research on this subject differs widely. Lau and 
Sigelman (2000: 32) are very careful in their approach and maintain a ‘very cautious 
‘perhaps’’ to the connection between negative advertising and the lowering of turnout. 
According to the authors this might be caused by the fact that political attack advertisement is 
generally less liked and regarded as less ethical than advocacy advertisements86 but as to the 
actual efficiency find that ‘political attack ads are no more effective than advocacy ads’ (Ibid: 
36) .87 They maintain that attack advertisements may have ‘unhealthy’ consequences for a 
democracy but also claim that this would only have impacts of ’very small magnitude’ (Ibid). 
Wattenberg and Brians (1999), on the other hand, voice their opposition to Ansolabehere and 
Iyengar’s findings in a much more resolute matter. They call their research ‘deeply flawed’ 
and lacking any ‘clear evidence’ (Ibid: 893). Indeed, they maintain that negative advertising 
does not decrease turnout and if ‘negative commercials persuade voters that the choice 
between the candidates is an important one, then they are likely to increase than decrease 
turnout’ and generally reject the thesis that negative advertisements demobilise the electorate. 
Their research was more recently supported by the findings of Goldstein and Freedman 
(2002) who found that attack advertising more likely stimulated interest for an election which, 
as a result, was also deemed as more important by the citizens. 
 
II-2-1-d-4: Voting as a duty 
The weakening of the perception that voting is a civic duty is also cited as one of the 
causes of declining voter turnout; especially proponents of compulsory voting have very 
                                                 
86 Ballinger (2006: 18 and footnote 76) points out that in the British 2005 general election a poster accusing then 
prime minister Tony Blair of lying about the war in Iraq ‘harmed, rather than helped, the Conservative 
campaign.’ 
87 Lau and Sigelman present a review of literature on this subject in Table 2-4 on pages 33-5. 
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strong feelings about this particular matter. As I have already mentioned in Part One this 
‘voting norm’ is especially prevalent amongst the older generations and as Blais (2000) 
suggests, if people feel that they have a duty to vote, this is most likely to happen as they 
become older. For example, in Japan ‘early postwar generations saw voting as a duty rather 
than a right. Younger people today, however, overwhelmingly view voting as a right: in the 
25 to 29 year-old age group, for example, 57 percent of respondents in one study saw voting 
as a right, while only 35 percent called it a duty’ (Pharr 2002: 838). A similar situation 
happened in the United Kingdom – Ballinger (2006: 6) points out that the ‘British Election 
Study shows that the perception of voting as a duty rises with age: only 56 per cent of 18-24 
year olds regard voting as a duty, whereas 92 per cent of the over-65s do so’. However, even 
given these statistics ‘data for the 1994-2001 period reveal that very large majorities of British 
citizens believed that voting is a civic duty … [T]he fact that at least two thirds of the 
electorate still regard voting as a duty suggests a relatively high level of psychological 
engagement with the political system’ (Clarke 2004: 287). This research does mention which 
socioeconomic group dominates the one third of citizens who do not view voting as a duty, 
but one may suspect, again, that young citizens (as well as poorer and less educated members 
of the electorate) will be strongly present. Topf’s (1995: 45) research indicates that this is 
indeed the case as ‘the youngest electors are less likely to vote than older electors’. It seems 
that younger citizens seem to regard voting primarily as a right and only secondarily as a duty. 
The question remains whether, as they grow older, they will develop a sense of duty. 
Research however suggests that the non-voting habit will probably ‘stick with them’ even as 
they age and that voting behaviour is a difficult habit to change and that the first three 
elections are on average decisive whether a person will be a voter or a non-voter; there is little 
movement between the two camps past this point (Putnam 2000, Miller and Shanks 1996, 
Plutzer 2002, Franklin 2004, Delli Carpini 2000, Franklin Lyons and Marsh 2004). Such a 
claim goes against Topf’s assertion that his research did not find ‘evidence of any general 
trend towards an increasing difference between these groups over time’ (1995: 45). 
However, independent on these findings, Blais (2000: 104) discovered a strong 
correlation between the sense of voting as a duty and turnout. According to his research the 
sense of duty ‘is an important consideration for most voters’; Rosenstone and Hansen (1993: 
147), on the other hand, come to an altogether different conclusion and one which does not 
put much importance on the fact whether someone feels it is his or hers obligation to cast a 
ballot – according to their research those who felt a strong sense of civic duty were only 6% 
more likely to vote than those who did not. It would seem thus logical that the absence of a 
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voting norm depresses turnout, however, such findings do not seem to fit the United States 
where turnout in light of recent data remains typically low – according to the Pew Research 
Center (2007: 49) for the past two decades the ‘vast majority of Americans continue to see 
voting as a duty, and most say they feel guilty when they do not get a chance to vote. Nine-in-
ten agree that it is their “duty as a citizen to always vote”.’ However, in the case of the United 
States turnout is low because of other factors which have already been discussed in the pages 
above. In the United Kingdom the two thirds who feel it is their duty to vote roughly 
corresponds to the turnout numbers in the 2001 and 2005 general elections and a similar patter 
can be detected in unified Germany from 1990 onwards – turnout hovers around 80% 
(International IDEA 2004: 61) which approximately represents the number of people who feel 
it is their duty to vote, 86.1% (see Mochmann 2003: 156). And although research suggests that 
older people are more likely to regard voting as a duty and thus are more likely to vote, this 
does not mean that the young generations, like for example in Canada, do not realise the 
difficulties in attaining universal suffrage or the importance of voting – they only have strong 
doubts about voting as an effective mechanism of political change (Chareka and Sears 2006). 
In this light it might prove interesting to see, whether there is a connection between the 
sense of voting as a citizen’s duty and CV: recently Denk (2007) analysed this question. 
When comparing European countries he found are ‘in general no strong correlations between 
the institution of compulsory voting and sense of citizen obligation’ (Ibid: 12). Even more 
fascinating is his comparison between Canada and Australia: his analysis indicates that ‘the 
sense of citizen obligation is stronger in Canada than Australia’ (Ibid: 13); his findings lead 
him to conclude that the connection between compulsion and a voting norm are ‘overall 
weak’ though CV does seem to have an impact on culture – both positive and negative. 
However, this problem has already been addressed and it is therefore not necessary to 
examine it in further detail. 
 
II-2-1-e: Summary – Declining voter turnout? 
Voter turnout has somewhat declined – that much is true. It is impossible to list all 
factors that depress participation as they will significantly differ from country to country, 
from one democratic system to another – whilst in some states registration may depress 
turnout, in others it might be the first-past-the-post system and in others still the age of the 
electorate, or the importance of elections. More often than not, it is going to be more than one 
factor; most probably it will be a combination of several things which affect turnout. 
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Although generally speaking many established democracies have been experiencing 
somewhat lower rates of turnout in recent years, it is rather premature to assume that this is a 
general trend as Aarts and Wessels (2002) emphatically point out; the authors maintain that 
two factors that can significantly alter the outcome of research: the time-frame and type of 
elections being examined. They also add that each election is unique and that there are many 
variables related to turnout in any particular vote. In this light, relatively high turnout figures 
(especially if there is a sense of importance of the election and a polarised electorate) are not 
that uncommon as we sometimes are led to believe – proponents of compulsory voting tend to 
overlook these cases and news reports about high turnout do not make a particularly thrilling 
read as opposed to reports of abysmally low participation figures and a crisis of democracy. I 
believe there is reason to be optimistic: the findings that people are less involved in elections 
but not necessarily less involved with the world around them means that citizens are not 
losing interest in public matters which are very important within the modern democratic 
framework. The fact that they do not express themselves by voting at elections might be 
caused by other reasons other than voter apathy and indeed be the signal the beginning of a 
more fundamental change in society where traditional political and party systems are losing 
their allure to the now emerging critical citizenry. It is difficult to establish what the future 
holds in store for the democratic system: will the party system prevail in the end or will 
representative democracy be replaced by a more independent system of representation? In any 
case it is evident that changes are taking place and although there has been a decline in 
turnout this does not have to signal a crisis of democracy. 
This chapter, which dealt with institutional and political-cultural factors affecting voter 
turnout, together with the socioeconomic causes discussed in Part One, meant to illustrate that 
the problems in the assessment of the decline in participation are not a matter of black and 
white approach but that the situation has many different shades of grey and as such is much 
more complex and fragmented than one could be left to believe by some theorists. The 
institutional and political-cultural factors I have described in the pages above are (together 
with the socioeconomic factors) have an important effect on turnout. Indeed, the various 
reasons underlying turnout rates show that the crude generalisations made by CV supporters 
are artificial and blind to specific causes. 
 
 
 75
II-2-2: Low turnout does not cause unequal representation 
II-2-2-a: Introduction 
The proponents of compulsory voting argue that low turnout is bad because it causes 
unequal representation – the young, the poor and the less educated are the least likely to vote 
and thus worsen the prospects of being adequately represented in a democratic assembly, such 
as the parliament. In the case of a parliamentary democracy this means letting others decide 
for you. Due to the fact that these often excluded groups would very likely cast a ballot for 
social-democratic (centre-left and left) political parties, these parties are at a disadvantage as a 
result low voter turnout. For democratic theory this translates into the under-representation 
and the disadvantage of these groups vis-à-vis other segments of society which results in 
worse life-chances. For advocates of compulsion, universal turnout should be the aim of every 
democracy and the next logical step after achieving universal suffrage. They maintain that 
high and equal turnout brings about more legitimacy to the system and is ultimately beneficial 
to the ‘health’ of a democracy. 
The aim of this chapter is to cast these claims into doubt and to argue that election 
results achieved in a low turnout democracy most often will not be different even under 
universal or near-universal rates of participation.  
 
 II-2-2-b: The left does not suffer from low turnout 
It is often claimed – by Crewe (1981: 253), Lijphart (1997) or Pacek and Radcliff 
(1995; 2003), Bohrer, Pacek and Radcliff (2000) amongst others – that left-of-centre parties 
suffer as a result of low turnout, and that this causes unequal representation for certain groups. 
This theory works with two main assumptions: (1) that most non-voters – who, as we have 
established, hail from the less educated, poorer and younger spheres – would vote for social-
democratic parties and policies, and it logically follows from this claim (although not 
expressly stated) that (2) countries with compulsory voting legislation will be more 
responsive towards social policies, as power will be more balanced between the left and the 
right. Both suppositions, however, manifest a weak link between what they say and what is in 
actual fact reality. 
The first supposition is built upon a big ‘if’. CV advocates seem to take for granted 
that, if universal turnout were to be achieved (the only way to do this is, realistically speaking, 
by institutionalising compulsory voting), non-voters would predominantly vote left-of-centre 
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parties, as Pacek and Radcliff, Lijphart and Crewe hypothesise. Recent studies have, however, 
somewhat cast this claim into doubt: Tóká (2002: 50) finds the rise of votes for left parties 
with increasing turnout as rather insignificant: ‘for every one percent increase in turnout, a 
left-wing party can expect a change in its vote share anywhere between a one-hundredth of a 
percent loss and a three-hundredths of a percent gain’ (italics in original text); other available 
research, most of which has been written within the American context (Brunell and DiNardo 
2004, van der Eijk and van Egmond 2006, Highton and Wolfinger 2001) confirms that higher 
or lower turnout would have only a negligible effect on party strength and it is thus highly 
improbable that results would be effected.88 In the United States, Tucker, Vedlitz and 
DeNardo (1986) found that universal turnout would benefit only minority parties as these 
currently suffer as a consequence of low turnout but again would not bring any substantial 
gains to Republicans or Democrats. The research of Citrin, Schickler and Sides (2003: 84) on 
the other hand finds that Democrats (though not a left party in the traditional continental 
sense) would generally profit from universal turnout, but even then this would only rarely 
change election outcomes as ‘full turnout would likely change only a handful of outcomes;89 
the main problem being that elections suffer from the lack of competitiveness. Also Highton 
and Wolfinger (2001: 179) show that universal turnout would bring only ‘modest changes’ 
and would not constitute such a great benefit to the Democrats; furthermore, due to its 
heterogeneous nature the ‘party of non-voters’ is already represented by that section of the 
population which votes, meaning that ‘since voters’ preferences differ minimally from those 
of all citizens’, it would make no difference to the results of an election if ‘everyone voted’. 
Though Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980: 111) give evidence of the demographical 
differences between voters and non-voters, they come to the conclusion that ‘these 
demographic biases do not translate into discernible overrepresentation of particular policy 
constituencies’. Teixeira (1992: 104), whilst pointing out the undesirable effects of low 
turnout also in the end is forced to acknowledge that ‘most electoral outcomes are not 
determined in any meaningful sense by turnout and are not likely to change through even 
highly implausible levels of nonvoter mobilization. It appears therefore that nonvoting does 
not as a rule make much of a difference to election outcomes’ and says that ‘not much’ would 
happen if ‘everybody came’ to vote (Ibid: 95). In a similar light, Verba, Schlozman and 
                                                 
88 However, exceptions are sometimes possible: Wattenberg and Brians (1998) find that in the elections of 1994 
registered non-voters would have voted more for Democratic candidates and estimate that the Republicans 
would have lost 24 seats and thus a majority. 
89 Under full turnout for the Senate the ‘Democratic candidate’s percent of the vote increases by an average of 
1.5 percentage points in 1994, 1.3 points in 1996, and .15 points in 1998’ (Citrin, Schickler and Sides 2003: 82). 
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Brady’s study (1995: 205) supports the conclusion ‘that voters and non-voters do not seem to 
differ substantially in their attitudes on public policy issues’. 
As I already pointed out, it could be argued that the United States does not have a 
typically ‘left’ party but, again, research of any quantity on this subject has on the whole been 
made in America and is scarce in other parts of the democratic world – a few countries where 
scholarly studies have dabbled on this subject was, for example, Canada and Norway. In the 
case of Canada, which in contrast to the United States has a traditional left, labour oriented 
party, Rubenson et al. (2007) proved that the assumption that universal turnout will increase 
the left’s share of the vote is not relevant and that the results of a simulated universal turnout 
would be consistent with data from America. ‘Had everyone voted in Canada in the 2000 
general election, the NDP, the traditional party of the left, would have gained .2 percentage 
points, moving from 9.9 to 10.1 percent. … Likewise, the shares of votes for the rest of the 
parties do not change markedly’ (Ibid: 448). However, as the authors point out, the difference 
in results may be more evident in countries with stronger class voting; this is in line with the 
suggestions made by Pacek and Radcliff (1995). Such would be the case of Norway – a study 
of whether the Norwegian Labour Party suffers from low turnout in local elections also 
showed some interesting results. Whilst support for the party from the 1960s has declined 
much as turnout has, Saglie and Bjørklund (2004) found ‘no systematic support’ that the 
Labour party as such suffers from declining turnout; according to their research ‘declining 
turnout is not necessarily the cause of declining support for the Labour party’. Instead, the 
authors point out that these events may be caused by broader changes in the society, 
something which I have already discussed in the previous chapter. In other words, their 
findings undermine the claim made by proponents of compulsory voting that declining 
turnout directly damages social-democratic parties and, by that same token, their traditional 
voters as lower turnout and lower support for social-democratic parties do not necessarily 
have to be linked together. It is important to keep such a possibility in mind, as CV advocates  
do not even consider such a possibility but immediately attribute diminishing support for the 
left as a result of low electoral participation. Similarly as in Norway, Martinez (2005) finds 
that were turnout higher the outcomes of the 2001 general election in the United Kingdom 
would not change the results as the Labour Party would have won anyway. And a much larger 
research of 25 democracies by Bernhagen and Marsh (2004: 17) supports the same premise – 
there is no evidence that ‘left, right, or centre parties gained systematically from full turnout 
scenarios’. 
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Czesnik (2007) examined the impact of CV on the 2001 Polish general election and 
concluded that, were each citizen to participate, the hypothetical result would be exactly the 
same as the official one, at least vis-à-vis the winners and losers: ‘Although many more 
citizens would have voted, the winner of the election would have been the same’ (Ibid: 19) – 
the differences would be at maximum 2%. The research of Hooghe and Pelleriaux (1997: 5-
10, quoted in De Ceunick, Devos, Reynaert, Valcke and Verlet 2007: 9) also supports the 
assumption that compulsory voting does not make that much of a difference one the overall 
results; the authors, both supporters of CV, examined the hypothetical effects of the abolition 
of compulsory voting in the Belgian region of Flanders but were forced to conclude that the 
‘political shift would be fairly limited’ (Ibid), i.e. not relevant in the formation of the 
executive, and at the same time found that the cancelling CV would lead to the under-
representation of women and the less-educated. 
Let us not, however, only dabble on existing research but try and see the effects of CV 
for ourselves. A case in point can be empirically deducted from how compulsory voting 
changed the situation in Australia – the following evidence can come somewhat of a surprise 
to supporters of CV. The Labour party formed a government four times from 1901-1913; was 
shortly replaced by the Liberals in 1913, but was back in power from 1914 to 1917; from 
1917 to 1929 Labour went into opposition and Australia was governed by Nationalists. After 
these dates Australian politics were governed interchangeably by Labour and by 
Nationalist/Liberal coalitions with the number of elections won being more on the Labour 
side but the number of actually formed governments on the conservative side. In the last pre-
compulsory voting election in 1922 turnout was 56.36% and Labour won with 42.3% but was 
forced into opposition after the Nationalists formed a coalition with the Country Party 
(together they received 47.79% of votes – 35.23% and 12.56%, respectively). In the first 
election with compulsory voting in 1925 turnout was 91.39% with Labour winning 45.04% of 
the votes but, again, was unable to form a government because the Nationalist and Country 
parties created a coalition with 53.2% of the votes (42.46% and 10.74%, respectively). The 
results show that Labour’s gain was minimal and it was the National party that gained most 
out of the institutional change in the electoral system where suddenly 38.03% more citizens 
came to cast their vote because of CV legislation. So, I ask, where are all the ballots the left 
should have gained? Should not the introduction of compulsion have shown a dramatic 
increase in the preferences for the social-democratic, i.e. Labour, party, as there were so many 
new voters (former non-voters, i.e. the young, the poor and the uneducated) who logically 
should have voted for the left? There indeed is something rather illogical about the whole 
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claim. The Australian example is just another piece of evidence suggesting that the situation 
vis-à-vis compulsory voting is not as clear cut as its proponents often take for granted. My 
findings are, at least in the case of Australia, validated by the research of Chong, Davidson 
and Fry (2005: 14-6) who also show on more recent election data (1996-2004) that the ‘same 
government would be elected under either a compulsory voting regime or a voluntary voting 
regime’ and present data that proves that under a voluntary voting system there would have 
been a ‘greater representation of left-leaning parties’ (the Democrats and the Greens) than 
under current electoral practice. Even Mackerras and McAllister (1999: 227-9), though they 
point out that Labour gains from the system of compulsion (while right-wing parties lose), the 
results of elections would only change probably in a ‘closely fought contest’ (Ibid: 229) as 
‘the impact on the vote for leftwing parties is usually slight’. 
As Lever (2007: 16) succinctly points out not always do voters ‘vote on their self-
interest – for good and ill – so from the fact that social democrats assume that it would be in 
the interest of the socially disadvantaged to vote ‘left’ it does not follow that that is how the 
socially disadvantaged will vote, when they vote’. As we well know, political decisions, and, 
to a great extent, elections are not always a matter of pure logic: personal preferences may 
play an important role in deciding who is worthy of our vote. One’s socioeconomic status and 
age need not be a straightjacket on how one votes. Lever expresses her fear ‘that if voters 
cannot spontaneously see the case for voting for a social democratic party or its nearest 
equivalent, the compulsion to turnout is unlikely to make it plainer’. 
I believe that not only in my eyes these studies cast in doubt the claim that left and 
left-of-centre parties would benefit from near universal turnout, i.e. compulsory voting. In 
fact, it seems that full participation would only very rarely change electoral outcomes, thus 
rendering accusations of unequal representation meaningless. Yet even if is Pacek’s and 
Radcliff’s research and Lijphart’s claims were accurate about full turnout and party 
representation (as they clearly are not) and the poor, the young and the uneducated voted 
unequivocally for the left, this does not under any circumstance guarantee that the parties will 
form a government – if one looks at the Australian example, it is clear that the winning party 
(Labour) was, as a result of a coalition between two different parties, actually 
underrepresented in parliament and this happened even under a majoritarian system (!) which 
should mostly guarantee the winner the running of the country. It is even more obvious that 
coalitions are even more likely to exist in proportional systems; although it should be logical, 
there is no guarantee that the winning party will form a government as the Australian case 
clearly demonstrates. 
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Briefly turning to the second assumption – that states with CV will be more prone to 
welfare policies – simple evidence will show that it is also false. Let us take two examples: 
Australia and the Nordic countries. Whereas the former is a country with a long tradition of 
CV, the latter do not have any such institution (Indeed the mere mentioning of compulsion in 
Sweden in 1999 (let alone the proposal to introducing it) created considerable ripples in the 
societal waters was met by fierce opposition (International IDEA 2004: 30)). If, even 
superficially, we examine their social welfare systems, it is easily discernible that the Nordic 
countries are much more sophisticated in comparison to Australia, that can be generally 
described as more liberal, for example in the British sense. And if we compare two other 
countries, for example the United Kingdom and France we will find that, notwithstanding the 
roughly similar turnout figures, the two countries importantly differ vis-à-vis welfare policies 
(France being well developed in the social sphere). Lever (2007: 15-6) in this light points out 
that countries notes for their social policies that only do not have CV ‘but even the democratic 
countries with compulsory voting are not notable for their social democratic policies’ and 
points out that compulsory voting is neither sufficient nor necessary for social democratic 
policies.90 
  
 II-2-2-c: Summary – Same winners, same losers 
To claim, as proponents of compulsory voting do, that all forms of low turnout are bad 
is an oversimplification of the complexities of turnout in much the same way as to state that 
all forms of high turnout are good. It seems that arguments CV advocates provide to show the 
bad effects of low turnout do not hold: low turnout does not significantly damage the chances 
of left and centre-left parties to be successful in an election and thus does not mean that their 
traditional voters (young, poor, less educated, or any combination thereof) are not sufficiently 
represented; it does not damage the health of democracy because in cases of voluntary voting 
only people with a genuine interest will come to the elections, as opposed to systems of 
compulsion which coerce voters to show up. In this light, I believe it is reasonable to ask, why 
is there so much ado about low and unequal turnout when the representation level in 
parliament would be the same? If there were no change in party preference (or only a slight 
                                                 
90 I lack space for a detailed examination of the relation between CV and welfare policies. However, conducting 
research on the social policies of compulsory voting countries could be another avenue worthy of research. Also 
the question whether the welfare system itself engenders the trust of the citizens towards the state which 
translates itself into high participation could also be inspected. For a debate on the connection between politics 
and welfare see for example Castles and McKinlay 1979, Hicks and Swank 1992 or Hill, Leighley and Hinton-
Andersson 1995. 
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one) and the voting results were to be the same, why should turnout be mandatory? In the case 
of Flanders, though women and the less-educated would not come to the elections, according 
to Hooghe and Pelleriaux’s (1997) research this seems would not have an affect on the overall 
composition of parliament, so why is there so much talk about the under-representation of 
certain classes? This seems to be not as much of a problem of the presence/absence of 
compulsory voting legislation but of the overall representation in the democratic system itself. 
To sum up, the left does not seem to be any worse off in a voluntary voting system and the 
overall representation remains fairly constant, at least according to the above mentioned case 
studies. 
 
II-2-3: Compulsory voting only raises turnout 
II-2-3-a: Introduction  
The most evident change that compulsory voting brings is the dramatic rise in turnout 
its proponents always point out. This much is obvious. However, it is equally important to 
realise that there are noticeable differences between CV countries: there are different 
intensities in the implementation of the legislation as, indeed, the laws themselves differ in 
their wording and level of impact. In an ideal case scenario, participation under a CV regime 
would be close to a hundred percent, but in the real world this is not the case. The reason is 
simple – there are CV states that do not even achieve the turnout levels of countries with 
voluntary voting. To put it a different way, not every CV system generates Australian or 
Belgian 90 percent turnout rates. This is my first argument. 
The second one will claim that the assertion that CV generates positive spillover 
effects (procedural, party-oriented and voter-oriented) on top of significantly increasing 
turnout is a very dubious one indeed because such claims are simply not true. To be sure, not 
even proponents of compulsory voting are wholly agreed upon the fact whether CV creates 
such benefits: Lijphart (1997: 14) on the whole distances himself from such suppositions as 
he calls such advantages ‘speculative’; on the other hand Keaney and Rogers (2006: 29) seem 
to take them for granted as they argue that mandatory turnout ‘also cuts down the cost of 
political campaigning and encourages the political parties to engage with those groups least 
interested in politics or most dissatisfied with the political system’ without actually bringing 
any concrete evidence to support these claims. They are not the only ones: or Faulks (2000: 
114) and Engelen (2007) also hint at for positive spillover effects accompanying compulsion. 
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So, in this section I will examine the different types of CV regimes. I will then go on 
to demonstrate that the positive spillover effects compulsory voting is claimed to have are 
speculative at best and more likely completely false; indeed, I maintain that the only benefit 
CV can claim is that it raises turnout which I will later claim is not always something positive.  
 
II-2-3-b: Different countries, different compulsory voting 
It is evident that compulsory voting increases turnout, but these figures can differ 
significantly, depending on the effectiveness of the institutions and the strictness of the 
regime which translates itself into sanctions imposed on non-voters in a given country. 
Robson (1923: 571) points out that such measures ‘in order to be effective as a method of 
inducing a refractory electorate to go to the polling station, the infliction of a penalty for 
abstention without good cause must be rigidly and universally applied’. Although Robson 
posed his argument in the form of an observation, empirical evidence suggests his hypothesis 
is an accurate description of the real-life situation.  
When one examines the turnout levels in countries with compulsory voting, one finds major 
differences – for example Guatemala with its mean turnout of 51.6% ranks 154th in the world, 
Mexico (65.2%) 122nd and Ecuador (68.9%) 111th (according to International IDEA 
compulsion is weak in Ecuador and Mexico and not enforced in Guatemala); on the other 
hand, Australia with its average participation rates of 94.5% is the first, Singapore (95.3%) 
the second and Belgium (90.9%) the fifth91 (Pintor, Gratschew and Sullivan 2002: 78-9; 
International IDEA classifies these three latter countries as states with a strict level of 
compulsion; according to Gratschew’s classification (2002; 2004) there are two other types of 
CV enforcement: weak and non-enforced). The wide gap between the two examples is self-
evident; Kato (2007: 14) tested Robson’s hypothesis when he compared the average turnout 
between the three types and found that countries with strictly administrated compulsion have 
an average turnout of 91.3%, countries with a weak administration 76.9% and those with 
nominal CV a mere 63.9% – even lower than the average of 69.2% in states with voluntary 
voting. Also Hirczy (1994: 64-5; 2000: 46) has shown that democratic states which impose 
penalties for non-voting have on average, vis-à-vis countries that do have compulsory voting 
laws but do not enforce sanctions, 10-13% higher turnout. 
                                                 
91 Again, this data can be misleading because these numbers are based on the turnout of registered voters, not 
turnout based on the voting age population. In such a case we get a rather different picture: Australia (no longer 
the first but 20th with 84.2%) is displaced by Belgium (18th, 84.8%) and Singapore drops to the 129th position 
with 51.2%. Guatemala drops to 162nd place with 29.8%, Ecuador to 149th (42.6%) and Mexico (48.1) to 136th. 
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The above data clearly demonstrates that there are considerable variations between 
turnout levels between different CV regimes and that the dramatic increases in turnout 
proponents of compulsory voting often talk of are linked almost exclusively to strict 
enforcement regimes – such cases are according to International IDEA’s data at the present 
confined to eight countries: Australia, Belgium, Cyprus, Fiji, Luxembourg, Nauru, Singapore, 
Uruguay; due to the fact that relevant to this study are only free democratic countries (in other 
words, if we compare the level of freedom as measured by Freedom House, i.e. according to 
political rights and civil liberties), we can cross off Singapore and Fiji from the list, so the six 
states left account to only circa 20% of countries practicing CV.92 Hill and Louth (2004: 12) 
acknowledge this number when they claim (perhaps in a bit of a self-defeating way) that ‘no 
more than 15 regimes … can properly be described as being compulsory because it is rare to 
see the practice used in places and with reasonable levels of enforcement and institutional 
support’ and that this list ‘can be further reduced to six (or seven with the inclusion of the 
Netherlands prior to 1970) when restricted to states with a history of well-established 
democratic norms’. In addition, just a mere year later, the list shrinks even more as Hill and 
Louth (2005: 35) claim that 
 
‘no more than 14 regimes … can properly be described as being in any way compulsory – it is in fact 
rare to see the practice used with reasonable levels enforcement and institutional support. This list can be further 
reduced to 4 (or 5 with the inclusion of The Netherlands until 1970)93 by restricting it to developed states with a 
history of well-established democratic norms and systematic administration of compulsory voting.’ 
 
It is thus rather an oversimplification to assume that CV in itself will cause significant 
increases in turnout – although even weakly enforced compulsion will make more citizens 
come to the polling booths, dramatic increases are only connected to strict cases of 
compulsion which is currently practiced only in a handful of states – somewhat of an anomaly 
in the democratic world. High turnout is thus not necessarily something which is present in 
each and every country with compulsory voting laws but only in those where its enforcement 
is strictly implemented, as Robson correctly hypothesized. 
However, what makes a compulsory voting regime strict, weak or non-enforced? The 
sanctions – penalties are actively pursued, used only occasionally, or exist in theory but are 
not acted on in practice. This means that it is rather difficult to establish the exact number of 
countries that practice compulsory voting as it is easier to identify those with strict legislation 
                                                 
92 Until 1970 the Netherlands also practiced strict enforcement of its compulsory voting system. 
93 According to the authors the countries in question are currently Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg and Cyprus. 
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(viz. Hill and Louth’s classification above). Furthermore there exists some discussion whether 
IDEA’s classification into the three above mentioned categories is useful. Birch (2007) rejects 
this taxonomy and claims that it is better to classify states according to the administrative 
apparatus vis-à-vis compulsion – countries which have it (CV with sanctions) and states 
which lack such an apparatus (CV without sanctions – Norris (2002: 75) calls the two rules 
‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’). According to Birch (2007: 7) there are ‘virtually no instances in the 
contemporary world of truly ‘strict’ enforcement’ and furthermore doubts that Australia and 
Belgium could, upon closer examination, be classified as strict CV regimes. Although I am 
inclined to agree with Birch that it is perhaps more convenient to classify compulsory voting 
systems according to the presence or absence of sanctions, I do not agree with the reason why 
she makes such a claim, i.e. that at the present, there are no countries which would use strict 
enforcement against non-voters. 
Before I will in the next chapter comment on the possible implications of CV 
penalties, it will be useful to concentrate our debate on the types of sanctions themselves. It is 
logical that by its very nature compulsion requires a system of sanctions for those who 
choose, for one reason or the other, not to vote in an election. Different countries have 
adopted different measures how to deal with non-voters: in general, I believe it is possible to 
distinguish between two broad groups of sanctions: financial, or non-financial. 
Financial sanctions may be relatively small – such as 3 francs in Switzerland, 10-20 
pesos in Argentina (see Pintor and Gratschew  2002: 107), 20 dollars in Australia94 (Bennett 
2005), or 20 francs in Liechtenstein (International IDEA 2004b: 16-7) – or even quite 
considerable and heavy (25-125 euros in Belgium95 (Pilet 2007: 2) up to 700 euros in the 
Austrian region of Tyrol96 when in use,97 up to 500 pounds in Cyprus, and 99-991 euros in 
Luxembourg (International IDEA 2004b: 16-7)). The severity of these penalties obviously 
depends on one’s income. 
Non-financial sanctions make up a list of rather diverse measures which are difficult 
to generically classify. In Italy a ‘name and shame’ campaign was used when the names of 
                                                 
94 This is provided non-voters acknowledge their transgression and pay immediately. If they however lose their 
case in court, the fine increases 50 dollars. 
95 The first absence is penalised by a minimum of 25 and a maximum of 50 euros, the second one 50-125 euros. 
96 This was the maximum fine permitted by law, non-voting usually cost the citizen 50 euros. 
97 Austria abolished compulsory voting for elections to the National Council in 1992 (Styria, Tyrol and 
Vorarlberg being the last regions to do so). The nation-wide duty to vote in presidential elections existed until 
1982, from then on, each region chose whether to exercise compulsory voting or not. The last province to require 
mandatory turnout was Tyrol but this was abolished in 2004; Austria thus abolished the practice of compulsory 
voting altogether. For additional information see the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, 
http://www.bmi.gv.at/wahlen/elections_compulsorey_voting.asp (accessed 09/2007). 
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non-voters were put on public display at the town hall; it could prove difficult for a non-voter 
to ‘get a job within the public sector in Belgium, Argentina or Venezuela’ (Gratschew 2002: 
108). However, certain types of non-financial sanctions can be rather severe and even entail 
the infringement of civil rights, disenfranchisement and at worse carry a gaol sentence: 
citizens are sometimes removed from the voter register (Belgium – ‘a voter that did not vote 
four times in 15 years is not eligible to vote for the next ten years’ (Pilet 2007: 2) – Singapore, 
and Thailand); they need to produce proof of casting a vote in order to access certain goods 
and services provided by the public sector (Peru, Bolivia); in Australia people who refuse to 
pay fines for non-voting may eventually end up ‘for one or two days in gaol’ (Bennett 2005: 
7). In the Australian case Gratschew (2002: 107) points out that there have not been any cases 
where a person not attending a poll would, as a direct result, be convicted and sent to prison 
and if this happens it is because he did not pay the fine, not because of non-voting. However, 
due to the fact that in Greece a citizen could spend ‘up to one month’ (International IDEA 
2004b: 16) behind bars for non-voting, it is theoretically possible for people to go to gaol as a 
direct result of not voting;98 the same sanction applied when voting was compulsory in the 
Philippines in 1973 – the non-voter could spend up to half-a-year in prison for not turning up 
at the polling booth (Hartmann, Hassall and Santos Jr. 2001). 
It must be pointed out that it is difficult to classify penalties, notwithstanding whether 
they are of a financial or a non-financial nature, as being minor, medium or major because 
every citizen will regard them differently. For some, even the smallest of fines may represent 
a considerable burden (especially the poor who, I might point out, are also the least likely to 
vote), others may find that not being able to find work in the public sector (as is the case in 
Belgium, where those already working as civil servants may not be promoted – Pilet 2007: 2) 
has no effect on them whatsoever, and some citizens may not have a problem with being 
disenfranchised or spending a day in gaol. For certain people missing out on state jobs or 
spending some time behind bars may present a severe handicap (after all, they will end up 
with a criminal record). 
Gratschew (2002: 106) sums up that the ‘simple presence or absence of compulsory 
voting laws is in itself too simplistic. It is more constructive to analyse compulsory voting as 
a spectrum ranging from a symbolic, but basically impotent, law to a government that 
systematically follows up each non-voting citizen and implements sanctions against them’. 
 
                                                 
98 This severe sanction replaced older penalties under which it was more difficult for a non-voter to obtain a new 
passport or driver’s licence.  
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II-2-3-c: Spillover effects – too good to be true 
As I have shown in Part I, certain proponents of compulsory voting claim that apart 
from increasing turnout, there are other advantages which derive from CV; however, a 
detailed examination will show that these assertions are, on the whole, false. 
It is claimed that CV countries will accommodate institutional arrangement in such a 
way as to make them as ‘voter-friendly’ as possible due to the fact that citizens must vote 
according to law. In this light, compulsion is claimed to produce procedural spillover effects – 
such as weekend voting, ease of registration, widespread use of absentee and postal ballots 
and internet voting. Although such a claim might seem logical, it is important to emphasise 
that this is not a phenomenon exclusively characteristic of CV countries, and indeed some 
states with a voluntary voting system may be much more advanced in these matters than the 
ones with compulsion; to be sure, electoral reform is in a state of constant flux in virtually all 
countries, not only those with CV. I believe each democracy has an interest in making the 
voting process easier, although it might make sense that countries with CV have a more 
immediate impulse to do so, for example by simplifying registration or introducing internet 
voting. 
Logic would dictate that CV regimes should, in the drive to make voting as painless as 
possible, examine unorthodox methods to simplify the electoral process. If we focus, for 
example, on internet voting99 and postal voting, we will find the hypothesis that these forms 
of absentee voting will the most prevalent in countries with CV as unfounded. Two examples: 
in 2007 it was Estonia, a voluntary voting country, held the world’s first national election in 
which citizens could use the internet to cast a vote100 and four years earlier around 60% 
French citizens residing in the United States used the internet to elect their representatives to 
the Assembly of the French Citizens Abroad (Internet Rights Forum 2003: 18). There have 
been other experiments with voting via the internet, albeit on a much smaller scale and 
tentative manner in several Swiss cantons, in the Canadian province of Ontario, in Austria and 
                                                 
99 I am talking here of remote internet voting (i-voting), which falls under the category of e-voting (electronic 
voting). However, e-voting can also refer to voting through an electronic voting machine (for example in Brazil, 
India or the United States) not by casting a paper ballot; the citizen still has to make the journey to the polling 
booth. Furthermore, it seems that electronic voting is more a matter of convenience for the government, and 
more specifically for the particular electoral commissions, due to the fact that it makes counting the votes easier. 
Both systems – remote internet voting and electronic voting – are not without a large deal of controversy about 
the misuse of the electronic system and possible election fraud. I have already addressed this issue in Part Two in 
the section on reforms concerning absentee voting. 
100 For more information see the Estonian National Electoral Committee website, 
http://www.vvk.ee/engindex.html (accessed 09/2007). 
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as a part of the European Union CyberVote Project, amongst others.101 As to postal voting 
International IDEA data102 shows that it is Finland and Iceland where this type of absentee 
voting is used widely (around 40% and up to 20%, respectively). In many countries (Canada, 
Spain, Switzerland) there are no special reasons needed to cast a ballot by mail other than 
notifying the authorities in advance. This is, however, not the case in Australia, a compulsory 
voting regime, where only citizens who find themselves distant from a polling station for 5 
miles or more on Election Day in their State or Territory or the ill, infirm or pregnant women 
are eligible to cast a mail ballot – indeed, hardly an example of a voter-friendly measure. To 
sum up, the cases illustrate that it is a mistake to assume that countries with CV are always the 
most responsive in making elections more user-friendly: Estonia – the first country to 
introduce remote i-voting – does not practice compulsion and casting an absentee ballot in 
Australia seems to be more complicated than doing the same in Finland or Iceland, i.e. states 
without CV. By citing these examples I do not wish to say that democracies practicing 
compulsion are not pursuing policies to make voting easier (for example, Belgium is 
increasingly using electronic voting – not internet voting, though – to simplify elections) but 
that a CV regime does not necessarily equal more ‘voter-friendly’ institutional arrangements 
than countries with voluntary turnout.  
Indeed, asserting that the introduction of CV would bring about such procedural 
spillover effects is mere speculation. The last time compulsory voting was established in a 
democratic country was in Cyprus in 1960 and since that time many reforms have been 
implemented in many different democracies around the globe. It is therefore doubtful that the 
introduction of CV would significantly contribute to institutional reform: the problem of 
registration has already been tackled quite thoroughly in the United States and there is a lively 
debate about implementing institutional changes in Britain even without compulsion (an 
elected upper house, switching from the Westminster model to proportional representation, 
amongst other issues). It may indeed be true that changes would take place more quickly upon 
the introduction of CV but due to the fact that there has not been an introduction of 
compulsory voting for almost 50 years, this is something very difficult to prove. 
 Party-oriented spillover effects are no less a matter of much debate. They are based on 
the claim that high turnout in CV countries is something which one can take for granted and 
thus political parties can shift their attention from motivating citizens to vote to ‘winning over 
                                                 
101 For more information about electronic and internet voting refer to the ACE Project website 
http://www.aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/e-voting/countries (accessed 09/2007). 
102 International IDEA, ‘Postal Voting and Voting on the Internet’, 
http://www.idea.int/vt/postal_voting_internet_voting.cfm (accessed 09/2007). 
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the undecided voters’. As a result, it is claimed, elections will be less expensive, parties will 
turn away from populist rhetoric and attack campaigns (which can be regarded as a typical 
example of populism) and instead bring issues of genuine national interest into the limelight. 
Thus populism could gradually begin a less and less important role in politics and in time 
disappear altogether. If one examines the elections in Australia one necessarily arrives at the 
conclusion that this is not the case. Young (2005) found that attack advertising in the 2004 
Australian federal elections was a widespread phenomenon. According to her research 7 out 
of 12 Labour party television advertisements were negative as were 7 out of 9 Liberal party 
advertisements; these ads were used as a means to discredit the leader of the other party. As 
Ballinger (2006: 18 and footnote 76) points out the 2004 general election in Australia was 
‘more consistently negative’ than the 2005 British election and employed a tactic aimed at ‘at 
discrediting each party’s principal opponent’ (Ibid). So it does not seem that CV generates 
‘gentleman-like behaviour’ in politicians or create a sense of fair-play amongst political 
parties. 
If we examine the claim that Gosnell (1960: 185) made (and Lijphart seems to 
support) that elections will be ‘less costly’ we find that it is not so, again, taking data from 
Australia. Available empirical evidence clearly illustrates that the cost of election campaigns 
has, on the whole, been rising in Australia in spite of compulsory voting legislation. This has 
nothing to do with CV but the ‘adoption of modern campaigning techniques in the 1980s, 
mainly relying on the electronic media, has seen a spiralling of election costs for the major 
parties.’ (McAllister 2002: 393-4, especially Figure 13.2). As McAllister points out parties 
under a voluntary voting system ‘rely on their mass memberships to mobilize the vote; freed 
of this by compulsory voting, the parties use the mass media to appeal for votes.’ 
Furthermore, even in Australia, as in most other democracies, political parties primarily rely 
on funds donated by wealthy individuals and corporations, rather than membership costs and 
money from the state. The claim that compulsory voting diminishes the importance of money 
thus seems false. In this respect it seems appropriate to mention the claim Keaney and Rogers 
made, i.e. that compulsory voting lets parties concentrate on ‘winning over the undecided 
voters’: this may surely be the case, though not exactly in the way Keaney and Rogers 
envision. In the case of Australia two research projects (Gaunt 1999, Denemark 2000) found 
that in the 1990s $60 million were spent on a sports grants programme in swing 
constituencies. Leigh (2004) demonstrated that ‘spending from the $2.7 billion fund [of the 
Roads to Recovery, a safety and transport programme] was overwhelmingly directed towards 
coalition-held electorates’ that voted for the government in the 2004 election and a year later 
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another study (Andrews, Fry and Jakee 2005) linked increased spending within the framework 
of Job Network, a federal programme targeted against unemployment, with marginal 
constituencies – an illustration of the fact that money is still important in Australia.103 Surely, 
such examples hardly represent the diminishing importance of money or fair-play behaviour, 
more likely the same political calculations and machinations than in any other country. 
 The theory that compulsory voting might have a positive effect on party identification 
and political support also proved according to Lundell’s research (2007: 16) as false. He 
found that although CV has a ‘positive impact on party identification, trust in politicians and 
trust in political parties … the actual effect on the dependent variables is very small’ and that 
in this instance there is ‘no actual dividing line’ between countries with compulsory voting 
legislation and without it. Lundell expresses the idea that CV probably has a positive effect on 
certain citizens (most probably those who would vote anyway) but at the same time causes 
‘frustration among those who are indifferent to political matters’ (non-voters). This leads him 
to conclude that ‘compulsory voting does not provide a remedy to inadequate citizen 
confidence in political institutions and party-based representative democracy’ (Ibid). 
 Equally speculative as procedural and party-oriented factors are the voter-oriented 
spillover effects; proponents of compulsory voting assume that CV may act as an incentive for 
citizens to be more interested, informed about and engaged in politics in general. Though this 
claim finds some backing in Berggren’s (2001) and Gordon and Segura’s (1997) research,104 
Selb and Lachat (2007: 4) have argued against Gordon and Segura’s findings on the grounds 
that the statistically significant increase in political sophistication in countries with 
compulsory voting is distorted as a result of the methodology they use; after switching from 
the individual to the country level, the effect of compulsory voting will disappear. Jakee and 
Sun (2006: 64) point out that the claim that citizens become more politically sophisticated is 
unconvincing because advocates of compulsory voting always fail to specify a model by 
which this process takes place and ‘the transformation process is merely assumed’. Apart 
from the two studies other evidence that compulsory voting promotes more political 
knowledge on behalf of the citizens is scarce – Grönlund and Milner (2006) actually found 
that CV countries had an under-average political knowledge amongst their citizens. Schmidt 
(1974 quoted in Katz 1997) found that in the Netherlands the ‘people who voted regularly 
before 1970 but failed to do so after the abolition of the compulsory vote, were 
                                                 
103 The relation between CV and financial arrangements is another avenue open to research. 
104 The impact of compulsory voting on political sophistication is only a small part in this broader study of the 
structural and contextual factors affecting the costs and benefits to individuals of becoming politically 
sophisticated in 12 West-European countries, three of which had compulsory voting legislation.  
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disproportionately uninterested and uninformed about politics’. Also Loewen, Milner and 
Hicks (2007: 12) after conducting a survey amongst young Canadian voters discovered that 
providing young voters with ‘a financial disincentive from abstaining from voting did not 
increase how much they learned about politics’. Though the aim of the authors is not to prove 
a point against compulsory voting (indeed, the opposite seems more accurate), in the end they 
are forced to concede that ‘most arguments for the merits of compulsory voting would claim 
that is the effects are conditional, then they are most likely to manifest themselves among 
those who would otherwise be unengaged, particularly youth’ (Ibid: 16). In other words, if 
CV were to have an impact, it should be most felt amongst the younger generation; their 
research, however, proves that this is not the case with increasing political knowledge through 
a system of compulsion. 
The same amount of doubt is present in the assumption that compulsory voting will 
increase the interest (expressed by participation) of people in politics; though Engelen and 
Hooghe (2007: 13-5) support the institution of compulsory voting, their research shows that 
CV does not in the European context seem to produce a higher than average political interest, 
nor does it boost feelings of political efficacy. Turning yet again to the Australian context: 
Ballinger (2006: 14) cites data which clearly demonstrates that there is virtually no difference 
in the engagement, or rather disengagement, amongst young voters when comparing young 
Australians with young Britons. Obviously such a question would seem irrelevant in Australia 
where turnout is obligatory, however the cited research shows that if CV were to be abolished, 
only half of 16-18 year-olds would vote (as opposed to 87% if participation is compulsory) 
and overall turnout in Australia would fall to the region of 50-60% (Jackman 1999: 46) even 
after more than eighty years of compulsory voting; a loss of around 30% of voters would 
result in the abolishing of compulsory voting in Belgium (Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998), 
Brazil or Venezuela (Power and Timmons Roberts 1995) – in other words, CV does not create 
the voting norm or lastingly shape behaviour, as Hill and Louth (2004: 26) confidently claim 
though in the same article they concede that it were ‘doubtful … that the voting habit would 
stay with us without the strong incentive of law (Ibid: 9). The Netherlands experienced such 
noticeable declines (around 15% on average) after the abolition of compulsory voting laws in 
1970, yet even nowadays turnout still remains around the 80 percentile mark, i.e. more than 
the average of some current CV countries.105 
                                                 
105 It might be pointed out that turnout in the Netherlands remained high despite the abolition of compulsion and 
that it probably did generate a voting norm. Such an argument may seem valid, but one has to take into account 
the history of strong political engagement, the size of the electorate, proportional representation and other factors 
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These examples show that compulsory voting (or more likely the sanctions) increases 
and equalises turnout but does not show that it increases and equalises knowledge or interest 
in politics (not political issues) expressed by engagement in elections – if that were the case it 
would not be rational for so many people (assuming they are informed and interested in 
politics as CV supporters maintain) to become disengaged from the electoral process so 
sudden – after all, we know that more educated and knowledgeable people tend to vote more. 
Even Engelen and Hooghe (2007: 19), though themselves supporters of compulsion, point out 
that CV ’is not a panacea solution, as it does not bring the advantages that some proponents 
have attributed to it’ and they are forced to conclude that compulsory voting does not 
contribute ‘to the spread of political interest or political efficacy’. 
 
II-2-3-d: Summary – sanctions, not CV, increase turnout 
My aim in this chapter was twofold: (1) to empirically demonstrate that the level of 
participation is directly dependent on the strictness of the CV regime and (2) that compulsion 
does not generate any other benefits aside from increasing turnout. 
As to the first point, it is a common mistake to assume that any CV regime is 
successful at generating high turnout figures. Indeed, only those with a strict level of 
enforcement, and logically penalties, which presently are only four democratic countries – 
Australia, Belgium, Cyprus and Luxembourg – have very high turnout, usually close to or 
over 90 percent. Indeed, in my eyes, it is therefore the penalties that in fact generate high 
turnout, not the legislation (as Kato’s examination revealed that CV countries only with a 
nominal compulsory voting law have on average lesser turnout than states with voluntary 
voting). 
The second point made it clear that it is empirically impossible to back the claim that 
compulsory voting produces positive spillover effects – such an assertion is speculative, 
controversial, questionable and, in the end, false. Procedural changes are happening even if a 
country does not have CV and some of the most radical innovations (for example, voting over 
the internet) have taken place in states without any history of compulsion whatsoever. Party-
oriented spillover effects centred around the claim that in a system where everyone turns out, 
                                                                                                                                                        
which keep turnout high. However, it is important to realise that almost 40 years have past since the abolition of 
CV and that the generational effects would have mostly manifested themselves by now (if we assume that new 
voting patterns establish in roughly two generations’ time, i.e. 50 years). Turnout in the Netherlands remains 
fairly constant thus suggesting that there are other factors which effect these figures at the present rather than 
merely the abolition of CV.  
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parties do not need to coax voters coming to the polls but can concentrate straight on 
important political issues; evidence demonstrated that populism is still present, for example in 
the form of attack advertising and that there does not seem to be any more sense for politicqal 
fair-play in countries with CV than in voluntary voting regimes. Furthermore, money still 
plays an important (and some would argue increasing) role in political campaigning. Finally, 
the claim that CV has an effect on the information and knowledge of voters, makes them more 
interested in politics and establishes a voting norm is also debatable – indeed, if compulsory 
voting were to have such positive and long-lasting effects, why do opinion polls generate 
projections of substantial turnout declines in Australia or Belgium? 
In my eyes, compulsory voting does not generate these desired spillover effects, and if 
somehow it is so, their impact is negligible and not worth serious debate. Indeed, again it 
seems that the only undisputable effect compulsion has, or more likely the sanctions 
associated with it, is that it substantially raises turnout. That is it. 
 
II-2-4: Compulsory voting violates liberties 
and does not increase legitimacy 
 
II-2-4-a: Introduction 
Advocates of compulsion go out of their way very often to stress that CV is just like 
any other law, for example paying taxes, sending one’s children to school, serving on a jury or 
even wearing a helmet whilst driving a motorcycle. All laws oblige citizens to act in a certain 
way and no one usually questions the fact that it is the nature of legislation to somewhat limit 
individual freedom. Due to the fact that it is the law, it is also logical that there will be 
consequences for those citizens who fail to fulfil its demands, in this concrete example, vote; 
however it is claimed that these penalties are mostly of a symbolic nature and serve as a 
reminder of one’s civic duty, not as actual punishment. Furthermore, the advocates claim, 
compulsory voting is different than other laws, because it is not voting which is required but 
only turning out (after all, the term ‘compulsory voting’ is a misnomer) – thus compulsion 
does not infringe on the right not to vote because the citizen can choose to spoil his ballot, 
thus effectively not voting. 
I question these assertions on two political notions: (1) individual freedom, and thus 
the associated concept of (2) legitimacy. In the following pages I will show that CV does not 
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satisfy the reservations made against it as there are some serious issues left unanswered. One 
may regard this chapter as the breaking point between the two parts of the thesis: empirical 
and normative. This section draws on material from both fields, as will become apparent. 
 
II-2-4-b: Compulsion infringes on individual freedom 
A common reservation made by CV opponents is the fact that compulsion seriously 
limits personal liberty, especially the right not to vote, leading for example Abraham (1955: 
33) to claim that CV has an undemocratic nature. I will not differ from these claims. Indeed, it 
seems to substitute the right to vote with the duty to vote as the right to vote becomes in a 
system of compulsion irrelevant and non-existent. In general, CV advocates with two 
arguments to defend their position vis-à-vis reservations made regarding the infringement of 
personal freedom: (1) compulsory voting is just like any other law and the penalties for non-
voting are negligible; (2) CV does not affect on the right not to vote because only turnout is 
required. Let us look at each one in more detail. 
 
II-2-4-b-1: CV is not comparable to other laws 
Proponents of compulsory voting often claim that CV is just like any other law, and it 
is logical that all laws somehow limit or regulate individual freedom. According to Lijphart 
(1997: 17) ‘compulsory voting entails a very small decrease in freedom compared with many 
other problems of collective action that democracies solve by imposing obligations: jury duty, 
the obligation to pay taxes, military conscription, compulsory school attendance, and many 
others’. Furthermore, Lijphart – as many others after him – maintains that CV is much less 
restrictive than some of the above cited examples (see also Hill 2007: 5). In this light, CV 
supporters claim that the penalties associated with compulsion are negligible and that their 
financial impact is the same as paying for minor traffic violations. That, however, is hardly 
true. Let us examine the possible implications of sanctions more closely (as I have already 
talked about their nature in the chapter above).106 
Proponents of compulsory voting readily acknowledge that there are penalties 
associated with CV practice but maintain that these sanctions are not really burdensome: 
Lijphart (1997: 3) calls them ‘generally low penalties’ similar in their impact to parking 
                                                 
106 It has also been suggested that a fresher and different approach might be to do away with the whole system of 
penalties as they are negative and restrictive and this makes it more difficult for citizens to relate to the current 
electoral system in a positive way – an alternate proposal is to offer voters incentives to vote, instead of forcing 
them to vote. This will, however, be covered in detail in a Part III. 
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tickets and Keaney and Rogers (2006: 33) see them as ‘fairly minor sanctions’ comparable to 
a ‘small fine’ associated perhaps with parking tickets. Watson and Tami (2004: 8) beef up 
their case for CV by showing that for example in Australia in the year 1993 only 4412 voters 
(representing 0.9% of all non-voters) actually ended up in court whilst 94% of excuses made 
by the roughly half a million of abstainers were accepted and the rest 23,320 (4.7%) paid the 
allocated fine.107 Though these numbers may in the larger context look insignificant, I 
maintain that the reality is more complex and that CV advocates tend to turn a blind eye that 
apart from the minor penalties there are exist more serious forms of sanctions and the possible 
repercussions may be very real indeed, especially in countries with a strict level of CV 
enforcement. Some fines, for example the almost 1000 euros in Luxembourg, are not 
something to be ignored, as for most people this may amount to half of their monthly wage. 
However, in my eyes, it is especially the non-financial sanctions that can have the most severe 
consequences. 
Probably the strongest impact of compulsory voting laws is the possibility to end up 
behind bars as a result of non-voting. Though CV supporters point out that, for example in 
Australia, if someone does end up in gaol, it is because they did not pay the allocated fine, not 
because they did not vote, to me this sounds as mere wordplay. The fact of the matter is that 
the principle remains the same, regardless for what reason the individual question is sent to 
gaol – his incarceration will somehow be connected to the fact of not voting. Lever (2007: 19) 
duly points out, that ‘it is a predictable consequence of compulsory voting that people will go 
to prison, and end up with a criminal record, either because they cannot or will not pay the 
fine for non-voting.’ If we consider the case of Australia, after the election in 1993 at least 43 
non-voters received a gaol sentence as a result of this (Bennett 2005: 7); some cases make the 
news if the protagonists are vociferous enough.108 However, Australia is not the only country, 
where voters may end up behind bars: in Greece, Cyprus and the Philippines it is possible to 
be incarcerated as a direct consequence for non-voting. 
Another ghastly implication of a CV regime is disenfranchisement, as is the case in 
Belgium. Though admittedly the loss of one’s voting rights is not permanent, I still feel 
especially strong about this case because I cannot see how a democratic country could have 
such provisions when the right to vote should be sacrosanct. This is a direct violation of the 
                                                 
107 However, later elections show a considerable increase in the number of people who paid the 20 dollar fine: 
whilst in 2001 this was 39,874 people, in 2004 this number was 52,796 according to the data provided by the 
Australian Electoral Commission. Thus, one can see a clear increase of 25% in the number of non-voters. 
108 This was the case with Melissa Manson who refused to pay her fines for non-voting ‘on principle’ and as a 
result went for a day to gaol in 1999. Her reasons for not voting were that ‘there were no candidates worth voting 
for’. See Hill (2002c, endnote 17). 
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right to vote, putting the non-voter on par with convicted felons who in some states lose this 
right because of their crimes against the society. Trying to rebuff such a comment, as I 
suspect CV supporters would do, by stating that chronic non-voters would not really care if 
they lost their right to vote is simply irrelevant, because their ‘crime’ is not such as it requires 
the state to infringe on one of the basic political liberties an individual has within a 
democracy. I therefore find the following Birch’s (2007: 11) claim rather disturbing: ‘If 
voting is considered to be a civic duty, it would seem logical that non-voters should have their 
civic rights restricted. The most obvious right to restrict is the right to vote itself.’ I deeply 
question such ‘logical’ thinking. How does the disenfranchisement of the non-voter help the 
democratic system? Is the system more democratic and healthier by actually curtailing the 
universal right to vote? I seriously doubt this (Hill (2002c: 4-5) also seems to argue against 
disenfranchisement). 
 It might be argued that not all CV countries have such harsh responses to voter 
misbehaviour. This is certainly true as apart from systems with a strict enforcement of 
compulsion several countries have weak enforcement, or penalties exist on paper but not in 
practice. One might ask the question what is the logic behind having compulsory voting 
without any penalties to back it up? There are two plausible explanations. The first one is that 
for the local authorities it might not be worth the time and effort to enforce the penalties and 
running a CV system may even prove costly. If this is the case, it is clear that compulsory 
voting has already outlived its usefulness and should be abolished altogether. The second 
answer to the above question is – as Gratschew (2002: 106) suggests – that ‘[n]ot all laws are 
created to be enforced. Some laws are created merely to state the government’s position 
regarding what the citizen’s responsibility should be.’ In other words, the existence of 
compulsory voting legislation makes a citizen obliged to act in a certain, morally desirable 
way. It must be obvious to any one that by not going to the polling station he is breaking the 
law and this recognition imposes a kind of moral obligation on the voter and acts as a self-
regulatory measure. The voter is aware that he will not be punished directly as the 
consequence of his actions but also knows that, in the end, the choice whether he casts a ballot 
or not must be sorted out by his own reasoning and conscience. My objection to this way of 
thinking is that it is unnecessary to have laws if they provide no practical use. If it is intended 
to be made a statement it might be more prudent to mention that voting is a citizen’s duty in 
the constitution.109 Furthermore, to have CV enshrined in law and readily available, though 
                                                 
109 Birch (2007: 17) lists constitutionalisation (together with incentive voting – discussed later – and collective 
sanctions – used mainly in former Soviet satellites) as a possible alternative to compulsory voting. The provision 
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not actively practiced, may pose a more subtle but not less real danger as Lever (2007: 21) 
points out that seldom used laws still ‘raise the spectre of arbitrary enforcement … against 
annoying, unpopular, or combative individuals or groups’ and that such legislation ‘can 
seriously constrain someone’s liberty and privacy even when it never results in legal 
punishment; and can intimidate the groups to which that person belongs.’ 
So, CV may thus become an oppressive tool, and although the probability of it being 
used in such a way is small, it is still possible. Again, if the law is not in use (regardless the 
reasons, administrative, financial or otherwise) and serves only as a reminder of a citizen’s 
duty, it should also be abolished as any law which has outlived its usefulness. To this extent, 
countries which have a strict but consistent practice of compulsion behave more reasonably 
than states without serious CV administration. 
In any case, returning back why I do not think that compulsory voting is comparable to 
other laws, I grant that it is quite true that voting once every four or five years requires less 
effort than sitting on a jury, however, I still feel that there is something wrong in comparing 
the two. Lever (2007: 36) maintains that it is difficult to compare compulsion with the duty to 
sit on a jury, serve in the army, send children to school or pay taxes; it is equally difficult to 
compare compulsory voting to these concepts as each one is justified differently and their 
moral and political significance is lost when treated as ‘examples of justified coercion in 
response to collective action problems’– taxation is tied to the concept of proportionality and 
redistribution (the element of compulsion is necessary here because otherwise the state would 
cease to function), jury duty to political notions of justice, fairness and equality (compulsion 
is necessary to ensure a free and fair trial not a biased jury), sending children to school goes 
with a basic idea of equality of chances (compulsion is necessary to force parents to send their 
offspring to school), etc. To generalise and claim that CV is just like any other coercive law is 
to misinterpret the different natures of these forms of compulsion (taxation, jury duty, 
mandatory elementary education etc.) which have ‘an evident and agreed point to them, 
whereas whether or not it is desirable to raise and equalize voting, or to use legal compulsion 
to do so, has still to be established’. Indeed, in this light it is important to bear in mind that 
CV does not have such urgency to it the other concepts cited above do.110 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
that voting is a ‘civic duty without making it compulsory in law’ is enshrined in a number of constitutions, for 
example in the Central African Republic, Colombia, Cuba, East Timor, Haiti, Italy, Mozambique, Paraguay, and 
Portugal. 
110 I come back to this point in the Conclusion when I claim that the proponents of compulsion cannot prove the 
urgency to establish CV as there is not a society-wide consensus on the issue.  
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II-2-4-b-2: CV infringes on the right not to vote 
Advocates of compulsion acknowledge that to a certain extent CV limits the freedom 
of citizens because of the obligation to participate in an election and because of the penalties 
involved for those who do not do so. However, despite of these facts they claim that 
compulsory voting does not violate personal liberties in an unforgivable manner because there 
are other benefits to be gained, such as enhanced participation, equality and 
representativeness (Lijphart 1998: 10). Hill (2007: 5) in reference to Australia writes that the 
‘system embodies an implicit assumption that that the harm of restricting the freedom to 
abstain is outweighed by benefits that accrue’. To be sure, it is mainly argued that the right 
not to vote generally remains intact as ‘all that needs to be required is for citizens to show up 
at the polls’ (Lijphart 1997: 17), not actually cast a ballot. After all, we must remember that 
the term ‘compulsory voting’ is a misnomer. This is why Keaney and Rogers (2006: 7, 26) 
argue that the term compulsory voting should not be used and instead the practice should be 
renamed to the more accurate ‘compulsory turnout’ and Birch (2007: 2) also points out the 
‘negative connotations of the term ‘compulsion’ in English.’111 
It is important to point out right at the beginning of this section that the practice of 
compulsory voting was challenged legally in the European Court of Human Rights in 1971 in 
the case of X v Austria (Append. No. 4982/71) under the Convention’s Article 9 which deals 
with the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. ‘The Court then ruled that a system of 
compulsory voting for those of majority age does not violate the right to freedom of 
conscience, provided that electors are free to hand in a blank or spoiled ballot’ (Baston, 
Ritchie et al. 2004: 36). Such a decision certainly is a valuable argument for proponents of 
compulsory voting, as it underlines the claim that, provided the ballot is secret, there is no 
way of knowing whether the person in question had voted or not, which thus does not violate 
his right not to vote.112 However, in my eyes this decision does not morally justify 
compulsory voting but only acknowledges that is congruent with the democratic electoral 
system. I believe rather than just taking this court case as it is, it is important to take into 
account the time period at which the ruling was made: in the 1970s many communist systems 
were clamping down on reformist voices, and in this respect I have come to the conclusion 
                                                 
111 Birch discusses the term at length in several languages on pages 1-2 of this paper concluding that negative 
connotations are mostly present in English, whether other languages, like the Romance ones, use the a much 
more neutral term which translates as ‘obligatory voting’. 
112 This, however, is not the case with Australia, as the discussion bellow illustrates. Hill (2007: 9) as a 
proponent of compulsion is well aware of this problem and acknowledges that were the European Convention of 
Human Rights apply to Australia, the current system ‘might run into trouble’ as Australia ‘seems to require 
actual and formal voting rather than mere attendance’. 
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that it was a way of setting apart democratic compulsion – as practiced in Australia or 
Belgium at that time – from undemocratic compulsion – for example until the year 1990 in 
former Soviet satellites states, the USSR itself or in other totalitarian regimes usually with 
only one party vying for seats in parliament. It was a way of distinguishing the undemocratic 
state of affairs in the Eastern block and democratic idiosyncrasies of some Western countries.  
So, although from a legal perspective CV is still regarded as compatible with democratic 
practice (provided the ballot is secret and that there is a way how to spoil a vote) I still 
maintain that the right not to vote, as understood under a voluntary voting regime as a right to 
abstain, is crucial to the democratic system and is as important as the right to vote itself. 
First, let us look at the reasons, why the right to vote as such is not a trivial issue. As 
we know, there may be several reasons for non-voting; one them is can be interpreted as a 
form of protest or discontent (Wattenberg 2002). It is a well-established and fundamental 
principle within a democratic society that individuals have the right to protest, regardless 
whether this is accomplished by free speech, attending a demonstration or consciously not 
voting. Indeed, non-voting may be regarded as an easy, consistent and non-demanding way by 
which citizens can protest, it can be a form of civil disobedience. By forcing turnout and 
sustaining it by penalties, non-voting becomes an expensive exercise, not only financially but 
psychologically. ‘Rights of non-participation, no less than rights of anonymous participation, 
enable the weak, timid and unpopular to protest in ways that feel safe and that are consistent 
with their sense of duty, as well as self-interest’ (Lever 2007: 37). Laws requiring citizens to 
turn out exert a significant amount of pressure on the individuals and although proponents of 
CV claim that only turnout is required, not the actual vote, the reality is that most people, 
even those who would not have otherwise voted, will cast a ballot in the end. It is very much 
doubtful that such a coerced vote has value other than to improve voting statistics and give off 
the impression that a country’s citizens are strongly engaged in the life of the community.. 
There is no doubt that some citizens will choose not to vote out of sheer laziness and such a 
‘justification’ is wrong by any standards. But even though such ‘reasons’ exist and can 
sometimes be common, this does not give anyone the grounds for curbing the right to abstain 
which is as important as granting universal suffrage – although CV truncates this ‘laziness 
factor’ at the same time it forces the dissatisfied to vote but not only them; the uninformed 
and the uninterested are also coerced to cast a ballot although they may have because of this 
reasonable causes for abstention. I therefore find no backing to Mackerras and McAllister’s 
claim that when casting a ballot in a CV regime ‘the act of voting means that they are forced 
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to think, however superficially, about the major parties’. Empirical evidence clearly shows 
that it is not so because if it were the case there would not have been so many random votes. 
In other words, the right to abstain acts as a convenient and discrete way for citizens 
who do not vote in order to show their protest to ‘slip out the back door’ without further 
repercussions whatever their reasons for non-voting may be. If citizens do not regard non-
voting as a passive way of staging a protest and their grounds for not showing up at the 
election is not laziness, there are probably other, more mundane causes. First of all, the right 
not to vote enables people without any real political knowledge to admit their ignorance 
without forcing them to make uninformed decisions which may otherwise upset the 
democratic system. Non-voting as much as an active process of disobedience can also be 
interpreted as an honest gesture of simply admitting the fact that one does not have the 
knowledge to make a well-considered political judgment. Poorly informed voters tend to 
make decisions based on irrational personal preferences that do not reflect on the given 
political situation thus further fuelling populist politics.  
However, apart from expressing one’s protest or admitting one’s ignorance, there may 
be other, more immediate motivations. As pointed out already, the typical non-voters, i.e. the 
young, less educated and the poor may have other more immediate needs and problems that 
make it difficult for them to vote – issues such as unemployment, housing, etc. But they may 
not be only ones whose immediate concerns may make it difficult to cast a ballot and on 
occasion personal reasons, however trivial they may seem for someone with a detached 
perspective, may prevent us to vote even if it is against our better judgement. A person may 
for example need to attend to an ill relative, meet up with a potential employer, travel 
unexpectedly out of the country, etc. There may be many reasons. The problem is that CV 
forces these citizens to explain themselves which can not only feel demeaning but can cause 
resentment rather than support for the democratic system. Even though cases similar to those 
mentioned above are likely to be accepted by the authorities this does not make the need for 
the right to abstain any less urgent. Rather than facing the awkward situation of having to 
explain one’s time management to the state authorities it is much more convenient to exercise 
the right not to vote, regardless whether one is a continuous non-voter or the ‘one-off’ type. 
Maintaining the right not to vote forgoes with such uncomfortable situations which require the 
citizen to explain his conduct. 
So, after establishing the reasons for maintaining the right to abstain, I will now look 
at the right not to vote within the confines of a compulsory voting system and examine, 
whether CV is truly a misnomer which still guarantees the right not to vote. 
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It is important to realise that there is a disagreement even amongst supporters of 
compulsion on how to understand the concept of CV. Proponents of compulsory voting claim 
that the only duty citizens have is to turn out at an election, and therefore the right not to vote 
remains intact as they can still choose to abstain or cast a blank ballot. Closer examination, 
however, reveals that CV supporters themselves are not united on how to view the duty to 
turn out: Lijphart (1997: 3) maintains that all citizens have to do is ‘to appear at the polling 
station on election day without any further duty to mark a ballot or even to accept a ballot’ 
and although he acknowledges the importance of the ‘none of the above’ ballot he 
nevertheless makes it clear that the best option would be if the citizen had the option to refuse 
to accept a ballot (Ibid: 19, footnote 23); on the other hand Keaney and Rogers (2006: 26, 30), 
whilst they put strong emphasis on pointing out that the system they support is compulsory 
turnout not CV, paradoxically end up promoting the latter – it seems that they are not simply 
satisfied by the prospect that a citizen turns up at the polling station and crosses off his name 
from the registry, but actively votes (regardless whether this is a valid, even a formalised 
protest vote, or a spoilt ballot). The difference between these approaches neatly illustrates the 
fact that whilst Lijphart makes truly a case for compulsory turnout, Keaney and Rogers want 
citizens to cast a ballot, not merely turn up, thus arguing for compulsory voting. For the 
purpose of our argument I will characterise these two concepts as (1) a weak (Lijphart’s) and 
(2) a strong (Keaney and Rogers’) version of CV. One could even assert that the former 
version is more liberal because it is less demanding of the citizen but this is a false impression 
as neither account is really justifiable in terms of promoting only turnout – both infringe on 
the right not to vote, although in different ways.  
Keaney and Rogers’ case for, what they call, ‘compulsory turnout’ is obviously 
defective – though they assert that the ‘citizen is not required to cast an actual valid ballot 
and, consequently, the right not to vote remains intact’ (Keaney and Rogers 2006: 30) upon 
closer inspection it will be obvious that it is not so. A citizen must vote (regardless whether he 
casts a valid or invalid ballot); showing up will not suffice – it is clear that this cannot be 
understood in a strict sense as ‘non-voting’. Keaney and Rogers equate non-voting to a protest 
vote as they do not envision a place for abstention: their version of compulsory turnout does 
not allow for it as they themselves acknowledge that their version ‘impinge[s] on the right not 
to take part in the political process at all’ (Ibid). They admit that ‘some curtailment of 
personal freedom’ is involved, however, they maintain that it must be seen in context as other 
compulsions are common in the democratic context, citing the usual examples of jury duty, 
taxation, etc. As I have discussed already above, they justify compulsory voting as serving the 
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public good (without elaborating what exactly the public good is, but do say that CV brings 
‘benefits of increased legitimacy, representativeness, political equality and minimisation of 
elite power’ (Ibid) not once doubting the fact that any reasonable individual will see the case 
for compulsory turnout. 
Lijphart, on the other hand, attempts to circumvent the controversy surrounding the 
strong version of CV by clearly stating that the only requirement a citizen should have is to 
turn out at Election Day and cross his or hers name off the voters’ list. Such a practice appears 
certainly as a weaker version to Keaney and Rogers’ proposal but closer examination will 
reveal that it also constrains individual freedom, though is somewhat less imposing than the 
former example. Lever (2007: 26) makes the acute observation that in Lijphart’s version ‘the 
case for forcing turnout, but not voting, is obscure’ and suggests that Lijphart’s approach, 
although it disguises itself as a less demanding version of CV, will produce, in the end, the 
same results as Keaney and Rogers’ proposal. The logic is that it is reasonable to assume that 
most people, due to the fact they have already turned out at the polling station and crossed off 
their names from the register will cast a vote as well; not doing so would not be worthwhile 
and would seem to most people as a complete waste of time.113 It is clear that that the 
truthfulness of such an assertion is difficult to establish for certain, as this is very unstable 
ground we are treading on and further research in this area could prove useful; however, the 
same goes for trying to deny such a claim. Equally difficult is the attempt to ascertain how the 
two concepts of compulsory voting (weak and strong) would actually differ from each other 
with regards to the voting itself – i.e., would there be any variation in the amount of votes cast 
in a system of compulsory turnout as Lijphart understands it and CV envisioned by Keaney 
and Rogers? There is no case study which I could draw on, but logic would dictate that there 
would not be much difference.114 In any event, the fact that people are prone to vote whilst at 
the polling booth does not, by any means, justify the practice of forcing them to attend thus 
infringing on their right not to vote (understood as the right not to attend). Lever (2007: 24) 
points out that Lijphart would probably regard the practice of forcing a citizen to accept a 
ballot or register a legally valid vote as something inconsistent with certain fundamental 
liberties – ‘the people’s freedom of conscience and, quite possibly, their privacy too.’ 
                                                 
113 This, however, does not mean that the people who have voted because they have already turned out as a result 
of CV would have voted in the first place provided they had a choice under the voluntary voting system.  
114 This is another topic worth further research: whether compulsory voting systems around the world are true 
compulsory voting systems as Keaney and Rogers understand them or compulsory turnout systems as Lijphart 
understands them. Comparing the rates of participation with the votes cast as well as the amount of protest/spoilt 
ballots would be useful and worthwhile indicators.  
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However, compulsory voting itself seems exactly to violate such a freedom of conscience, i.e. 
abstention from the electoral process. 
For example, Australia readily permits citizens to abstain on religious grounds, 
however vis-à-vis other arguments is quite unyielding. Nevertheless, making a case for 
abstention on a different justification than religion does not make the argument for the right 
not to vote any weaker – ideological reasons may be just as reasonable (indeed, I regard it as 
much more reasonable) as invoking some divine order. The relentlessness of Australian courts 
neatly illustrates some of the absurdities inherent in a CV regime and also illustrates that in 
this country, it is compulsory voting which is required by law, not turnout (I believe it is also 
here where Keaney and Rogers draw their inspiration for their ‘compulsory turnout’ system). 
Australian authorities regularly accept the objection to vote on religious grounds as a valid 
defence (implied in the case of Douglass v Ninnes in 1976), however other conscientious 
reasons for non-voting are on the whole not regarded as a sufficient reason by the state 
authorities and courts. 
Australia is typically regarded as the ideal-type compulsory voting country – turnout is 
high (usually around 95%), the system is well administrated, penalties strictly enforced and 
CV also does not violate the right not to vote which is guaranteed by the secret ballot. 
Detailed examination will, however, show that this is not the case as there exist some very 
problematic areas. While it is certainly true that, due to the fact that the ballot is secret, there 
is no way of forcing people to vote, to suppose that the system sanctifies non-voting 
behaviour would be very misleading; the opposite is the case as it is not turnout which is 
important to authorities but voting itself. This is evident (as cited by Chong, Davidson and 
Fry (2005-6: 12) from a report made for the Australian Electoral Commission (Medew 2003: 
7)) which clearly expresses its worries that there is no guarantee that ‘everyone will comply 
with the electoral laws and vote formally’ and is in accordance with the statement made 
earlier by the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2004: 183) that the secret ballot 
makes it impossible ‘to determine whether all electors have met their legislated duty to vote’ 
(my italics), though it argues that it at least possible to measure the level of turnout. In this 
light, further evidence that it is voting not turning out which is required can be extrapolated 
from the fact that it is illegal to spoil a ballot. Though Orr (1997: 292) points out that it ‘it is 
not technically an offence to fail … to record a formal vote’ yet acknowledges that ‘electoral 
officials probably do have the power to force electors to actually vote, whether by stopping 
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them leaving the polling station without depositing the ballot paper in the ballot box’,115 
Twomey (1996: 11) points out that marking a ballot informally is actually an offence in 
Australia because it does not meet the requirements of the Commonwealth Electoral Act’s 
guidelines how to vote; as a result if citizens are actually to choose between different 
candidates neither of which they prefer, they are actually forced to lie and a ‘vote which is a 
lie and does not represent the view of the elector is treated as being of greater importance to 
the system of representative democracy, than one which truly represents a person’s political 
opinion, as long as the elector may freely choose between those candidates standing for 
election.’ Indeed, Twomey calls this an ‘unsatisfactory view of the meaning of ‘representative 
democracy’’ (Ibid). Also, if voters were to, as Chong, Davidson and Fry (2005-6: 12) point 
out, ‘simply put the ballot in their pocket and leave the polling booth’ this would be ‘in 
defiance of section 339 (1)’ of the act itself entitled ‘Compulsory Voting’! This push to have 
rather high voting than turnout is clearly evident in court rulings against non-voters in 
Australia.  
As I have said, ideological reasons (as opposed to religious ones) are not sufficient 
reasons for non-voting as the case of Judd v McKeon (38 CLR 380) in 1926 illustrates. The 
court then dismissed Judd’s claim that as a socialist he could not vote for capitalist parties or 
support the social system based on capitalism116 and asserted that the only ‘valid and 
sufficient’ reason was the ‘personal physical inability to record a vote’ (without further 
concretising the matter), not turn up; in 1970 in the case of Lubcke v Little (VR 807) at first 
the Magistrate agreed that Little had a sufficient reason for non-voting, because he had no 
preference among the candidates at the election, however, the Supreme Court of Victoria on 
appeal overturned the verdict on the grounds that ‘voting is certainly preferential ... but it does 
not follow that a subjective incapacity on the part of the voter to determine that he prefers one 
candidate in an election to another affords a valid and sufficient reason for failing to vote’ 
(Australian Electoral Commission 2004: 4). Even more shockingly a year later in the case of 
Faderson v Bridger (1971, 126 CLR 271) the court dismissed Faderson’s claim that, not 
having any preference, it would have been a lie to state his preference as the ballot required 
him to do so. The High Court affirmed that 
                                                 
115 According to Orr these powers are derived from four sections within the Commonwealth Electoral Act 
(1918): they are section 233 (‘the voter upon receipt of the ballot-paper shall without delay … mark his or her 
vote on the ballot-paper … and … deposit it in the ballot-box’), section 240 (a person must mark the candidates 
on his vote in order of preference), section 339 (1) (‘fraudulently take any ballot-paper out of any polling booth 
or counting centre’), and section 348 (1) (‘disobey a lawful direction given by the person in charge of the 
premises’).  
116 This case created a precedent which was later applied to most of the other objections against CV. 
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[h]owever much the elector may say he has no personal preference for any candidate, that none of them 
will suit him, he is not asked that question nor required to express by his vote that opinion. He is asked to 
express a preference amongst those who are available for election. That is to state which of them, if he must have 
one or more of them as Parliamentary representatives, as he must, to mark down his vote in an order of 
preference of them (Australian Electoral Commission 2004: 4). 
 
 The case of O’Brien v Warden (1981, 37 ACTR 13) was in Chong, Davidson and 
Fry’s words (2005-6) even more ‘damning’. Warden arrived a week prior to the election but 
had no knowledge of the candidates and views they represented. The magistrate found such an 
explanation satisfactory, however, on appeal Warden was found guilty of breaking the law – 
the Justice stated that CV legislation in his view does ‘not oblige the elector to make a true 
expression of his preference among the candidates. On one view he must make an expression 
of apparent preference; on another he need not express himself intelligibly or at all’ 
(Australian Electoral Commission 2004: 5). 
To me, such verdicts sound preposterous and violate the right to freely choose. Indeed, 
as Chong, Davidson and Fry point out (2005-6: 12) these rulings seem to be at odds with the 
‘more noble propositions that compulsory voting reflects the will of the people, or that it 
teaches the benefits of political participation’. If anything, the authors note, voters are taught 
that they need not make intelligent choices, only cast a valid ballot. Indeed, it seems that the 
authorities regard the citizen as an automaton with only limited electoral choices they can 
make and abstention is not one of them – hardly something desirable in a democratic society. 
As the system seems not to care about the ‘subjective incapacity’ of the voter to decide, it de 
facto sanctifies donkey votes and opposes purposefully spoiling the ballot.117 So, it appears 
that although the religious objection to vote (i.e., to the institution of voting as such) is readily 
accepted by Australian authorities, attempts to oppose compulsory voting on ideological 
grounds (such as objecting to the CV system itself, lack of sufficient knowledge to make an 
informed decision or not wishing to vote in a particular election) are rather short-lived. 
Australia seems to accept an objection to voting in general but not any opposition to the 
                                                 
117 Another serious problem which Chong, Davidson and Fry (2005-6: 13) highlight is the onset of electronic 
voting and the possibility of the spoiling one’s ballot. They express their worries that with the possible increase 
of the computerised ballot in the future, it will become increasingly difficult to spoil the vote – they mention the 
example of internet surveys that do not allow to finish the process of answering them until all required fields are 
filled out and all necessary boxes checked. Without the none-of-the-above option voting, not just turning out, 
would become compulsory. 
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system of compulsory voting or in the case of a particular election – one must therefore use 
his right to vote absolutely, or never at all.118  
This is absurd and as Lever (2007: 28) remarks ‘[s]uch a position seems remarkably 
arbitrary, morally and politically. A conscientious objection to being compelled to vote can be 
fully as conscientious as an objection to voting itself.’ She draws up an analogy between 
conscientious objectors for war: people who are not pacifists should fight in all conflicts and 
should not choose which wars to fight and which not to fight. This sounds equally absurd. 
According to Lever, due to the fact that Australia chooses to excuse people with an objection 
to voting in general (mostly on religious grounds), but does not exempt from the duty to vote 
those with reservations against that duty or particular election, the country effectively violates 
the principles of freedom and equality of citizens. Implicit in her objection to compulsory 
voting is the question why, in the Australian case, one set of arguments is taken into account 
whilst others are completely disregarded. In effect, the citizens are expected to behave a 
certain way and if they do not wish to participate they are ‘free’ to do so, provided they give 
the right excuse to the authorities. In this light, Hill (2007: 18) mentions that it it in the 
interest of a CV system to ‘allow dissenters like these to abstain without penalty’ for two 
reasons: ‘because their claims are morally compelling in terms of the types of democratic 
values compulsory voting is supposed to serve’ and ‘because such highly publicised cases of 
prosecuted voting recalcitrance are likely, over time, to bring the institution of compulsory 
voting into unjustified disrepute, especially when such recalcitrance results in a gaol 
sentence’. 
Coming back to the two cases for compulsion presented above, I maintain that both 
examples – Lijphart’s and Keaney and Rogers’ – infringe on the right not to vote not only 
because of the fact that there is not much room for abstention in both cases but also because 
both accounts work with the assertion that the citizen must explain his actions to the state 
authorities if he fails to behave in the way dictated by law (regardless whether it is simply to 
turn out or cast a valid ballot). In my view, such a provision violates the right not to vote 
precisely because of this required explanation and the possible penalties which follow if one 
ignores this duty. It is interesting to put this into perspective with the right to vote – whereas 
no one sane would, within the democratic context, question a citizen’s candidate or party of 
choice or make him state why had he voted in such and such a way, proponents of 
                                                 
118 I appreciate the fact that in the Australian case authorities are quite ready to accept many excuses, this, 
however, does not alleviate the fact that it is not possible to protest by non-voting against the system of 
compulsion without being fined or not voting in a particular election because of the choice of candidates.  
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compulsory voting seem to have no difficulty in making the non-voter explain why he did not 
vote. To me this further demonstrates the absurd nature of CV because the freedom associated 
with the right to vote and the freedom associated with the right not to vote go hand in hand 
and are inseparable within the democratic context. The freedom to abstain from the electoral 
process altogether (not to vote) should be unconditional and independent of further 
clarification much as the right to vote is. Furthermore, it is important to realise that abstaining 
from the electoral process is also a form of voting (though passive, but voting nonetheless) – 
admittedly, it may not please many people that citizens decide not to vote in elections (myself 
included) but this is something one should learn to appreciate, to examine and, if needs be, 
address the true causes behind abstention (which can be even in some cases beneficial to a 
democracy as I will discuss in the next chapter). 
This is why I cannot regard neither version of compulsory voting (weak or strong) as 
justifiable in fulfilling the right not to vote which I believe is not satisfied simply by having a 
‘none of the above’ option, by the possibility to spoil one’s ballot or by signing one’s name 
off the register. In effect, in their attempt to imprint the duty to vote on the society (by 
stressing the importance of universal turnout or near universal turnout as the next logical step 
following universal suffrage) by institutionalising CV, supporters of compulsion in actual fact 
do away with the right not to vote which they seem to regard as something unnecessary for a 
democracy. This, however, is false because in such a case we are left only with the duty to 
vote which gives elections a rather nasty authoritarian tinge as citizens must vote, provide 
explanation when not voting (only some of which are accepted), and if practicing the ‘right 
not to vote’ (not usually the case as this would be a waste of time) their protests are not 
seriously taken into account. If one of the principles of democracy is having free and fair 
elections, part of this freedom must be the right not to vote understood as the right to abstain 
from the electoral process altogether. The right to vote without the right not to vote loses its 
meaning and the duty to vote does not presuppose the right not to vote, and in fact neither the 
right to vote – the duty to vote supersedes the right to vote, rendering it trivial and obsolete. 
Lever (2007: 22) in addition points out that there is a significant difference between 
the rights and duties of the electors and their representatives: as opposed to ordinary citizens, 
legislators may well be required on some occasions to vote – for example because of party 
discipline – openly and even in a given way. However, universal suffrage does not imagine 
such a case so ‘it is hard to justify a general duty to vote, or a duty to vote publicly, simply 
because one is a citizen and has a right to vote’ (Lever 2007: 23). Representatives are voted 
into parliament simply to make decisions on the citizens’ behalf (i.e. vote) but this logic does 
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not work the other way around – citizens are not obliged to vote for their representatives, they 
do not owe them their legitimacy, more than anything else the parliamentarians must seek 
legitimacy the citizens. This, however, I will cover momentarily in the second point in this 
chapter. 
To summarise the arguments why the right not to vote is not something trivial, I 
believe it is important to think of the right to vote as something inseparable from the right not 
to vote. Indeed, though Verba and Nie (1972: 1) claim that ‘the more participation there is in 
decisions, the more democracy there is’, it important to realise that even the choice to abstain 
must be understood as a decision, notwithstanding its passive nature. Democracy is also about 
‘not taking decisions’ as much as actively doing so. One must – although this may be difficult 
at times – acknowledge the right to abstain as something implicit in democratic practice and 
equally important as the right not to vote. Gratschew (2002: 106) writes that the ‘leading 
argument against compulsory voting is that it is not consistent with the freedom associated 
with democracy. Voting is not an intrinsic obligation and the enforcement of such a law 
would be an infringement of the citizen’s freedom associated with democratic elections.’ I 
tend to agree and maintain that the right not to vote is necessary for democratic freedom. As I 
have shown, compulsory voting limits this freedom, even though it claims that is not the case; 
this is true for both weak and strong accounts – Lijphart’s and Keaney and Rogers’. The 
Australian case showed how narrow-minded and limiting a CV system can actually be, 
effectively curtailing freedom of citizens. Most proponents of compulsory voting recognise 
this: for example, Lijphart (1997: 16) writes: 
 
Probably the most serious objection to compulsory voting is normative in nature: compulsory voting 
may be an attractive partial solution to the conflict between the democratic ideals of participation and equality, 
but it is often said to violate a third democratic ideal, that of individual freedom. … That compulsion of any kind 
limits individual freedom cannot be denied, but the duty to vote entails only a very minor restriction. 
 
These pages illustrated that it is certainly not so. 
 
II-2-4-c: High turnout does not legitimise democracy 
Proponents of compulsory voting make it clear that high turnout makes a country 
healthier, more egalitarian and thus, ultimately, the whole democratic system more legitimate. 
The second part of this chapter will argue that this is not the case. In fact, I tend to believe that 
low turnout in itself is not necessarily bad and that it can indeed by high turnout which can be 
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harmful to a democracy in some cases. Within this context I raise three main objections to 
CV: (1) by focusing on raising turnout compulsory voting tackles the symptoms rather than 
the causes of low turnout and makes only superficial changes; (2) CV generates a 
considerable amount of invalid, protest, and donkey votes which indicate dissatisfaction with 
the system and undermine its legitimacy; (3) low yet genuine turnout is more legitimate than 
artificially high turnout, which could actually harm democracy. I will now deal with each 
objection in detail. 
 
II-2-4-c-1: CV tackles the symptoms rather than the causes 
I have already hinted at this problem in the first chapter when I talked about the 
possible reasons underlying declines in turnout and pointed out the fact that CV masks the 
serious issues tends behind the falls in participation. One of the most serious objections 
proponents of CV must deal with – apart from the suspected undemocratic nature vis-à-vis 
individual freedom – is the claim that CV deals only with the symptoms and not the causes of 
low voter turnout, in effect fixing problems on the surface by mechanically increasing 
participation without tackling the real issues causing low turnout. Such increases, I maintain, 
could even damage democracy rather than make it more legitimate and healthy. Indeed, I 
believe it stands to reason that if we make voters out of non-voters this does not in any way 
remove the discontent that caused abstention in the first place. 
Ballinger (2007) describes CV as a superficial form of ‘palliative care’. It concentrates 
on rectifying numbers without actually doing something about the causes that generate these 
figures. In the same vein Franklin (1999: 206) voices his scepticism that the causes of 
abstention can be solved by simply introducing compulsion as a ‘cure’ to the ‘disease’ of low 
turnout as CV ‘will not cure the underlying conditions that lead to low turnout’ but ‘divert 
attention from other proposed reforms … which would address genuine deficiencies’ and 
turnout could then be an authentic indicator of the health of a democracy, unlike turnout 
generated by compulsion (Ibid: 222). Selb and Lachat (2007: 23), though strongly arguing 
against low turnout, conclude by stating that ‘the sources of this problem, however, are likely 
to be unaffected by a decision to compel citizens to the polls’. Finally, Lever (2007: 16) 
points out that decision-makers should be concerned about the ‘multiple forms of deprivation 
that characterize this section of the non-voting population’ and not abstention per se. 
As I have established earlier from a socioeconomic point of view, it is mostly the 
poorer, younger and less educated citizens who are the core non-voters. These individuals 
obviously have many different reasons (albeit not all reasons, for example laziness, could be 
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deemed reasonable) why for non-voting but proponents of CV seem unconcerned with these 
different explanations. Instead supporters of compulsion champion the broadest and easiest 
strategy possible to boost turnout, but they do so only for turnout’s sake.  
As one has already seen, there may be might be many different reasons for turnout to 
fall: they might be caused by socioeconomic and demographic factors, institutional reforms 
(or lack thereof), or by political culture. Tackling these issues may be difficult but very 
important for making a democratic state a better place to live in. I believe that instead 
‘cheating’ and applying the quick-fix solution of CV, politicians and political theorists should 
rather concentrate on the promotion of policies which will mend the problems and 
subsequently result in natural increases of turnout (or it is also possible that not, if the nature 
of citizenry is changing from the supportive to the critical electorate) without the coercion 
involved in institutionalising CV. If we are well aware of the fact that the poor do not vote, 
should we not rather focus our efforts on the creation of a fairer tax system or labour laws? If 
the young do not vote because they harbour feelings of mistrust for the political elite, should 
not the focus be on regaining their trust? If the less educated tend to in general vote less than 
their more educated counterparts, should not there be a governmental reform of the education 
system rather than making the citizens show up at elections under the threat of penalties? 
Surely, for the disadvantaged groups voting is usually bottom of the list, whereas finding a 
job, affordable housing or healthcare would be pursued with far greater urgency. By 
equalising voter turnout the however does not equalise the life chances of the most 
disadvantaged citizens within the society (indeed, I have shown that the link between high 
voter turnout and a higher social-democratic representation is very dubious). Compulsory 
voting aims to equalise and raise turnout, especially amongst the young, less educated and 
poor; however, the penalties (most notably the financial sanctions) accompanying CV in 
systems with strict enforcement are most likely to have the heaviest impact precisely on these 
citizens – older people come to the polls in far greater numbers than young voters and people 
who are better off are less likely to feel the financial consequences of the penalty. 
Paradoxically, compulsory voting coerces into compliance and has the greatest impact on 
those who are said to benefit the most from CV. In effect the laws could end up, as Keaney 
and Rogers (2006: 7) warn, ‘heavily discriminating against the very groups the measure is 
meant to support’ and the whole provision would be turned on its head.119 Indeed a 
                                                 
119 However, in defence of compulsory voting it must be said that even in strict enforcement systems like 
Australia or Belgium the authorities invite non-voters to explain their conduct and sound reasons are readily 
accepted. By the same token some states ‘offer loopholes, intentionally and otherwise, which allow non-voters to 
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hypothetical situation of introducing compulsory voting in Poland would seem to have 
precisely such an affect as people without work would, according to Czesnik’s (2007: 14-5) 
research, most likely remain non-voters, despite the risk of being fined; the main reason 
seemed to be to a form of protest. 
The danger that CV brings is, that it may lull governments into complacency because 
high voter turnout masks the underlying problems of low voter turnout and can shift our 
concentration for some serious political issues. In this sense, ‘compulsory voting is, at best, a 
distraction from the serious moral and political problems … and at worst, is likely to persuade 
governments … that “something is being done”, although the most serious forms of inequality 
will have been left unchanged’ (Lever 2007: 16-7). Indeed, one sometimes tends to suspect 
that compulsory voting and high turnout figures are of the most benefit to politicians and the 
image of a state they want to project within the wider world as a successful, legitimate and 
healthy democratic country, as opposed to other states where turnout is generally much lower. 
One must admit that the fact that 90% of citizens turned up at the polling booths looks very 
good on the news – nationally and internationally. But, again, I stress that this is only a 
convenient façade which masks the more important problems within a community and these 
problems, because everything looks in the best of order and the democratic system seems to 
be thriving, are left untreated. The incentives to societal changes will be weak at best as there 
will be considerably less motivation for politicians, parties and governments to respond to the 
changes that are taking place within society (providing that it is somehow possible to pinpoint 
the problems in the first place). And this complacency may actually be one of the causes of 
stagnation and unresponsiveness of a democratic political system. This is why I believe that 
CV can pose certain dangers, and these feelings of self-satisfaction might in the end very well 
be more hazardous than low voter turnout. This brings me to the second point in this section. 
 
II-2-4-c-2: Compulsory voting generates dissatisfaction 
In countries with CV everything seems to be in the best of order. Nearly everyone 
votes, and thus nearly everyone’s voice is heard and taken into account. The system must thus 
be better and fairer than one where only half of the population comes to the ballot box. Does 
this then mean that there is no opposition and disinterest to the fact that one is obliged by law 
to vote? Simply put, there certainly is. And it surely is not small. 
                                                                                                                                                        
go unpunished. For example, in many countries it is required to vote only if you are a registered voter, but it is 
not compulsory to register’ (Gratschew 2002, 107). 
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Measuring the level of dissatisfaction with CV in a country using compulsion is, 
however, tricky. One must bear in mind that in a country using CV there is no real feedback 
on the actual level of electoral engagement and one must at times need to re-create certain 
data. A compulsory voting system does away with some useful statistical indicators which 
political scientists can use to gauge what is ‘going on’ in the society and help pinpoint 
continuing problems – indeed, how else would political scientists know that the typical non-
voter is mostly young, uneducated and poor and how else could politicians shift their attention 
to address the problems of these citizens? To be sure, CV supporters will claim that such a 
question in Australia or in Belgium is absolutely irrelevant as nearly everyone votes and as to 
the few non-voters, the government does not need to concern itself with them as they 
constitute only an insignificant minority. Surely, such a reply can be expected but one needs 
to ask, as I pointed out above, whether one does not miss out on some important aspects. 
Again, by institutionalising high participation through CV, does not cause problems to go 
away, any more than one can turn lead into gold by merely wishing it. High turnout generated 
by compulsion is not a magic pill which solves all democratic headaches. But to come back to 
the issue of dissatisfaction a compulsory voting system generates: the fact that non-voters in 
countries with CV legislation form a minority does not by any chance mean that people are 
satisfied with compulsion. In fact, one may easily prove that it is not the case. How? By 
looking at the number of protest and random votes. 
It is important to realise that we are dealing with two issues here: protest votes against 
the coercive system of CV (blank and spoilt ballots) and uninterested votes (donkey votes). 
Whereas empirical data for the former is readily available, the latter are statistically somewhat 
tricky-to-measure. I will first discuss the protest votes. 
It will probably not come as much of a surprise that countries practicing compulsion 
have quite a high ratio of invalid/blank ballots vis-à-vis regimes with voluntary turnout. 
Drawing on concrete empirical evidence, it can easily be verified that compulsory voting 
indeed has detrimental effects on the electoral process: there is a direct correlation between 
CV and the amount of invalid ballots cast. Gratschew points out that there is proof ‘that 
forcing the population to vote results in an increased number of invalid and blank votes 
compared to countries that have no compulsory voting laws’ (Gratschew 2002: 106, see also 
Mackerras and McAllister 1999: 224-6). The invalid votes could be interpreted as protest 
votes which to a considerable extent illustrate the level of dissatisfaction that a not 
inconsiderable number of voters harbour against CV. Let us examine three well-established 
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democracies with a strong tradition of strict compulsion – Australia, Belgium and 
Luxembourg – and examine the number of invalid ballots during recent elections.120 
 
 
Invalid ballots cast in Australian federal elections, 1946-2007
Source: International IDEA
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120 Statistics were provided by the International IDEA webpage. 
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Invalid ballots cast in Belgian parliamentary elections,
1946-2007
Source: International IDEA
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Invalid ballots cast in parliamentary elections
in Luxembourg, 1948-1999
Source: International IDEA
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 BOX 7: DOES COMPULSORY VOTING MAKE CITIZENS STUPID? 
 
Proponents of compulsory voting do have an explanation why there are so many 
invalid ballots in CV systems as opposed to voluntary voting ones and, as one might 
expect, it has nothing to do with expressions of dissatisfaction. In the Australian case CV 
advocates maintain it is the complexity of the nearly perfect electoral system that is the 
cause of invalid voting. 
Bean (1986: 31) argues that the spoilt ballots are a consequence of preferential 
system of voting rather than CV legislation; McAllister and Makkai (1993: 23) claim that 
the interaction between a ‘large number of immigrants’, compulsory voting and the 
‘complexity of the electoral system’ are the cause of spoilt ballots rather than protesting 
citizens. The question how much of these votes are protest votes is a matter of contention, 
yet I hardly believe that even the complexity of the ballot could not result in so many 
invalid votes. If it is the case, this certainly gives enough cause for serious action as the 
electoral system may not be as perfect as it is claimed it is. 
Proponents of compulsion maintain that in the Australian case informal votes are 
mainly ‘accidental’ and caused by immigrants and people with literacy problems (Hill 
2007: 16); spoilt votes occur because of numerous candidates on a ballot and the necessity 
to mark them in the correct preferential sequence – the more candidates there are the more 
likely it is that the voter will cast an invalid ballot (McAllister, Makkai and Patterson 1992, 
see also Young 2004); Mackerras and McAllister (1999: 226-7) list four reasons which in 
their eyes significantly contribute to informal voting: a) complex nature of Australia’s 
electoral system, b) frequency of elections, c) House, Senate and sometimes referenda are 
held together and each vote must be cast in a different manner and d) differences to cast a 
formal vote in state and federal levels. 
In this light I find it rather ironic that the Australian system is often praised as one 
of the best democratic systems in the world when it is so complicated that as a result many 
people actually cannot manage to cast a valid vote though it is the idea behind compulsion 
that everyone’s opinion should be heard and that all ballots have equal worth. From what 
one can tell CV advocates do not seem to be bothered by this at all. 
So, even if we accept the claim that it is the sheer complexity of the Australian system that 
contributes to informal voting, there is still another issue which troubles me. How to 
explain the number of invalid votes in other CV regimes? From a comparative perspective, 
increased percentages of spoilt ballots are a matter of fact in all CV countries, such as 
Belgium, Luxembourg or until 1970 the Netherlands. The voting systems do not 
significantly differ from one country to another – granted, there might be certain 
idiosyncrasies but on the whole it is about highlighting one’s choice. If we elaborate this 
premise further, it would mean that either Australian voters are, simply put, more 
incompetent than their European counterparts (which I doubt very much) or that CV in 
general has a negative effect on citizens’ ability to cast a valid vote, making them 
essentially more stupid (which I find equally doubtful). If we dismiss these two 
possibilities, than we are left with the simplest, and thus probably the most accurate 
explanation possible: invalid votes are protest votes. 
 
The results prove that, notwithstanding the fact that turnout in these countries remains 
high (around the 90% mark), on average around 5% to 6% of voters spoil their votes; indeed, 
Australia has ‘one of the highest levels of spoiled ballots among established democracies’ as 
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McAllister and Makkai point out (1993: 23) and indeed in the 2004 election in Greenway the 
amount of informal votes reached a striking 11.83% (Young 2004: 1); Power and Timmons 
Roberts’ research (1995) shows, that in the case of Brazil, these invalid votes amounted as 
much as 40%. Correspondingly, the amount of invalid ballots in countries without 
compulsory voting is usually under 1%; one could regard these votes as ballots invalidated by 
error; it is very much doubtful whether citizens who actually make the effort to vote under a 
voluntary system would spoil them on purpose. By the same token, it seems to me very 
improbable that in countries with compulsory voting there would be so many individuals 
unable to correctly fill out a ballot. 
It must be pointed out that in states with proportional representation the threshold a 
party needs to get into parliament is commonly around 5% – there thus ‘exists’ a protest party 
which ends up not being represented and CV proponents do not seem to care much about 
this.121 
                                                 
121 Obviously, such a party would not be able to agree on anything else than abolishing CV; this, however, does 
not weaken the argument that there is a considerable amount of people who are dissatisfied with the system and 
cast invalid votes. 
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 BOX 8: THE NONE OF THE ABOVE VOTE 
 
In part, the problem surrounding the increased number of protest votes in a CV 
regime may be linked to the fact that not many states have the institution of a formal 
protest vote – the so called ‘none of the above’ option; Engelen (2007: 28) writes that this 
formalised protest vote would be ‘more attractive’ than having citizens simply spoil their 
ballot or cast a blank vote. At the present only France, Spain and Ukraine have a 
formalised ‘none of the above’ vote; it was also part of the electoral system in Russia but 
the authorities abolished this practice as in 2006 as part of a broader voting reform (Angus 
Reid Global Monitor 2006); Matsler (2003: 955, 971-2) also stresses its importance in the 
case of making voting mandatory in the United States. The problems associated with the 
‘none of the above’ ballot are obvious: what would happen if it were to actually ‘win’ the 
election? Judging from the current state of affairs in democracies this is, realistically 
speaking, almost impossible but even if it somehow did, there does not seem much that 
could happen, apart from abolishing the compulsory voting system (or starting a serious 
debate to this end) and holding another election, as the otherwise ensuing power vacuum 
could be even more dangerous than a government without a substantial majority backing it. 
This is partly because that the ‘none of the above’ option has nothing in common except 
the dissatisfaction with the parties and their representatives or with the practiced political 
system, but as Matsler (2003: 972) points out it may also ‘stand for the proposition that 
marijuana ought to be decriminalized … that more national parks ought to receive funding, 
that Mumia should be set free, that the death penalty should be reconsidered’ etc. 
I believe that proponents of compulsory voting are well aware of this fact and are 
therefore quite willing to grant the none-of-the above option to the electorate. It is a 
strategy how to keep the opponents of CV happy that one can somehow formally voice his 
opposition to compulsory voting but at the same time do nothing to fundamentally reform 
the system. In this light, Engelen’s (2007: 31) comment that in a CV regime ‘politicians 
have to listen to their [the discontents] voices, which would otherwise never be heard’ as 
inconsequential and Hill’s suggestion (2006: 223) that in case of the creation of a protest 
vote it could contain ‘a blank space for respondents to write their own comments’ as 
trifling: I cannot imagine civil servants reading through and analysing each and every 
comment, let alone politicians taking any heed of them. 
Another interesting question linked to the one above is, what would happen if 
citizens were to vote for example in a referendum to abolish democracy in favour of a 
benevolent dictatorship? This is a remarkable dilemma for democratic theory but it would 
seem that there would be no other alternative than to accept the choice taken, even though 
this would be the last democratic decision the society would take. However, I will not 
further dwell on either of these issues, although it was useful to point them out. 
 
A good example of how compulsory voting increases invalid ballots (and voluntary 
voting virtually eliminates them) can be extrapolated from the voting statistics of the 
Netherlands, a country which abolished the practice of compulsory voting in 1970. After 
voluntary voting had been introduced there was a sharp drop in turnout,122 but by the same 
                                                 
122 On average around 15%: from 95% to 80% which still remains a result the United States and many European 
states could be proud to achieve. Hill (2006: 219), however, called this drop ‘drastic’ and pointed out low 
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token there was also a significant drop of the number of invalid votes which on the whole 
have stayed levelled on average around 0.5%; in 2003 it was just 0.1%. This, I believe, only 
proves that there is a causal link between compulsory voting and the amount of invalid 
ballots, i.e. protest votes. 
 
Invalid ballots cast in Dutch parliamentary elections,
1946-2006
Source: International IDEA
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Thus, CV does not only increase voter turnout but also as an undesired side-effect 
generates (which proponents of compulsion generally tend to omit in their research) a rather 
large amount of protest votes. 
However, apart from these invalid and/or blank votes, one must also take into account 
the second type of irregular ballots: the so-called donkey votes. When considering these votes 
(typical especially in Australia) the situation is somewhat different from invalid ballots. A 
donkey vote is defined as an uninformed/uninterested/random vote which occurs ‘when an 
elector simply numbers the ballot paper from top to bottom (or bottom to top) without regard 
                                                                                                                                                        
participation figures for regional and European elections; in this light it is perhaps ironic that voting is 
compulsory in Australia only for federal and state elections but not all municipal ones.  
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to the logic of the preference allocation. A donkey vote is counted as a valid vote because it 
contains a number ‘1’ and has numbered every square in sequential order.’123 Donkey votes 
can generally be viewed from two perspectives: (a) as a means for people without any 
knowledge or interest in politics to fulfil their citizens’ duty without spoiling the vote, and (b) 
where the ‘none of the above’ option does not exist, instead of spoiling a ballot or casting a 
blank one, the citizen can choose to cast the donkey vote as a form of a protest against the 
electoral system and/or current political establishment though it is impossible to interpret it as 
such. 
The problem with donkey votes in Australia is nothing new and actually, it has been 
around right since the institution of compulsory voting in 1924.124 In 1984 local authorities 
were forced to introduce voting reforms to mitigate this effect as much as possible, for 
example by providing a random list of the candidates rather than using the alphabetical order 
or listing of party names besides the name of each candidate; furthermore, ballot papers are 
not the same but each has the candidates listed differently. Though it is claimed that such a 
practice virtually eliminates donkey votes, I remain sceptical (in much the same way as it is 
claimed that high participation enforced by CV solves problems associated with low turnout) 
– this practice, in fact, makes it only impossible to measure them, but does not eliminate 
them. Indeed, for political scientists these random votes pose a serious challenge because in a 
system of compulsion it is virtually impossible to measure them. In the case of Australia 
estimates speak of up to 2%,125 other research mentions 3% (Mayer 1966: 154) and another 
still 1-3% (Goudie 2000). 
All together the amount of protest votes and the donkey votes make up a noticeable 
blot on the high turnout numbers created by compulsory voting. To be sure, CV supporters 
could object that the percentage of invalid ballots and donkey votes are not that high as 
opposed to the, for example, circa 40% of British citizens who did not vote in 2001. However, 
at the same time it must be remembered that even in compulsory voting regimes turnout is 
never a 100% – in strict systems around 10% of citizens do not usually show up (in more 
lenient compulsory voting systems this number often is much higher). If we add this number 
(10%) to the amount of invalid and donkey votes (say around 5%) we arrive at an actual 
turnout figure of 85%. In this light it must be pointed out that turnout in its high eighties can 
                                                 
123 Definition provided by Australian Politics Website 
http://australianpolitics.com/elections/features/donkey.shtml (accessed 08/2007).  
124 For a more extensive study of the relation of donkey votes to Australian federal elections, see Orr 2002. 
125 Australian Politics, http://australianpolitics.com/elections/features/donkey.shtml (accessed 08/2007). 
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be achieved even in countries without compulsion – for example Malta,126 Italy, New Zealand 
or Germany frequently achieve such results. 127 And it is important to keep in mind that 
turnout of around 90% is feasible mainly in countries with strict forms of CV (nowadays only 
four states) as turnout in countries without such a level of enforcement is often much lower, 
like mean participation of 70% in Argentina. To be sure, this is still higher than turnout during 
the last two general elections in the United Kingdom by around 10% but again, within the 
wider world, 70% turnout is not such a rare occurrence. As I have said earlier, voter 
participation can be a very fluctuating variable and it is quite possible that turnout will again 
begin to rise in the near future. 
However, those these numbers may still be high, the protest and random votes I 
believe have some serious implications for the concept of legitimacy of a CV regime. 
Whereas in systems with voluntary voting there is no real opposition to the regime, this is not 
the case in a country with CV as the empirical evidence presented above clearly 
demonstrated. In this respect I ask the question what use are concerns about a more legitimate 
democracy when the electoral system itself engenders considerable opposition and disinterest 
from voters? Given the rather large amount of invalid votes, doubts may be cast about the 
legitimacy of the institution of CV itself and accordingly the legitimacy of the government 
elected by such a system – are the elections truly free and fair when citizens are forced to 
attend? In this respect the legitimacy of the government and also the system of CV is being 
devalued by the considerable number of protest and random votes. Indeed, as Abraham (1955: 
21) claims an ‘unwilling or indifferent vote is a thoughtless one’ but proponents of 
compulsion either trivialise the whole issue or turn a blind eye to this fact completely. This 
discussion now brings me to the third part of this chapter. 
 
II-2-4-c-3: High turnout can damage democracy 
I have said at the beginning of Part II that one of the two key normative ideas CV 
revolves on is the concept that high participation is good because it increases the legitimacy 
and the health of a democracy. Indeed, many opponents of compulsion, myself included, 
                                                 
126 Admittedly, Malta is something of an anomaly vis-à-vis turnout: not only due to its small and geographically 
concentrated population and government, committed electorate and proportional representation resulting in one-
party executives. For more details about the particularities in Malta, see Hirczy (1995) and Siaroff and Merer 
(2002: 917). 
127 Hill and Louth (2005: 28-9) claim that in the case of abolishing compulsory voting in Australia one could 
expect the same level of turnout as for example in New Zealand and Malta due to the political circumstances in 
both countries. Though there would be a large drop in turnout in Australia were voluntary voting be introduced 
(as much as 40 %) this does not weaken the argument that there are voluntary voting regimes with high levels of 
turnout.  
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would agree that higher turnout is preferable to low turnout. Where we, however, differ is the 
fact that CV advocates maintain that all forms of low and unequal turnout are bad. For them 
high participation rates make an elected government more legitimate, but not only the 
government – proponents of compulsory voting maintain that high turnout makes the whole 
democratic system more healthy and legitimate, therefore citizens have a duty to vote. I am 
convinced that such a claim suffers from a profound fallacy. Indeed, I maintain that 
unnaturally high turnout as created by CV may actually harm rather than help democracy. Let 
us look at this argument in greater detail. 
Having the possibility to vote must be one of the basic requirements of any democratic 
system. Free and fair voting is in this light not only a right but also one of the sources from 
which a democracy draws its legitimacy. That much is clear. However, where I believe CV 
proponents make a mistake is they equate the legitimacy of an elected government with the 
legitimacy of the whole democratic system. I believe it is fundamental to distinguish between 
the two. An election in itself is not a referendum about the legitimacy of democracy as a 
system per se as proponents of compulsory voting tend to see it. The basic idea of a 
democracy, as opposed to other systems of government, is the concept that citizens govern 
themselves (either through their elected representatives or by directly participating in the 
decision-making process). The procedure how to achieve this is to have an election or a 
referendum. 
As I have established earlier, proponents of compulsion are deeply convinced about 
the fact that low turnout is something to be worried about: for example Matsler (2003: 961) 
argues that high voter turnout ‘legitimizes a democracy in a way partial turnout never will’, 
and Engelen (2007: 25) claims that the ‘more citizens abstain, the more the elected bodies 
lose their accountability’. The reason why they and other authors are so concerned with high 
turnout is because they have a fundamentally different and, I believe, deeply flawed 
understanding of the relation between voting, legitimacy and democracy. In essence, CV 
advocates claim that high popular consent expressed by voter turnout in elections is the source 
of legitimacy of a democracy (the more voters, the better) and assume that those who do not 
participate play a part in the destabilisation of the democratic system (this leads them to their 
second normative point that non-voting is bad because it means free-riding on the public 
good). The reason why I think such a premise is false is that democratic legitimacy is not 
derived from high voter turnout but from having the right to vote in the first place and the 
possibility to have free and fair elections which are only an instrument by which one realises 
his right to vote. It is important to realise that elections by themselves are not a referendum 
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about the legitimacy of a particular democratic system nor a source of democracy, but a 
convenient instrument how to fulfil the basic democratic ideal of self-government, i.e., to 
choose a country’s representatives or decide on a issue of public importance. To assume that 
elections are a source of legitimacy of a democracy is simply preposterous: I could just as 
well make a silly claim that the churn is the source of legitimacy of butter. There is simply no 
relation between an election and the legitimacy of the democratic state. To be sure, low 
turnout may prove to be unfavourable to the legitimacy of a government, this does not 
however weaken my case. Free and fair elections are certainly important, but more important 
about this term are the two adjectives free and fair, which can, again, be traced back to the 
right to vote. The process of choosing our representatives in parliament must be transparent 
and competitive in a fair sense and open to all eligible voters (which in a democratic system 
means virtually all people regardless of age, social status, gender or religion). What matters is 
whether or not we fulfil this ideal, not the way how we choose to fulfil it. So, the same way 
elections (instrumentally) are not a source of legitimacy of a democracy so, too, high voter 
turnout is not a source of legitimacy of a democracy. As Jakee and Sun (2006: 69-70) argue, 
‘equating higher turnout with greater “legitimacy” (or even improved “democracy”) is overly 
optimistic, if not simplistic. Compulsory voting systems can certainly deliver the former, but 
not necessarily the latter.’ 
Lever (2007: 22), in this respect, points out that citizens do not owe electoral support 
to the government and thus do not have a duty to vote. Although citizens have a duty to 
support just institutions, this does not, however, establish a general duty to vote – ‘it is quite a 
step from a general duty to support just institutions to the claim that citizens are morally 
obliged to vote in every election and that moral obligation may be legally enforced.’ In this 
sense, Lever points out that support is understood as active participation and the ‘failure to 
vote in and of itself will count as failure to support just institutions’. I subscribe to Lever’s 
argument that government is there for the benefit of the governed not the other way around 
(see also Farrow 1998: 43). The citizens do not owe electoral support to the government, 
because not all (most likely a majority) people will not have voted for the government which 
formed the cabinet in the first place. The citizens do not owe electoral support to democracy, 
because democracy does not base its legitimacy on any particular election but on the practice 
of having free and fair elections. And this practice of having free and fair elections is the ‘just 
institution’ that citizens should support. In addition, it is important to realise that implicit in 
this practice is not only the right to vote, but also the right not to vote. 
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Another reason why high voter turnout cannot be the basis for the legitimacy of a 
democratic system is the numerous problems it creates. As I have already shown, CV 
generates a considerable amount of protest and random ballots. What does this tell us? It tells 
us that compulsory voting brings to elections citizens who have no interest in being there. In 
this respect, I believe it is important to ask: what value do such votes have? The ballots of 
individuals who do not understand and do not appreciate the nuances of the democratic 
system will be more as sand in the cogs of a clock than oil which makes in run smoother. 
The fact of the matter is, and what CV supporters tend not to understand, that more 
voters does not necessarily mean better choices. In a voluntary voting system it is safe to 
assume that only people who are (at least minimally) interested in casting a ballot are the ones 
who show up at elections, whereas in a CV regime a significant minority of people are forced 
to turn up against their will. My objection centres on the idea that compulsion forces citizens 
who are uninterested in politics and/or lack sufficient knowledge to meaningfully participate – 
as a result these individuals, who under a voluntary voting system would ordinarily abstain, 
are unlikely to cast a well considered vote. Selb and Lachat (2007: 19) prove this point when 
they state that ‘voters prone to abstain if CV was abolished [in Belgium] are less inclined to 
make their decisions in a way that coherently reflects their issue preferences’ as they have less 
political knowledge and lack the interest necessary to make reasoned decisions. This is why, 
according to the authors compulsion thus may have ‘undesirable effects’ (Ibid: 23); in a 
similar vein Wattenberg (1998: 20) points out that forcing people to vote in the United States 
could generate donkey voting.  
In this light I believe it is important to distinguish between genuine and non-genuine 
voter turnout: whereas in a voluntary voting system a of, say, 80% can be regarded as 
genuinely high (for example in Germany, Italy, or the Scandinavian states), it is impossible to 
say the same about these results in a CV country (if it were genuine, there would not have 
been compulsion in the first place). Forcing individuals who cannot make informed choices to 
come to the polling booth and vote in my eyes hardly represents a betterment of democracy. 
As we have seen, compulsion will not make them more informed anyway, so why should we 
dilute the quality of democracy by quantity? I do not think so that it is in the interest of the 
democratic system to coerce ignorant citizens (at least in political matters) to come to the 
polls. The reason why we should make something obligatory should be for the ideals of 
democracy, not because of numbers. To argue that more voters make a better democracy is a 
false argument – I might as well say that more patients will mean better healthcare which is 
absurd. This incessant insistence on high participation reminds me of making herds out of 
 123
citizens; indeed, it seems to me that CV supporters would rather have a herd of all citizens 
than a smaller group of individuals better accustomed to make informed rational choices. 
To be sure, compulsion seems to serve no other purpose than increasing turnout for 
turnout’s sake. This is why I am convinced that it is more useful to have a more genuine, 
albeit lower turnout, than to have artificially inflated rates generated by compulsion, and this 
is why low turnout may not be bad. 
Indeed, certain scholars have argued that the fact that people choose not to show up at 
an election may even be a sign of a healthy society – voters participate in elections when they 
feel there is an imminent danger to their way of life or when something very important is at 
stake (this ties in with Franklin’s notion of the critical citizenry that is discriminating in its 
voting habits). However, when changes in the political system will not really affect citizens in 
any important way, they may have no incentive to vote because their life will not change 
significantly if either party forms a government. This is, for example, why Lipset (1960; 
1981) claimed that a low level of participation may be taken as proof that the will of the 
citizens is expressed by existing government policies; Jones (1954: 36) describes political 
apathy as a ‘political virtue’, Hardin (1998: 24), at least concerning the example of the United 
States, calls it ‘evidence that government has not engendered grievous distrust and 
opposition’,128 and Wilson (1936: 76) argues that in ‘a society which only 50 percent of the 
electorate participates it is clear that politics does satisfy in a way the desire of the mass of the 
individuals in the state’ (see also Wilson 1930). Correspondingly as low turnout may not be 
such a bad thing so, too, high turnout may not be such a good thing – this claim is in line with 
Tingsten’s (1937) thesis that sudden increases in participation may be the evidence of tension 
and serious governmental malfunctioning and by the same token may bring to the polling 
booths citizens whose social attitudes are unhealthy from the point of view of the 
requirements of the democratic system;129 Morris-Jones (1954: 25) argued that high turnout 
was a ‘totalitarian’ idea and that a partially apathetic electorate was in fact safeguarding 
democracy and acting as a ‘counterforce to the fanatics who constitute the real danger to 
liberal democracy’ (Ibid: 37); in fact Prothro and Grigg (1960: 294) point out that a 
considerable part of non-voters may indeed be the fanatics Morris-Jones talks about as 
‘fortunately for the democratic system, those with the most undemocratic principles are also 
those who are least likely to act’. 
                                                 
128 Wattenberg (1998) contests such a claim and points out that in the American example non-voters are likely to 
be dissatisfied with the current political establishment. 
129 Of course, Tingsten was referring to a voluntary voting system – in a CV regime when needs to add the 
protest and random ballots I spoke about earlier. 
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Although Tingsten, Wilson nor Morris-Jones did not, in this light, write about 
compulsory voting,130 an interesting observation may be made regarding the claim that high 
turnout necessarily reflects socially unhealthy views of some citizens – in other words, the 
higher the number of voters, not only the more protest and random votes there will be, but by 
the same token the more extreme political outlooks not be congruent with a liberal 
democracy. Obviously such a claim would need to be tested by further research but the 
available scholarly studies seem to suggest that there is a good deal of truth to this line of 
reasoning. Engelen (2007: 28) acknowledges this when he affirms that in the Belgian region 
of Flanders ‘about a quarter of valid votes currently go to the extreme right-wing party’. 
Whilst examining the impact of the hypothetical abolition of compulsory voting in the area, 
data collected by De Ceunick, Devos, Reynaert, Valcke and Verlet (2007: 14-6) shows that 
the extreme right Vlaams Belang131 would as a result lose voters; though it would not be the 
only party to do so, it seems that its position would be considerably shaken as 30 to 40% of its 
voters (the most vis-à-vis all other parties) claimed that they would never go back to the 
polling booths, were CV abolished. In the Australian case, Mackerras and McAllister (1999: 
229) note that ‘[m]inor or protest parties benefit [from compulsory voting] because high 
turnout also mobilises disproportionately more swinging and uncommitted voters, who have 
usually defected from the major parties’ but at the same time point out that in the wider 
picture their gains are not that important (and neither are for the major parties as I proved 
earlier). In the Netherlands, which had CV legislation up to the year 1970, Irwin and van 
Holsteyn (2007: 9) found that nationalistic and authoritarian citizens were ‘more likely to 
support compulsory voting’ thus indirectly validating the connection between radicalism, CV 
and high turnout. The authors in an earlier study show (Irwin and van Holsteyn 2005: 33) that 
the biggest loser after the abolition of compulsion in 1970 was the extremist Peasant Party as 
‘it would seem that the establishment parties would gain nothing by forcing either alienated or 
uninterested voters to the polls’ (Ibid: 34). In this light, it is probably not surprising that one 
of the reasons why the Netherlands abolished compulsory voting with the support of all the 
major parties, apart from the fact that it was regarded as undemocratic (Ibid: 16, 25-6), was 
‘because of the rise of splinter parties, coupled with the feeling that the voters of the splinter 
parties were the disaffected who would simply stay home if voting were not obligatory’ (Katz 
1997: 244, Irwin and van Holsteyn 2005: 24, footnote xxv). 
                                                 
130 Due to the time frame it could be argued that the authors were worried about unnaturally high turnout in Nazi 
Germany and subsequently Stalinist Russia. 
131 Vlaams Belang was formed in November 2004 after its predecessor, the Vlaams Blok, lost a court case for 
inciting hate and discrimination and was force to disband. 
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If we take these findings into account, I submit the following question: If high 
participation, as research suggests, causes the proliferation of extremist views on a 
parliamentary level, does not the ‘health’ of a democracy, with which so many CV supporters 
are obsessed, derive itself from the fact that one does not vote for political views which are 
hostile to democratic principles? Surely this is the case, because in my eyes it is much more 
important to be without such radical parties in parliament than to, only to satisfy our thirst for 
turnout in the high nineties, have them drafting legislation. In this respect I strongly disagree 
with Engelen’s (2007: 29) assertion that ‘one has to take every vote at face value’ because 
calling some votes ‘worthless puts one on the slippery slope to totalitarianism’. I find such a 
claim absurd because it should be obvious that voluntary voting does not deny anyone his 
vote but that high participation created by CV may be dangerously linked to the proliferation 
of more politically radical views represented on the parliamentary level; by the same token 
this also could suggest that compulsory voting coupled with proportional representation may 
actually help sustain small parties which under normal circumstances would not stand a 
chance in the electoral race. If anything, it is most likely compulsion that creates the slide 
towards this ‘slippery slope’. However, as I have already mentioned, more research would be 
needed on this subject to draw more precise answers.132 
Obviously, I do not wish to claim that high turnout is, in general, bad, only that 
unnatural and coerced high turnout by a compulsory voting regime is not as good as a number 
of theorists take for granted. Accordingly, not all forms of low turnout need be bad; in fact, as 
I have shown, lower turnout may mean better turnout for a democratic society. High turnout is 
something a democracy should be proud of (provided it is genuine) but not something to be 
pursued at all cost regardless of consequences. 
However, it may be that ‘neither high nor low rates of participation are in themselves 
good or bad for democracy’ as Lipset (1981: 229) claimed, and Bollen (1980) did after him. 
Indeed both authors, as opposed to compulsory voting theorists, argue that it is not possible to 
use participation figures as an instrument to gauge political democracy because ‘the extent 
and nature of that participation reflect other factors which determine far more decisively the 
system’s chances to develop or survive’ (Lipset 1981: 229). What this passage suggests is that 
participation is only a secondary factor in terms of importance vis-à-vis democracy: turnout, 
                                                 
132 A valid objection could be raised by pointing out the fact that compulsory voting may not be ‘responsible’ for 
the representation of more politically extreme parties, because their voters are usually well disciplined and quite 
mobilised at elections. The theory works with the notion that those voters, who under a voluntary voting system 
would stay at home vote for these extreme parties just to express their displeasure with the fact that they are 
obliged to vote. 
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which an election generates, is necessarily reflected by numerous other variables (which I 
have already addressed) that influence whether voters will participate in collective decision-
making or not. Again, we are coming back full circle to the objection that, with its focus on 
increasing turnout, compulsory voting puts aside underlying problems which are the real 
cause for non-voting and voter dissatisfaction.  
  
 II-2-4-d: Summary – Low turnout does not equal bad turnout 
Compulsory voting creates some serious problems. First of all, there are important 
issues regarding individual freedom: citizens can as a result of non-voting end up in gaol 
and/or being disenfranchised. The incarceration of people for abstention can easily be 
interpreted as limiting the freedom of conscience and clamping down on non-conformist 
views which the greater society somehow does not deem worthy of being taken into account. 
As to the disenfranchisement of non-voters, it is obvious that such a practice is undemocratic, 
because it infringes on the basic democratic right to vote (provided we do not actually put 
non-voters on par with felons who because of their crimes forfeit their right to vote). 
Furthermore, I have shown that in a system of CV it is not turnout which is desired but 
voting; the whole system thus violates the right not to vote which is as important as the right 
to vote as, indeed, one could regard it as a form of voting in itself. 
Secondly, as we have seen, there are several serious issues regarding the legitimacy of 
CV system (indeed the infringement on the right not to vote is also one): a sudden jump in 
turnout does not mean that problems which were causing low participation in the first place 
go away; they only simply disappear from view. By making the numbers right, compulsory 
voting deems the problem of low turnout solved, but such a solution certainly does not make 
things automatically better as the changes are cosmetic rather than substantial. As a matter of 
fact we know that it is the uneducated, the poor and the young who are the least likely to 
come to vote and it may be that these groups will be affected worst by sanctions imposed by 
compulsion. To fight low-turnout by making voting compulsory would be, in Franklin’s 
words (2004: 220), like shooting the messenger. ‘Removing the signal that something was 
wrong would not make the thing right’ is an apt description of the efforts of CV supporters. 
We must further take into account that CV brings to the polls all people and turns them 
into voters but this does not mean that the individuals are content with such an arrangement. 
Indeed, their dissatisfaction can be seen in the form of protest votes (invalid or spoilt ballots) 
which are directly tied to the CV system (empirical evidence is readily available). To be sure, 
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a compulsory voting regime brings to the polls not only dissatisfied individuals but also 
uninterested and uninformed citizens who are most likely to cast a donkey (random) vote only 
to keep the administrative apparatus of their backs. These ballots have no rationality or logic 
and as such are completely worthless to democratic practice. When the quantity of these 
ballots is taken into account, compulsion does not generate levels of participation which are 
all that different from other democratic countries. And atop of all this, there is tangible 
empirical evidence that compulsory voting (or, more specifically high turnout generated by 
CV) causes an unhealthy representation of extremist political views. It therefore follows that 
more voters does not necessarily translate into a better and more legitimate democracy. In this 
light, it may be better to have lower voluntary turnout (because this at least guarantees that 
only people with at least a minimal interest in the election will vote) than high and artificial 
turnout (where even the extremists, the uninterested, the uninformed and the dissident are 
coerced to vote). 
 
II-2-5: Non-voting is not free-riding 
II-2-5-a: Introduction 
The last argument in the apology of compulsory voting is the moral dimension. It is 
only after building on the four prior empirical steps that CV advocates put forward their 
normative claim that voting is not merely a citizen’s right but most importantly his duty, and 
therefore people who do not vote act in a selfish and immoral way: simply put, they free ride. 
In the eyes of the proponents of compulsory voting such people are useless and there is no 
place for them within the society of responsible citizens. The non-voter is regarded as a 
person who takes advantage of the other voters’ efforts and brings nothing in return. Indeed, 
Lijphart (1997: 17) writes that ‘nonvoting is a form of free riding’ and claims that such a 
practice is ‘selfish and immoral’. 
Obviously I will dispute this claim. It is important to take this chapter not as an 
isolated one but directly tied to the previous one, as it indeed builds upon the arguments 
presented there. In the last chapter I showed why low turnout is not bad and how high turnout 
can actually damage a democracy. In this chapter I turn my attention to the person of the non-
voter. I will examine what value people, who do not vote, can bring society. First of all, I will 
show that proponents of compulsory voting face a serious dilemma as they work with two 
profoundly diverse concepts of the non-voter: in the first picture, these people are looked 
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upon in a patronising way as children that do not know that it is in their interest to vote and 
must be properly guided, in the second picture they are likened to selfish immoral free-riders. 
Such inconsistency obviously does not reflect well on compulsion. Secondly, I will argue that 
to call non-voters free riders is another oversimplification in terms typical of CV supporters 
and that this sweeping statement omits in an important way the relation of the non-voter to the 
concept of legitimacy and, in addition, because of the fact that there may be other forms of 
participation which may indeed be even more helpful to the society than merely casting a 
ballot once every four years and branding non-voters as free-riders make such distinctions 
impossible. Finally, I will show that the non-voter cannot be a free-rider because there is no 
public good to free-ride on. I will examine the concept whether high and active participation 
(voting) can be regarded as a public good. Indeed, in the following pages I will counter the 
arguments about the immoral free-riders and prove that non-voters do have their intrinsic 
worth for a democratic society. 
 
II-2-5-b: The non-voter – CV’s double dilemma 
CV advocates face an interesting predicament as to the nature of the non-voter. When 
one recalls the second and the current chapter of Part II, one finds significant differences. 
When supporters talk about the generational and socioeconomic factors effecting turnout and 
the representation of left and centre-left parties, supporters of CV seem genuinely concerned 
with the impact of low and unequal turnout and the resulting under-representation of certain 
social groups – there is thus good reason to make voting compulsory, because CV would get 
rid of these undemocratic discrepancies. Lever (2007: 30) points out that in the second step 
proponents of CV see non-voters as people who ‘find it difficult to protect their own interests 
… and so are liable to exploitation by the more powerful, knowledgeable and politically 
astute’ and thus their well-being is at stake. In the first picture the non-voter is regarded as a 
child needing guidance which the state provides in form of making voting compulsory, so that 
the ‘child’ will learn his civic duty. It is clearly evident that such argumentation is deeply 
patronising (Chong, Davidson and Fry 2005-6: 16), and certainly not in line with responsible 
citizenship. If we imply that the voters must be guided to the opinion polls because they 
cannot do so on their own, I find it difficult to believe that such people could make reasoned 
decisions as to for whom to vote. Should they not have guidance in this matter as well? 
Now let us look at the situation in the fifth point. We find a completely different 
depiction of the non-voter: he is no longer the weak individual society ought to protect from 
 129
the interests of the strong but a selfish exploiter of the public good without any moral 
conscience – he is a democratic parasite. His actions undermine the electoral system because 
not only he but also all other citizens and the democratic electoral system itself suffers as a 
result from his non-voting. It is thus obvious that we must teach such individuals how to 
behave ‘properly’. We are well aware that one of the motivations for the institution of 
compulsory voting is equality, however, by the very nature of its legislation CV seems to 
imply that there are in fact two classes of citizens. Proponents of compulsory voting must take 
for granted the duty to vote (the right to vote is not really relevant), and it is because the duty 
to vote supplants the right to vote that an imbalance in the concept of equality occurs – people 
are no longer regarded as equal in the traditional sense of each having the right to vote but in 
terms who participates and who does not. This hidden categorization implies that true citizens 
take an active interest in politics which benefits the society (this is from a minimalistic point 
of view characterised by voting), whereas the non-voters need to be coerced into taking the 
active stance by laws which make turnout obligatory. In this respect compulsory voting seems 
to imply that there are citizens who are valuable to a society (voters) and those who are not 
(non-voters). By trying to make the non-voters see the strength of their argument, proponents 
of compulsion put down their claim as a moral dilemma in terms of good and evil thus 
indivertibly forcing the non-voter into a corner due to the fact that it has already been decided 
that voting is good. Active participation is stressed as something desirable and good for 
democracy, whereas non-voting is portrayed as something parasitical and bad and people (not 
citizens, because being a citizen also means voting) who do not participate are accused of 
consciously taking advantage of the efforts of the well-behaved citizens. The problem for me 
with this picture is that it is too black and white and the good and bad sides are a priori 
defined, thus allowing no room for further argument. By supposing that something is the 
correct way of behaviour does not make it so, as I have already pointed out. This argument is, 
once more, linked to the fact that advocates of compulsion take too many things for granted – 
that low turnout is bad, that non-voters are worthless free-riders, that compulsory voting is 
like any other law, etc – and to me such presuppositions are typical of apologies of 
compulsory voting. The justification in this case stems from the selfish nature of the non-
voters who free ride on the electoral system; they must be made to contribute, even against 
their wishes and regardless of the quality of the vote, because it is for the greater good of 
society. In this chapter I wish to dispute such a claim. In my eyes, the non-voter is an integral 
part of the democratic system, much like the right not to vote is an integral part of the right to 
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vote. To be sure, to claim that non-voters are free riders is another simplification made by CV 
supporters. 
In the whole of the literature supporting CV not once do the advocates address this 
evident discrepancy. Proponents of compulsion seem not to have any particular misgivings in 
linking together these two rather diverse views – ‘this rather suggests that such plausibility as 
these arguments have turns on a failure adequately to identify the interests of nonvoters, or to 
enquire too closely, into who, exactly, we are talking about’ (Lever 2007: 31). Due to the fact 
that these two concepts are vastly different this problem is not something to be simply waved 
away and the fact that we are left without an answer poses serious questions about the 
consistency of thought of CV proponents. However, I will not devote my energy in answering 
this contradiction in terms, as it is something supporters of compulsory voting must do. 
Nevertheless, it was important to point this problem out. 
 
II-2-5-c: Non-voters are not free riders 
Proponents of CV claim that non-voters behave in an exploitative and immoral way 
and do not even think that the non-voter could be in some ways beneficial to the democratic 
society. Firstly, they are insensible to the fact that it is also the non-voters who have an 
important role to play vis-à-vis legitimacy. And secondly, they are blind to the different 
reasonable motives for non-voting and are oblivious to the fact that there may be other ways 
by which citizens can significantly contribute towards the betterment of democracy.  
As we know, elections are only seldom won by clear and distinct majorities, especially 
in systems with proportional representation. Though a Westminster model on the whole 
guarantees the victorious party formation of the cabinet, this is not always the case also (as I 
have shown in Australia). Coalitions of two or more parties are an important fact in political 
life and a very common occurrence. So if we have a coalition government, it stands to reason 
that it does not have the support of the majority of voters; in fact it may be true that a majority 
of citizens actually voted against it. And even in a first-past-the-post system, it is not rare that 
the government was voted in by a minority of voters. The important lesson from all of this 
vis-à-vis the legitimacy of a government is a matter of acceptance of the winner by all citizens 
(voters and non-voters alike), not only of the supporters of the victorious party or parties. In 
this respect it is clear that non-voters ‘have a critical role to play in conferring legitimacy on 
the outcome of elections, and this role is no less crucial for being largely passive’ (Lever 
2007: 32). To this I add that we must also take into account the acceptance of the victorious 
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side by voters who had voted against it. In this respect he rates of participation are not that 
important – a government elected with large turnout does not automatically become 
legitimate. If the streets are filled with people protesting against it, if there is public outcry 
against the cabinet, there is something obviously wrong. From this perspective, legitimacy is 
dependent on the consent of the silent majority – people who have not voted for the winning 
party or coalition and the non-voters – which accepts the result of the election. Such an 
approach acknowledges the significance of legitimacy being conveyed actively by the voters 
but at the same time shows the impact of the, often overlooked, passive consent of the other 
citizens in the society which plays a vital role in democratic theory. 
Secondly, compulsory voting is blind to the fact that there are non-voters and non-
voters. One can, without any hesitation, claim that there will always be people who will never 
vote. That is a matter of fact. However, to maintain that these individuals bring no value to a 
society is simply wrong. Let us examine why. Although it is true that a society needs the 
active participation of its citizens to survive, it is equally true that voting is not the only form 
of civic engagement. Indeed, various civil rights’ groups, environmental agencies, non-
governmental organisations, local communities and other countless associations make 
important contributions to the life of the state. Let us compare the contributions of two 
imagined persons. 
The first individual is someone who all his life has been promoting road safety in the 
area of his residence. For the past thirty years he has been actively engaged in this field and 
has accomplished several notable achievements: his relentless efforts contributed to the 
closing down of a busy road running through the neighbourhood where he lives and diverting 
traffic to an alternate, less populated street. Due to his endeavours new traffic lights were 
built, speed humps installed, and some streets were even completely pedestrianised. To put it 
simply, his actions significantly contributed to the decline in deaths caused by traffic and 
accidents in the immediate area, making the neighbourhood a safer place to live in. In other 
words, his efforts extensively increased road safety. Now, let us suppose that this individual 
holds a deep personal conviction that politics is not worth his time due to corruption and 
general mismanagement by the people in charge. It stands to reason, in his mind, that he will 
not vote because for him all ‘the lot in parliament are a bunch of rascals’. Out of principle, he 
will not vote. 
Now let us look at the other individual, we shall assume that she is an accountant who 
does not have any strong views and as such does not contribute to the life of the community in 
any field, apart from one: voting. As a person, she is rather boring, properly pays her taxes, 
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and does not have any extracurricular activities. She does not actively contribute to the life of 
the community, at least not in any way as significant as his fellow citizen who seems obsessed 
with promoting road safety However, she always votes at elections and not once did she omit 
to cast a ballot. 
Now, a CV regime will necessarily see the first person as a non-voter who selfishly 
exploits the society, whilst the second individual would be an example of the proper citizen. 
However, who is to say that the vote of the accountant is more valuable than the year long 
activities of the man committed to improving road safety in his neighbourhood? Does casting 
a vote once every four years really mean that we, as citizens, have sufficiently contributed to 
the betterment of the society and towards the health of a democracy? I hardly think so and do 
not believe that anyone sane would choose the latter over the former. As we can see, this 
example neatly illustrates that CV is blind to these important distinctions. Although it is true 
that under a voluntary voting system such differences would also be left unnoticed, at least it 
would not involve branding the man devoting his life to improve road safety as an immoral, 
free-riding non-voter. The fact that there may be other, much more meaningful ways to 
participate than just casting a vote, is an important distinction one should keep in mind and 
something proponents of compulsory voting tend to forget. To be sure, they could argue that 
such a person would not probably vote anyway but this is really not an issue here. The heart 
of the matter is that a CV system penalises all non-voters, regardless of their actual 
contributions to a society. And indeed, what is true at the individual level may be relevant at 
the national level. In this light Franklin (1996: 230-1) points out that low turnout countries 
need not be taken as states with an apathetic electorate. Indeed, taking the example of the 
United States, he draws attention to the fact that ‘Americans participate more than people in 
other nations in nonvoting activities’ (Ibid: 231). 
Furthermore, we must not forget that making voting compulsory in effect prescribes 
desirable behaviour without taking into consideration factors for non-voting which need not 
be immoral, selfish or exploitative. They need not be a form of reasoned protest, but may be 
more trivial, as I have made clear in the previous chapter where I stressed the importance of 
the right not to vote enables the uninterested and the ignorant to abstain from the process. In 
this light non-voters show their worth in the sense that they realise their limits. Indeed, I 
believe that a system is more legitimate if these citizens are not forced to cast votes because 
they will only dilute the results by their random ballots. In this sense, the non-voters have 
value because of their inactivity. 
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As we thus can see, non-voters are not always dishonest, immoral individuals, but can 
actually be very active in a society and may actually be as a result of their engagement even 
more valuable than some voters. There is no one template to which all non-voters would 
conform. Indeed, non-voters are not free riders, because they do not have a public good to free 
ride on. This brings me to the last part of this chapter. 
 
II-2-5-d: Voting, non-voting, free riding, and the public good 
CV supporters readily equate the behaviour of the non-voter to exploitation, immoral 
and parasitical conduct: in other words, free riding. When someone free rides, it is evident 
that there must be a public good to free ride on, as otherwise one could not speak of free 
riders. That much is evident. It comes to reason that one may ask what exactly this public 
good is. To be sure, that is a very good question to which proponents of compulsion do not 
give a clear answer (see also Lever 2007: 34). I am, however, convinced that it is voting 
which they regard as the public good. 
We are aware of the fact that proponents of compulsion believe that high turnout 
increases the health and legitimacy of a democracy and therefore guaranteeing high 
participation (i.e. something which is in the democratic framework expressed by the act of 
voting) serves the public interest. This is why I think that proponents of compulsion regard 
high participation, rather than the democratic electoral system (as Lever 2007 suggests), as the 
public good. This is the reason why they put so much emphasis on the duty to vote as opposed 
to the mere right to vote – high and active participation makes the democratic electoral 
system, in the minds of advocates of compulsion, come alive and truly flourish. This stands in 
contrast to countries which also maintain the democratic electoral system but because of low 
participation, it is nowhere as perfect as the one in a CV state. In addition, it is not only the 
democratic electoral system that is sustained by active participation but also the society. I 
believe that CV supporters do not see active voting as a mere instrument but that they see it as 
fundamental to the functioning of this system and of democracy as a whole. However, is it so? 
Can high participation be a public good? This part will argue that it is not so – and, without a 
public good to exploit, non-voters cannot be free-riders. Let us look at this claim in greater 
detail. 
 
II-2-5-d-1: The public good – an economical view 
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The expression public good is first and foremost an economic term coined by Paul A. 
Samuelson (1954) who is credited with creating the theory of public goods and it is usually 
contrasted with the concept of private goods. Simply put a private good is the egoistical 
competitive interest of an individual or group. It is excludable and rival, meaning that it is 
possible to prevent other users the consumption of the good and consumption by one user 
prevents simultaneous consumption by other people. There are many private goods, like cars, 
food, books, etc. For example a piece of pie is excludable for people who cannot pay for it 
and it is rival in the sense when one eats the pie there will be none left for others to consume.  
Public goods are defined by economic theory as goods conforming to two criteria: (1) non-
rival consumption and (2) non-excludability. When a good is non-rivalrous it means that the 
usage or consumption of such a good by one person has no effect on the consumption of the 
same good by another person. Non-excludable goods are those whose consumption is 
impossible to prevent: an individual may enjoy the benefits of the good without paying or 
contributing in one way or another. A typical example can be national defence, law 
enforcement, clean environment, road network, information goods or something as trivial as a 
lighthouse.133 Let us consider the lighthouse: it is non-rivalrous because even the crew of any 
ship (even that which has not contributed to its maintenance) can still benefit from the light it 
provides. It is furthermore non-excludable because it is impossible (or would be very costly) 
to limit the crew of such a ship not to use the light it provides. The same goes for national 
defence or clean air: even people not paying any taxes or contributing to the public good in 
any way still enjoy the benefits they provides as an attempt to single these individuals out of 
consumption would be practically unachievable. There are different types of communities 
which can draw upon the public good: in the case of lighthouses a community consists of 
vessels at sea, national defence provides protection for a society living within a state, while 
clean air is a global problem. However, it is clear that a public good is non-rival and non-
excludable for all members of a defined community and that it is in the grasp of each and 
every person to benefit from the good, even those who are free riders. 
The logic in providing such public goods even though there are people who exploit the 
system can be justified by rational choice theory and more specifically by its subfield, public 
choice theory, even though these approaches assume that citizens behave primarily in a 
rationally self-interested way. At first glance it would seem that rational choice theory by its 
                                                 
133 However, not all theorists view the classical example of the lighthouse as a non-controversial example of a 
public good. For example, the English economist Ronald Coase (1974) challenged the notion on the grounds that 
it is more of a club good, i.e. those goods which are non-rivalrous but excludable, like theatres, health clubs or 
cable television.  
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very nature should dismiss the claim that citizens have self-interested reasons for the 
existence of public goods given the existence of free riders; indeed, it would be more rational 
to choose to free-ride on a current public good than to support it. The obvious problem is that 
such ‘rational’ behaviour would be in the interest of all citizens and hence would result in the 
disintegration of the public good; thus, it is more rational and in the individual’s self-interest 
to keep the public good in place than not to have it at all, therefore most people choose not to 
free ride (either by their own choice, by taking advantage of various incentives or simply by 
trying to avoid penalties). If this were not so, the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest would 
make any provision of a public good difficult at best. For example, each person has an interest 
on an unpolluted environment to live in but left to their own devices not many people protect 
nature – an individual or company may rationally choose to burn dangerous waste (cheap) 
instead of disposing of it in an ecologically friendly way (expensive), if they are not coerced 
by the laws or given incentives to change their behaviour in a specific way; this may not be 
immediately reasonable for them but desirable in the interest of each member of the society in 
the long term. ‘The idea of public goods thus highlights the existence of public or collective 
interests that are distinct from the private interests of either individuals or groups. It could be 
argued that these constitute the ‘real’ interest of the individuals concerned rather than their 
‘felt’ interests’ (Heywood 2004: 245). 
From the above debate it is evident that the concept of public good is something which 
has its unique place in economic theory: it is a good beneficial to all members of a given 
society which, however, is difficult for individuals to provide on their own. It can be defended 
on the grounds of rational and self-interested behaviour by justifying it from the position of 
public choice theory. 
 
II-2-5-d-2: The public good – a political view 
Now, economical theory is not our concern here, it is rather political theory which also 
addresses the concept of public goods, although it understands them in a broader framework 
than economic theory does. Whereas a public good within the economic sphere has more to 
do with the materialistic side of life, in the field of political theory a public good is more 
aligned with the abstract notion of a common good and the public interest. Indeed, there are 
perhaps very few expressions which are as abused as ‘public good’ or ‘public interest’. This 
term have been frequently and routinely exploited by politicians left, right and centre and 
other than the fact that the term is linked to some vaguely defined positive outcomes, there is 
not much consensus on exactly what are the public goods. To be sure public interest suffers 
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from a serious definition problem134 and the expression has suffered much misuse and 
nowadays virtually lacks meaning other than serving as something politicians appeal to to 
increase their morality. 
Similarly as was the case with the economical perspective it could prove useful also to 
define private goods in the context of political theory. Again, private goods are something 
which individuals pursue because they wish to maximise what they see as their interests and 
thus promote their well-being. This need not necessarily be as materialistic as cars or food but 
more abstract as ideals – indeed, the creation or maintenance of compulsory voting laws can 
also in some cases serve private interests as shall be discussed later. It is evident that there is a 
myriad of private goods and it stands to reason that some of these interests are compatible to a 
lesser of higher degree with the interests of other individuals, although the reasons of one’s 
pursuit of such and such an interest may vary greatly. As opposed to private goods, a public 
good should be in the interest of all citizens. The problems with such a definition are obvious: 
concepts which would conform to the interests of all citizens are few and far between.135 
Indeed, some theorists question the whole concept of either the public good or the private 
good but they represent a relatively minor stream.136 Despite these differences in opinion, 
                                                 
134 These definition problems are nothing new they were addressed by a number of philosophers. For example 
Jeremy Bentham (2005 edition: 12) wrote that the ‘interest of the community is one of the most general 
expressions that can occur in the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost’. 
135 Stating that the public good is something that is to the benefit of a majority will simply not do: such interests 
could then only be qualified as ‘shared interests’ not real public interests. Some theorists acknowledge only these 
shared private interests – individuals congregate in the forms of various civil organisations, NGOs, lobbying 
groups, religious communities, trade unions, etc. in order to promote a specific shared interest which they would 
find impossible advancing alone. It follows that individuals in one such group tend to put their particular interest 
above those of other groups and individuals and that therefore there cannot be a public good in the interest of all 
citizens. For more on this refer to what I call the radically individualistic approach. 
136 There are theories which question either the existence of public good, or the existence of private good. These 
two approaches, which formulate two very extreme positions within the public/private interest debate I 
characterise as either (a) radically individualistic or (b) radically collectivist. For the purpose of this thesis, 
however, these two radical approaches will not be taken into the account as they would not be applicable to 
Western democracies because of their extreme positions. 
The radically individualistic stream puts great emphasis on personal liberty and maintains that the public does 
not share a common interest; instead there are only competing private interests. According to this view society is 
made up out of a collection of individuals who seek to maximise their own interests or goods (which they 
perceive rationally and accurately) without taking into the account the interests of others. This approach is not a 
single school of thought; rather it can be found in a number of different theories like rational egoism (Ayn Rand 
– The Virtue of Selfishness), individualist anarchism (Max Stirner – The Ego and Its Own, Benjamin Tucker – 
Individual Liberty essays, Josiah Warren – Instead of a Book), or the anarcho-capitalist stream of libertarianism 
(David D. Friedman – The Machinery of Freedom, Murray Rothbard – Man, Economy, and State). 
The radically collectivist approach in contrasts emphasises the society and questions self-interests as the driving 
force behind human action, going in some instances as far as saying that there is no such thing as a private 
interest, or at least that there should not be one. Individuals should accommodate their lives according to the 
needs of the community and in the name of the public good. The radically collectivist approach would be linked 
with various forms of socialism, communism and even fascism (particularly with regards to the state). Socialists, 
for example, reject individualism and claim that people are connected to each other by virtue of their common 
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there appears to be a general understanding among political theorists ‘that a distinction can be 
drawn between private interests and the public interest’ (Heywood 2004: 241). However, the 
ways how to arrive at a public good can vary greatly: I claim that in general one can 
distinguish between two broad approaches: (a) the individualistic approach (b) the collectivist 
approach. The first approach arrives at the concept of a public good by building upon private 
goods; the second view on the other hand acknowledges the objective existence of public 
goods next to the existence of private goods. I will now discuss both views in more detail. 
Within the individualistic approach private interests still remain the primary driving 
force for individuals’ actions; private life is given preference over the life of the community 
(ideologically these theorists are generally liberals). However, there are spheres where various 
private interests overlap and where this happens it is possible to find common intersection 
points which would constitute the public interest, although there will not be many of these 
goods.137 Obviously, there still remain question about the intentionality of the constitution of 
the public good but this does not dispute its existence.138 It is evident that private conceptions 
of good are constitutive for the public good; the common interest cannot be defined without 
first taking into the account various private goods, however, to assume there is none would 
equally be a mistake. This individual viewpoint, by stressing only private interests, fulfils the 
criteria which one could characterise as a weak, or thin, version of public interest – what is 
described as the public good are the few shared private interests by each and every citizen. 
Although they started out as private goods, they have evolved into what can be described as 
public goods because all individuals themselves recognise them as goods and have selfish 
                                                                                                                                                        
humanity; due to the fact that people care about the good of their fellow citizens and act accordingly it becomes 
increasingly impossible to differentiate between their private interests and public ones. 
137 It is important to point out that there may be very different definitions of the public good even within the 
individualist approach ranging from the classical liberals/libertarian miniarchists arguing for the very basic 
‘night watchman state’ with basic public goods (for example, Adam Smith – The Wealth of Nations; John Stuart 
Mill – On Liberty; John Locke – Second Treatise on Govermnent)/(Robert Nozick – Anarchy, State, Utopia; 
Friedrich Hayek – Road to Serfdom; Milton Friedman – Capitalism and Freedom) to that of the social liberals 
arguing for a state providing certain positive liberties (John Rawls – Theory of Justice; Thomas Hill Green – 
Prolegomena to Ethics, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation; Amartya Sen – Freedom, Rationality, 
and Social Choice). 
138 According to Adam Smith public goods appear only by coincidence. An individual ‘neither intends to 
promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. … [H]e intends only his own gain, and he 
is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. 
… By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really 
intends to promote it.’ (see Smith 1998, 512-3). 
On the other hand, John Rawls offers a totally different view and argues that there indeed is intentionality behind 
the creation of public goods. ‘Different political views, even if they're all liberal, in the sense of supporting 
liberal constitutional democracy, undoubtedly have some notion of the common good in the form of the means 
provided to assure that people can make use of their liberties … [I]f citizens are acting for the right reasons in a 
constitutional regime, then regardless of their comprehensive doctrines they want every other citizen to have 
justice. So … they're all working together to … make sure every citizen has justice. Now that’s not the only 
interest they all have, but it’s the single thing they’re all trying to do’ (Prusak 1998). 
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reasons for doing so. Despite the fact that citizens agree on certain provisions there will 
obviously be differences in opinion how best to secure such goods – for example, is it better 
to have a flat tax or a progressive one? Should the army be professional? Should education be 
free? Etc. 
The second viewpoint, what I call the collectivist approach, regards society as a 
communal body within which one can identify genuine public goods which objectively exist 
next to private goods but do not directly stem from them – this approach stresses both private 
and public interests as co-existing together from the beginning. For the collectivist approach, 
probably the most important public good is the commitment to political liberty which is, 
however, not understood as freedom to do what one pleases but as the participation in the life 
of the community – the shift from the individual to society is a significant factor here. As 
opposed to the individualist viewpoint this would present us with a strong, or thick, version of 
public good. In general, such an outlook sees the public good as having greater importance 
and moral value than the interests of individual citizens and recognises a ‘collective entity’ 
which has ‘distinct common interests’(Heywood 2004: 242). These theorists (ideologically 
mostly recruited from the republican and communitarian camp) believe that private interests 
are formed by one’s membership in a community which upholds specific, in our case 
democratic, values rather than the other way around; indeed, society is necessary for self-
realisation because self-realisation is ensured and ideas are conveyed through interaction with 
other individuals within a community.139 The measures by which public goods are promoted 
can vary in their intensity: in extreme instances the collectivist approach could be likened to 
                                                 
139 It is important to realise that interpretations of republicanism itself, similarly as liberalism, are far from 
unified. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy points out from a historiographical perspective classical 
republicanism (for example that of Aristotle – Politics, Nicomachean Ethics and Niccolò Machiavelli – 
Discourses on Livy) can be interpreted in two ways, primarily depending on how to view citizen engagement vis-
à-vis political liberty. The first stream, civic humanism (Hannah Arendt – The Human Condition; J. G. A 
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment) sees political participation, i.e. political liberty, as something intrinsically 
valuable for the common good. In other words, to be free and to enjoy civic virtue means to actively participate 
in the public life. From a philosophical perspective, communitarian thinkers are quite close to this outlook 
(Charles Taylor – Sources of the Self; Alasdair MacIntyre – After Virtue; Michael Sandel – Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice; Michael Walzer – Spheres of Justice, amongst others). 
The second stream, civic republicanism (the most important theorists would be Philip Pettit – Republicanism: A 
Theory of Freedom and Government; Quentin Skinner – Liberty before Liberalism), regards active participation 
and civic virtue not as something which is intrinsically part of the common good but as something which acts as 
a means to safeguard a society against oppression, domination and the exercise of arbitrary power. It is a way of 
preserving political liberty and the democratic society (which are the true public goods) and active engagement 
by citizens in politics is only an instrumental good for this purpose; in other words active participation is useful 
‘both in bringing about the right sorts of laws, institutions, and norms, and in ensuring their durability and 
reliability on the other’ (Lovett 2006). In an interview, Michael Sandel called the two republican views strong 
and weak, respectively (see Wenar and Hong 1996). 
Notwithstanding the differences between the intrinsic and instrumental good, both streams of republicanism 
nevertheless stress the importance of active political participation and civic virtue in the life of individuals and 
society. 
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Rousseau’s (1994: 7) idea of ‘general will’ which in his own words ‘tends always to the 
conservation and well-being of the whole and of each part of it’. Although I do not wish to get 
into deep philosophical arguments in this thesis, Rousseau understands the general will as 
what a community would unanimously do if each individual were to act selflessly – the 
general will is the sum of the common interests of all citizens within a community whether 
they realise this or not; if they do not appreciate the public goods it is because they are 
momentarily blinded by their own private goods and interests. For Rousseau it is quite logical 
that those citizens who do not recognise the superiority of the general will, act wrongly; in 
such a case, they should be coerced into the action dictated by the general will, and the 
individual will effectually be ‘forced to be free’ (Ibid: 58), in effect forcing them to express 
their freedom in much the same way what compulsory voting does by forcing people to vote 
(I will discuss this in more detail below). 
From the arguments above it is evident that the two most important streams of political 
theory in relation to current democratic practice – liberalism and communitarianism – endorse 
the existence of a public good, although they justify it by two different approaches. Generally 
speaking, the individualist approach (liberalism) stresses the importance of the individual and 
recognises the fact that there are some goods which every citizen has an interest in and in this 
perspective a public good develops almost spontaneously – this is the concept of the thin 
version of public goods. On them other hand, the collectivist (communitarian) approach 
points out that the individual is imbedded in the society and that public goods are objectively 
given and, if acting rationally, all citizens aim to enforce them – this outlook represents a 
thick version of public goods. It therefore can be safely assumed that the concept of public 
goods has firm roots within a democratic society – obviously, there are differences on how 
thin or thick such an interest should be but this does not weaken the argument of the existence 
of public goods in the political sense. 
 
II-2-5-d-3: Public good and voting 
The existence of public goods in a democratic context has thus been established. As I 
have pointed out earlier, proponents of compulsory voting suggest that active participation 
expressed by voting is the public good which they are defending; the democratic electoral 
system is a more-or-less unproblematic public good within the democratic framework and in 
fact, even opponents of CV would not see anything wrong in this assertion. The controversy 
arises when it is claimed that non-voting equals free-riding thus rendering active participation 
(i.e. voting) the basic building block of the democratic electoral system not just the most 
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convenient instrument of choosing the people’s representatives and at the same time 
disregarding any possible benefits of abstention which can also be seen as a form of voting. 
 When one talks about voting it is important to bear in mind that voting itself is a not a 
singular concept. Indeed, before one can actually vote one must have the right to do so as 
there cannot be any participation without the universal right to vote which presupposes the 
right not to vote as well. The importance of the right to vote and whether it conforms to the 
criteria of a public good is therefore one aspect which shall be examined below. The second 
is, whether the act of voting itself can be characterised as a public good, i.e. being in the 
interest of all members of a society, and whether, thus, active participation (as endorsed by 
compulsory voting) is a public good. 
The right to vote and the public good 
Proponents of compulsion take for granted the right to vote without giving extra 
thought to its importance. The relation between the right to vote and voting is not horizontal 
but a more hierarchical (vertical) relationship, where the right to vote forms the foundation 
upon which active voting and the duty to vote stressed by advocates of compulsory voting 
builds upon, though mostly it seems that this foundation becomes irrelevant because it is 
supplanted by a universal duty to vote. In my attempt to answer the question whether the right 
to vote is a public good, I will first define what would a democratic society uphold as 
something being in the public good. The best way to approach this problem is from a 
minimalist point of view – any thicker definition would spell disaster as there are different 
types of democratic systems and an even greater amount of cultural and social idiosyncrasies 
within a particular country. 
Do different types of democracy share some common principles? It is true that 
different countries may have different ideas about implementing democracy, yet, on the other 
hand, it is equally true that there are principles which no democratic state should be lacking. 
These principles are present in the very definition of democracy which can be characterised as 
a state system within which people rule themselves through popular participation (voting) and 
that the government decides in the society’s best interest.140 Accordingly then, the answer to 
the question whether the right to vote is a public good will follow naturally: if voting is one of 
the basic principles of a democracy, it seems logical that it is in the common interest to grant 
the right to vote to practically all adult citizens. And because voting is a basic right, it is safe 
                                                 
140 Obviously, this statement raises many questions, such as: Who are the people? Who should rule? How far 
should the rule extend? In whose interests? Etc. Although these are crucial issues in democratic theory it is not 
the purpose of this thesis to examine them.  
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to assume that basic rights and liberties are also public goods. In this sense the basic rights 
and liberties are the public good common for all democracies and the right to vote falls within 
these categories. The right to vote thus seems to be an uncontroversial concept within the 
democratic framework – after all, any democratic government derives its legitimacy in the 
first place from universal suffrage, (i.e. the right to vote without taking into the account 
gender, race, religion, intelligence, wealth or social status) which has had a turbulent history 
of its own.141 Any proposals for curbing universal suffrage in democratic countries would 
obviously be viewed as a step backwards and met with hostile reactions. It therefore seems 
quite logical that none of the two approaches to public good presented above would question 
the right to vote. The position of the individualist view would run along the lines that each 
person regards the right to vote as being in his own interest (regardless whether he chooses to 
exercise that right or not; not to have it would go against rationality and the democratic 
concept of equality) and therefore the right to vote will become a public good. Even the 
collectivist view cannot raise any objections against such a fundamental right. After all, it is 
one of the basic requisites for equal political participation; active citizen engagement is 
therefore in the interest of the whole society; however clear emphasis would be put on 
exercising the right to vote, not abstaining as non-voting does not equal active participation. 
This will be discussed in length below but the preference of using the right to vote as opposed 
to abstaining does not undermine the argument that the collectivist part of the debate would 
place equal emphasis on granting universal suffrage. 
By using the language of Isaiah Berlin (1969) the right to vote (encompassing the right 
not to vote) would be a negative liberty, which is closely linked to the principle of non-
interference and is usually characterised as freedom ‘from’ something. An individual, who 
enjoys a negative liberty, is free to do as he or she wishes. Berlin uses the concept of negative 
liberty when answering the ‘question ‘What is the area within which the subject – a person or 
group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without 
interference by other persons?’’. Indeed, negative liberty typically concerns individuals – the 
things I can do without interference from others or by harming others. Clearly, the right to 
vote grants me the freedom to decide whether to go to the polling station and cast my vote or 
whether I choose not to do so.142 In other words it does not normatively bind the individual to 
go and vote; it leaves up to the individual to deal with the moral implications of attending or 
abstaining. 
                                                 
141 For more on the history of universal suffrage see Keyssar (2000) and Lloyd (1971) amongst many others. 
142 There could still be the question whether my act actually harms someone, at least in non-physical sense. 
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To sum up, it is safe to assume that the right to vote would in all democracies be 
regarded as an undisputed public good, from which each member of the society would benefit 
(from the right per se, not necessarily from the result of the vote). I have argued that the right 
to vote should be regarded as a negative freedom and as a foundation for any other discussion 
on compulsory voting. After all, there cannot be any such discussion if there this right is 
absent. It is logical that democracy is built upon basic rights and liberties and the right to vote 
is amongst the most important ones.  
Voting and the public good 
As it has been established, the right to vote is fairly unproblematic and it is safe to 
presume that such a right is a public good, as each person has a personal interest in 
maintaining it. However, a rather different situation arises when it is assumed that active 
participation itself, i.e. voting, is a public good and when it is claimed that, as CV advocates 
do, that voting is a duty, rather than a right.  
When addressing this problem, it is important to realise that this claim is much thicker 
than simply maintaining that the negative right to vote is within the common interest of all 
citizens. The duty to vote can be characterised as a democratic principle, or rather as a 
principle which is compatible with a democracy, but it cannot be seen as a universal one as 
the right to vote is: simple proof could be that only a limited amount of democracies practice 
compulsory voting (and only four do with serious administration), whereas all democracies 
grant their citizens the right to vote. Lever (2007: 34) points out that to call ‘high and equal 
turnout or voting [a public good] obviously begs the question whether high turnout – or, even, 
equal turnout – are themselves public goods.  There are some reasons to doubt this, not least 
because what is to count as “low” or “unequal” turnout is obscure’. Indeed, to claim that 
active voting, as CV supporters seem to do, is a public good raises questions about what 
actually fulfils the criteria of high and active participation – is it 90% turnout, or would 80% 
suffice? Is 60% low in the case of the United States or Switzerland? And does turnout need to 
be as high in each election? Indeed, to base democratic legitimacy on high and active 
participation just begs the question that there are also countries which have much lower 
turnout but the legitimacy of which hardly anyone doubts, like the above mentioned example 
of the USA or Switzerland. Again the supporters of compulsory voting are unclear on this 
issue. 
So, asserting the duty to vote as expressed in practice by CV is compatible with 
democratic society but cannot be described as a universal principle – this is evident when 
examining it in the light of a public good. Rather than a general principle, compulsory voting 
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is a variance from the more common system of voluntary voting; its peculiar nature is further 
enhanced by the fact that there does not seem to be much consensus on what form should 
compulsion take: the rate of compulsion varies between countries, some of which have a strict 
system (Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg) whilst others are quite lenient in their approach 
(some South American states). 
Here we arrive at the second point, the urgency for high participation. If we make a 
quick survey of democratic states, we find no demand for high turnout numbers amongst the 
electorate, no sign that a majority of citizens wish to see compulsory voting legislation passed 
(in fact, quite the opposite is true). In this respect the right to vote is on a totally different 
level, especially because it is undisputable. Furthermore, as we already know, it does not 
follow that even in CV countries compulsion is viewed on favourably and that as opposed to a 
voluntary voting system and the right to vote, CV and the duty to vote is a controversial topic 
in democratic theory. So high and active participation understood as voting cannot be a public 
good in all democracies but only in countries where specific historical, sociological, cultural 
and other reasons made it possible. In any event, nowadays the institutionalisation of the duty 
to vote seems untranslatable to other countries. 
When examining the concept of voting as a public good it is useful to draw on the two 
theoretical approaches presented above. According to the individualistic approach CV could 
only be defended if all individuals would come to regard it as their private interest: however, 
such an assertion is untrue given the fact that it is not a universally agreed on norm, and that 
even in countries where it is required by law to attend the election there is a considerable 
amount of spoilt ballots and non-voters. So, although from the individualist perspective it 
would theoretically be possible to claim that CV should be regarded as public good, in reality 
this is not likely to happen. In such a case a thicker approach is needed to proclaim that voting 
is a duty, not merely a right. Proponents of CV point out that participation is to a democracy 
like the environment is to human life: it is a necessary condition for a healthy society – much 
as pollution damages the environment, so too much disengagement damages a democracy.143 
In any event this presupposes that low participation levels are necessarily bad for a 
democracy, which I have proven otherwise. The collectivist point of view would agree with 
this line of thought and many theorists would likely see voting as a duty. As it was claimed 
above, this outlook stresses the importance of active political and civic virtue; to be sure, 
                                                 
143 If one, however, applies the economic approach towards compulsory voting as a public good which is non-
rival and non-excludable, there could be a problem – in some countries non compliance with mandatory turnout 
can lead to the loss of the right to vote, such as Belgium. In such a case, compulsory voting could not be, strictly 
speaking regarded as a public good, because it would become excludable. 
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active voting would be probably the first example of engagement which springs to mind; the 
proponents argue that a society is kept alive and healthy by the activity of its members and 
voting at elections would qualify as the least possible form of participation. In other words, it 
is not only a citizen’s right but it his duty to help keep the community thriving. From this 
perspective the obligation to vote can, indeed, be seen as a public good but, again, only by 
clearly showing that low and unequal participation actually harms the system. 
Coming back to Berlin, it can be said that the statement that voting is not only a 
citizen’s right, but also his duty, is an example of positive liberty: this sort of freedom refers 
to communities, or individuals as part of their communities, and postulates that an individual 
is free insofar as he is the master of his actions. Positive liberty gives us the opportunity to be 
free to do something, it enables individuals achieve self-realisation and allows them to fulfil 
their potential. This liberty is interpreted as ‘the presence of control on the part of the agent. 
To be free, you must be self-determined, which is to say that you must be able to control your 
own destiny in your own interests’ (Carter 2007). Due to the fact that self-determination in the 
republican approach equals active citizen participation, CV is a way, to use Rousseau’s 
words, of ensuring the freedom of individuals within a community and forcing them to 
express their real interests. Compulsory voting is thus much more than a norm in the legal 
sense because it morally prescribes the desired behaviour expected of the citizens – all 
members of the community have the duty to vote but due to the fact that not all do, coercion is 
a necessary instrument in forcing people to fulfil their duty. In this sense, voting is construed 
as a positive right, a right which is only fulfilled by the participation of citizens. This, 
however, is a highly problematic concept. Voting, as all political rights, is primarily construed 
negatively (this in the democratic context is expressed by the right to vote). If we, however, 
start to claim that it is a positive right (as the duty to vote is), this will have important 
ramifications: we might very well begin to see other political rights positively, such as the 
right to become a member of a political party or the right to expression. Although this sounds 
absurd, if we start claiming that one most vote, we might very well end up promoting the idea 
that to make participation even better, the citizen must become a member of a political party 
and voice his opinions publicly at certain prescribed times. To be sure, such practices actually 
lead us from the path of democracy to a totalitarian system.  
Thus, to see voting as a public good is highly problematic for several reasons, all of 
which have not been proven by CV supporters: firstly, I established that it is true that low 
turnout does not damage democracy nor decrease its legitimacy, secondly, there is no urgency 
in democratic countries to establish compulsory voting laws and thirdly the duty to vote is not 
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a universally shared value in democracies as the right to vote is and therefore is not 
transferable as universal suffrage. So, this means that voting cannot be a public good and, 
therefore, non-voters cannot be free-riders. 
 
II-2-5-e: Summary – No public good, no free-riders 
The aim of this chapter was to build upon material presented in the previous one and 
to demonstrate that non-voting and non-voters are not the immoral free-riders. First of all, I 
pointed out the fact that proponents of compulsory voting have a conceptual problem how to 
characterise non-voters: whether as inexperienced ‘children’ who need guidance or immoral 
free-riders. Secondly I stressed that to universally declare each person who does not vote as 
an immoral free-rider is an oversimplification of terms because there are other meaningful 
ways citizens can contribute to the well-being of a society apart from casting a vote. Finally I 
examined the notion whether voting, as CV proponents seem to suggest (yet, again, they are 
not concrete on this matter), can truly be considered a public good. I found such an assertion 
lacking any evidence, vis-à-vis issues of legitimacy, urgency and as a universally shared 
democratic value. However, notwithstanding these differences all democratic countries grant 
the universal right to vote for their citizens and only a few actually force them to cast a ballot. 
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PART III: INCENTIVES: A MODERN 
ALTERNATIVE TO COMPULSION? 
III-1: Introduction 
Recently a somewhat different approach on how to get voters to the polling booths has 
emerged. Instead of making participation mandatory this concept stresses the use of incentives 
to coax citizens to cast their votes. It has been argued that it can be regarded as a fairer 
alternative to compulsory voting and it has been claimed that this approach gets rid of the 
negative connotations associated with compulsion whilst at the same time stimulating turnout 
– incentive voting has been hailed as the golden mean between voluntary and compulsory 
voting and as an effective approach of bringing the voters back to the election booths; it can 
be seen neither as a neutral (voluntary voting) nor a ‘sticks’ approach (compulsory voting) but 
as a ‘carrots’ approach. Some theorists and politicians have recently been considering instead 
of introducing mandatory turnout to propagate the use of incentives in election campaigns to 
stimulate voter participation – in the United Kingdom a study by Baston and Ritchie (2004) 
voiced its support for incentives and has been to a lesser degree used in some countries – a 
few U.S. federal states introduced a voter lottery (Hasen 1996: 2136 mentions that in certain 
Californian districts voters were offered a ‘half-dozen Yum-Yum doughnuts’ or a ‘discounted 
spinal adjustment by a chiropractor’, see also Hasen 2000) as did Bulgaria in 2005 (Balinov 
2006: 60) well as in the Norwegian city of Evenes (Gratschew 2006: 58). 
This chapter could be partially regarded as an anomaly because research is not as 
extensive as on compulsion. In any case, when talking about new areas of study, this subject 
may well prove an important one in time. As we are well aware, money certainly plays an 
important part in our life and handing out financial rewards always draws attention. It might 
well be that in the future we will be hearing more about incentives in elections. 
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III-2: The ‘carrots’ approach 
The central idea of this system is that incentives may help the public to adopt a more positive 
attitude towards voting thus stimulating turnout spontaneously and without coercion. The 
philosophy behind the ‘carrots’ approach argue is that instead of punishment people are more 
likely to react to rewards. In principle, the penalties are still in place but are not so evident to 
the non-voters – as opposed to the non-voters who gain nothing by staying at home, the voters 
get some sort of benefit; for example a ‘financial incentive is basically another way of looking 
at a fine – whichever way, voters are advantaged relative to nonvoters’ (Baston and Ritchie 
2004: 38). However, it is important to point out that there are several types of incentives, all 
of which need not be necessarily financial in nature. Various measures have been suggested as 
rewards for casting a vote: in the United Kingdom amongst others, a tax reduction, a small 
amount of money not exceeding ₤10 or even a constituency based lottery have been 
recommended (Ibid: 39-40). A proposal from South Korea’s Prime Minister Han Myeong-
sook considered boosting voter turnout by introducing lottery tickets or gift vouchers for 
books and other cultural products. ‘It would be better to come up with ways to give incentives 
in light of public opinion against punishments such as fines or restrictions’ (Korea.Net 2006) 
it was argued. There could be other possible incentives for voting like easier access to certain 
public goods, shorter waiting times for processed documents and information, easier access to 
government grants, travel discounts, etc. 
The proponents of incentive voting point out four key benefits of this system: (1) as it 
has been already hinted at, they draw attention to the generally positive psychological effects 
of using incentives instead of penalties that, rather than castigating non-voters and penalising 
them directly, rewards citizens who vote. Incentive based voting is a way of suppressing the 
negative feelings that some people may have against a penalty-based system; (2) maintaining 
a compulsory voting system may be costly, however incentive voting does away with the 
financial and administrative burden of the mandatory turnout system; (3) vociferous 
opposition against compulsory voting according to Baston and Ritchie (2004: 38) is no longer 
an issue as there ‘is no need to identify, locate and take action against non-voters’ and (4) 
people who do not vote are not regarded as free riders, they are no longer ostracised as their 
decision does not ‘involve imposing an official stigma’ on them for example by being 
convicted in court, nor is their right not to vote violated in any way. 
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At first glance, incentive voting may seem the perfect solution to the problem of 
declining voter turnout that is not as drastic and oppressive as compulsion but at the same 
time has all the prerequisites to succeed in raising participation. However, I maintain that such 
reasoning is wrong and that incentive voting may in fact be even more harmful than 
compulsory voting itself – in my eyes, bribing voters to come is a much worse principle than 
making turnout obligatory by law. Nevertheless, before I proceed to the critique of incentive 
voting, I will present a case study of the phenomenon which took place in the Czech Republic 
not so long ago. 
 
III-2-1: The effects of incentives - a case study of communal 
elections in the Czech Republic 
This case study examines the effects of incentives on communal elections in the Czech 
Republic on October 20-21, 2006. The use of incentives in such a scope as in the city of Most 
has been unprecedented in the electoral history of the Czech Republic and has brought much 
controversy. The use of this case study is useful in examining the effects of incentive voting 
and answering the question whether incentives mean a rise in participation levels or the 
effects are negligible. 
 The communal elections144 for the city council of Most have been an historic 
landmark in Czech political culture. It has been the first time that any what could be deemed 
worthwhile incentives were used in an election, much to the dismay of other political parties. 
                                                
 In order to understand the complexities a short introduction is in order. The whole 
issue revolves around the political association Mostečané Mostu (SMM, the ‘Citizens of Most 
for Most’). After the communal elections in 2002, the city council has been ruled by a grand 
coalition of the conservative Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and left-wing Czech Social 
Democrat Party (ČSSD) together with the support of several independent councillors. At that 
time SMM was in opposition with 10.72% of the votes, i.e. five mandates in the 45 seat city 
council. However, the situation changed radically in 2006 as SMM came first in the elections, 
won by a sweeping 33.36% and gained 18 seats. It announced that it will form a coalition with 
the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) which came in third in the election 
with a gain of 15.85% and 8 seats, and thus the two parties would control the council.  
 
144 Statistical data and numbers used in this essay have been provided by the website of the Czech Statistical 
Office’s official election website (accessed 01/2007).  
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 Mostečané Mostu was founded by members of the flat association Krušnohor which 
according to its website administers circa ‘16,500 flats, 250 non-residential premises and 
1,000 garages.’145 The main objective was to promote the interests of this group which takes 
care of almost half the housing in Most. Its members were dissatisfied with the way the city 
council was run from 2002 to 2006 as was evident in recent interviews, such as with SMM 
secretary František Ryba who is also the vice-chairman of the board of management of 
Krušnohor. ‘Our goal was to stop the filth ODS was doing in the council and restore normal 
relations. We have no quarrel with the Civic Democrats as such, only with the gang which 
turned the town administration into its own business.’ (Nedělní svět 2006b: 4) The so called 
‘filth’ points to the allegations of corruption in handing out city contracts and the 
administration of the town budget. The leader of SMM Vlastimil Vozka (also member of the 
board of management of Krušnohor) said that his association wished to restore ‘legal 
competition’ and ‘change the system’ (Ibid) of handing out public contracts. The reasons of 
SMM were therefore simple: to gain control of the city council, stop corruption and better 
manage Most’s finances. The means which SMM chose to fight the pre-election campaign 
were rather unorthodox. The association introduced a strategy (at least to the width of scope) 
not before seen in the Czech Republic – incentive voting. Basically, there were two types of 
incentives employed: (1) a lottery used in two pre-election rallies and a post-election one and 
(2) motivational voting by using direct financial incentives. I will now discuss the two types 
in more detail. 
 As it is obviously impossible to exchange rewards directly for votes, SMM had to 
adopt a different tactic. The first case involved a three-time lottery during three campaign 
rallies. The first two took place before the elections the last one immediately after the vote. 
The strategy SMM adopted was quite ingenious: three weeks before the elections took place 
the political association held a rally a part of which was a lottery for anyone who attended the 
meeting. A hundred people won bicycles in a lottery. Two weeks later, or one week before the 
election, another lottery was held, this time 35 people won personal computers. However, 
amongst the computers on the podium were also three new Škoda Fabia cars, all together 
worth about 35,000 euros at the time. These were not part of the draw but it was announced 
that they will be also available in a lottery, provided SMM proves victorious in the elections. 
A week later SMM did indeed win the election with more than a 20 percent gain from last 
time; two days after the election three people from a crowd of 11,000 won a car and a 
                                                 
145 http://www.sbdkrusnohor.cz/ 
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thousand received a voucher worth 1,000 Czech crowns (circa 35 euros at that time). The 
second tactic sparked even more controversy than the former, although in retrospect there 
does not seem to be much of a difference between the two. This case involved the 
entrepreneur Jiří Zelenka, number three on the list of candidates for SMM in the election, who 
promised a 10,000 Czech crown financial reward (about 360 euro at the time) to circa 600 of 
his employees in Unimontex company, also under the condition that SMM wins the election.  
 These incentives attracted widespread criticism prevalently from the ruling coalition of 
conservatives and socialists. During the campaign the then mayor for ODS Vladimír Bártl 
referred to the lotteries and promised financial rewards as ‘bribing of electors’ (Nedělní svět 
newspaper 2006a: 1). The leaders of SMM dismissed these claims; they argued that the 
strategy chosen was unorthodox but the only effective way how to make changes in the city 
council. Ryba argued that each political party offers something to their voters. ‘The prizes we 
offered were unique … Elections are a trade. We only changed the marketing strategy’ 
(Nedělní svět newspaper 2006c: 1). Incentives were thus just a means to an end, the end being 
controlling the council and displace corruption. ‘There was no other way, because otherwise 
we could not achieve a change of the city council,’ (Czech Television 2006) said Vozka. 
Other criticism which appeared in the media pointed to the cost of the campaign led by SMM 
which was estimated between 15 and 20 million crowns (circa 535,000 – 714,000 euro at the 
time).146 Some voices appeared claiming that one set of corrupted politicians was displaced 
by another, who actually ‘bought’ their way into the council. SMM denied these charges.  
                                                
 Even though SMM won the election, the old coalition decided not to relinquish control 
and referred the whole situation to court, partly because, in the words of ex-mayor Bártl, the 
parties did not want ‘such campaigns to be repeated in the future’ (Českolipský deník 
newspaper 2006: 5) Before the court issued a verdict there was a state of anarchy in Most city 
council as there were suddenly two mayors (ex-mayor Bártl refused to step down before the 
court verdict) and any decision-making was blocked for several weeks. In the end, the 
regional court in Ústí nad Labem had to issue three separate verdicts147, all of which 
confirmed the validity of elections, apart from district no. 20 (Chánov),148 were the court 
declared a re-election to be held. In this particular district the court acknowledged evidence 
that members of SMM were handing out lottery tickets or coupons valued at 300 crowns 
 
146 These estimates are based on media reports and statements made by experts. 
147 15 Ca 253/2006-129; 15 Ca 252/2006-14; 15 Ca 248/2006-22; verdicts decreed by the Regional Court in Ústí 
nad Labem. For more information visit the Czech ministry of justice website, http://www.justice.cz (in Czech). 
148 According to the Czech website of the European Social Fund the district of Chánov has a majority population 
of 1500-2000 Roma; most inhabitants (94%) have only primary education and there is widespread 
unemployment (90%). More at: http://www.esfcr.cz/mapa/int_us6_17_1.html  (in Czech). 
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(about 10.50 euros at that time). There were also reports of handing out the same amount in 
cash if citizens vote for SMM. Although the plaintiffs could not bring any tangible evidence, 
the court acknowledged the fact that there was evidence of swaying of voters in the day of the 
elections which is prohibited by Czech law149 and a unprecedented rise in participation levels 
– it jumped from 4.73% in 2002 to 36.52% in 2006; SMM gained 96.51% of votes – and thus 
elections in this district were invalid. In the re-election in December 2006 a similar result was 
achieved and participation levels soared even more: 50.65% of eligible voters came to the 
polling station and 94.7% voted for SMM. There was thus no change in the previous result.  
 As was mentioned above, the lottery and other financial incentives were found to be 
congruent with the Czech legal system. Its verdict however indirectly questioned the 
rationality behind the motivations of some people to vote. ‘As regards to the proposal which 
would deem the elections invalid, the court adds that notwithstanding the workings of the 
legal system of the Czech Republic regarding the regulation of conduct in election campaigns 
for concrete representative bodies, it is foremost the voters, and not one concrete party using 
progressive methods in its election campaign, who bear a not negligible amount of 
responsibility for the make-up of concrete representative bodies. It is the voter who should in 
each election meticulously judge, be it by past experiences with individual parties in the 
election or by the realistic chances of fulfilling pre-election promises made by individual 
parties in the election, whether the political party in question is only using populist gestures 
merely to gain power without actually intending to bring benefits to its voters.’150 
 It is important to point out that apart from the attempt to end corruption in the council, 
there was also a second reason cited by SMM’s representatives, which was no less urgent than 
the greater transparency argument. This was an attempt to increase voter turnout: ‘We are not 
interested in buying voters. By having prizes ready we want to make them (the citizens) stand 
and wake up from lethargy and apathy,’ said the leader of SMM Vozka (Mladá fronta Dnes 
newspaper 2006: 1) and added that the main reason was to ‘petition voters who normally do 
not attend elections’ (Czech Television 2006) and ‘attract as many people as possible so that 
the result will be legitimate’ (Nedělní svět newspaper 2006a: 1). In other words SMM 
declared as a reason for providing incentives higher voter turnout thus ensuring greater 
legitimacy for the elected city council. Judging from the example above, it is certainly true 
that there has been a massive increase in participation in the district of Chánov (a ten time 
increase in the repeated round of elections), but was this the case in Most as a whole vis-à-vis 
                                                 
149 Political parties must cease their campaigns three days before the election. 
150 Court verdict 15 Ca 253/2006-129. 
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other cities in the region,151 such as Ústí nad Labem and Litoměřice, which are comparable to 
Most in the number of registered voters?152 Statistical data provides a clear answer. 
 In 2002 the voter turnout levels for Most, Ústí nad Labem and Litoměřice were 
42.28%, 30.27% and 33.61% respectively. Four years later, i.e. in the elections where SMM 
used incentives in the election in Most, turnout was as follows: 37.41% in Most, 33.8% in 
Ústí nad Labem and 43.53% in Litoměřice. The graph below illustrates the trends in the three 
cities in the last three communal elections.153 
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 It is clear that there was an evident increase in participation in Most in 2006 (between 
1998 and 2002 there was a 5.11% decrease followed by a 10.07% increase in 2006), other 
cities in this region showed virtually no movement (up or down) worth considering, even if 
one takes into account all the greater cities, as the graph below illustrates. Upon examining 
the evidence, it can be stated that there has been a rise in participation levels in Most, 
something not seen in other comparable cities where there were no incentives used, however 
the overall increase in voter turnout in Most (10.07%) was far from something which one 
could describe by the term dramatic, though from last position in voter participation in 2002 
                                                 
151 The comparison of voter turnout between different Bohemian regions will not be used, as the population of 
Most, where incentives were provided during the election campaign, is negligible when compared with regional 
population. 
152 In the 2006 elections, Most had 93,370 registered voters; Ústí nad Labem 95,034; Litoměřice 93,267. 
153 Voter turnout percentage is unavailable for the first year of communal elections which were held in 1994. 
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the city came in second in 2006. However, Most did not displace Litoměřice (no incentives) 
where turnout remained relatively high for this type of election154 and has remained so for the 
past eight years. Vis-à-vis Most, there was a tenfold increase in the district of Chánov which, 
due to the impoverished nature of this city part, must have been directly related to incentives 
by SMM. 
 
Voter turnout in communal elections in the Czech Republic 
from 1998-2006 in the Ústí nad Labem region
25
29
33
37
41
45
Děčín 36,39 35,04 36,02
Chomutov 29,2 28,26 29,55
Litoměřice 42,16 42,28 43,53
Louny 38,49 34,67 36,99
Most 32,41 27,34 37,41
Teplice 33,99 30,96 34,68
Ústí nad Labem 29,07 30,27 33,8
1998 2002 2006
 
 
 The leaders of SMM claimed that there were two reasons for using incentives in their 
election campaign: the first one was to gain control of the council, the other to make more 
people come to vote, thus increasing the legitimacy of the city council administration. As to 
the first objective, SMM did gain control of the council and came in first in the election. It 
certainly was an impressive victory, however not a landslide one as the association had to 
                                                 
154 It was somewhat lower than the country-wide average for the Czech Republic which was 46.28%. 
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form a coalition with the communists to have a majority.155 Notwithstanding this fact, it is 
nonetheless a notable result for SMM which gained a mere 10.72% in 2002. The use of lottery 
and financial incentives brought a considerable amount of criticism and three separate 
complaints to court regarding the buying of votes. The judiciary concluded that each election 
campaign is about ‘buying votes’ and each political party addresses these issues in different 
ways; SMM used an innovative tactic of incentives which proved an effective strategy. A 
level of surprise and dismay was to be expected. ‘There is a wide range of circumstances 
which can affect [the elections results]. That is the nature of the whole political 
campaign…’156 In other words, each party has the liberty to choose its own ‘weapons’ in the 
election as long as they are within the law, as was this case. The obvious question which still 
remains unanswerable is, whether SMM’s sponsors (a group of entrepreneurs) were really 
sponsors and not investors who expect to get their money back from the city of Most. This, 
however, is an unresolved ethical matter and not something to be discussed in this essay. All 
in all, the first objective, i.e. to provoke a change in the city council was certainly achieved by 
incentives. The leaders of SMM would not agree with this, as it was especially the programme 
which they offered that made people vote for them and the incentives were just a way to get 
people to vote. ‘We did not win because of gifts but convinced voters [at meetings]’ (Mr. 
Ryba cited by Czech Television 2006) These claims seem to be in contradiction with the fact 
that the last and most valuable lottery took place after the elections and only if SMM won the 
vote. 
 This leads to the second claim made by SMM, that incentives were used to increase 
turnout and thus make the city council more legitimate. If one takes into account the statistical 
data introduced above, it is clear that there was a rise in voters by almost 10,000 people. It 
goes without saying that the greater the turnout, the more legitimacy the executive has. An 
increase of ten percent is not a bad result; however, from a broader perspective it is not that 
important. Even with the increase turnout in Most is about ten percent lower than the average 
level of turnout in communal elections in 2006 which was 46.28%, which by itself is nowhere 
near the level of turnout many scholars would deem as desirable. Let us assume that the 
increase in voters is linked with the incentives offered by SMM. If so, the majority of these 
10,000 citizens would give their vote to the association specifically because of the incentives. 
                                                 
155 The election results were: 1 – Sdružení Mostečané Mostu SMM (33.36%, 18 mandates); 2 – Občanská 
demokratická strana /conservatives/ (19.92%, 11 mandates); 3 – Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy 
/communists/ (15.85%, 8 mandates); 4 – Česká strana sociálně demokratická /social democrats/ (11.78%, 6 
mandates); 5 – Sdružení nezávislých kandidátů – Evropští demokraté /centre-right/ (5.17%, 2 mandates). 
156 Court verdict 15 Ca 253/2006-129. 
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If this were so, than this would mean that there is no increase in legitimacy of the council as a 
whole. In this case the equation that more turnout equals more legitimacy (understood as trust 
for a given executive, in this case the city council) would simply not hold. Furthermore, the 
claim that SMM’s goal was to bring more citizens to the polling booths looks like populist 
propaganda and only an attempt to justify their innovative method which guaranteed them 
control over the city council by using a normative argument. What happened in the electoral 
district of Chánov only illustrates how some voters make their decisions – indeed, to claim 
that they at least superficially thought about the elections is absurd, because the only thing 
they considered had to be their personal gain. 
 To conclude: this case study neatly illustrates the fact that incentives do achieve a 
greater level of participation, although it seems that it is not that significant as some 
proponents would lead us to believe. From the cited example it furthermore seems that it does 
not bring the desired increase in legitimacy, as votes tend to be given to one political party 
that introduced the incentives, in this case SMM. The question remains about the 
effectiveness and legitimacy if incentives were not part of any political party’s campaign and 
would be introduced by the government in form of a tax reduction or vouchers for some 
cultural events (we will look at this when discussing Bulgaria, below); these might bear some 
legitimacy but rewards handed out by one political party, as was the case in the Czech 
Republic, do not. 
 
III-2-2: Incentives: the hidden danger 
In one respect, the case study presented is an anomaly. When considering SMM’s 
success it is evident that much of it can be attributed to the use of incentives. Politicians and 
theorists making the case for incentives would not see this as the way forward because 
without any unified rules the offered rewards would come down to which political party has 
more money thus making the link between money and politics even more intense and such a 
case is clearly unacceptable (in such circumstances incentives could be funded by private 
enterprises or citizens thus giving a party an unfair advantage, as was the case with SMM). It 
would equally seem wise for the state not to hand out the money directly to political parties, 
even though there would be funds allocated specifically for the purpose of providing voter 
incentives, for three reasons: firstly, the parties could use the allocated money in another way; 
secondly how much money is handed out to a party would probably be dependent on its size 
and influence in parliament; and thirdly parties could be tempted to add more funds to the 
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incentives thus effectively creating an ‘incentives race’. It is therefore crucial, if incentive 
voting were to be introduced, for the government to be in charge of the whole system and 
regulate it. The following criticism will thus focus on incentive voting under the sponsorship 
of the government, as was the case in Bulgaria in 2005. 
As I have hinted above, I do not regard incentive voting as something beneficial to a 
democracy and to me it hardly seems as a system congruent with democratic principles. To 
criticise this approach even more, I believe that such a system may actually harm democracy 
even more than compulsory voting. I sum up my reservations in the following paragraphs. 
Generally, there are four objections. 
First, it is very much a question of debate whether the incentive voting system is 
financially more economical than compulsory voting as the first question is a matter more of 
speculation and the monetary cost of compulsion is difficult to establish because it is already 
part of the electoral system and countries like Australia or Belgium do not break down the 
electoral costs in such a way as to make it obvious how much does it cost to maintain the 
administration associated with CV. In any case the money for incentives handed out in one 
form or another would necessarily come out of the budget; this means that there would need 
to be cuts in other areas which could be ultimately more crucial to the well-being of the state. 
Obviously, in some systems political parties do get money from the state for campaigns 
depending on the number of representatives in parliament. In such a case, funds for incentives 
would have to be added to this budget as the money political parties gain for the state are used 
for campaigns and maintenance anyway. 
However, tangible evidence suggests that incentive voting would not be a cheap 
enterprise, something which could prove not only a problem to poorer countries but to the 
wealthy democracies as well. Let us, for example, take the proposed case in the United 
Kingdom where according to Baston and Ritchie (2006: 40) a ‘₤10 flat rate on a turnout of 80 
per cent would cost around ₤360m’. This is not a small amount and the overall increase in 
voter turnout could in the end prove counterproductive as the state would have to bear the 
financial costs. However, the costs need not be so dramatic, for instance if one would use the 
lottery as a means of handing out incentives – ‘an incentive of ₤2 per person might be 
inefficient to administer and too small to encourage turnout, while a lottery jackpot of 
₤100,000 per constituency might be attractive and cost only ₤66m in payouts, and the 
marginal cost of the extra voters would be a lot lower’ (Ibid). It is therefore possible to make 
incentive voting cheaper, but this does not answer the objection whether there are other 
sectors which would benefit from the finances allocated to the incentives. Furthermore, a 
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detailed look at the Czech and Bulgarian example (though the former was a party initiative 
and the latter a governmental one) neatly illustrates several problems; perhaps the main 
objection would be that neither method significantly increased turnout which is the primary 
argument for the possible introduction of incentives – in the Czech Republic the increase was 
circa 10% and in Bulgaria on a nationwide scale a mere ‘55.7 per cent of 6.7 million eligible 
voters cast their ballots – a fall of close to 10% from the previous election’ (!) (Balinov 2006: 
61). In the Bulgarian example, the citizens did not seem all that interested in the national 
lottery (prizes included a car worth 15,000 euros, computers, electronic devices and mobile 
phones) as only about 20% of voters registered for the draw. 
There have been some suggestions that rewards should be handed out to those who 
vote using postal ballots or e-votes because this type of voting reduces the costs of an 
election. The criticism arising from this proposition is that people will be rewarded even if 
they do not make an effort to go out and physically cast a vote. 
The second point has difficulty with the flexibility of reform of the incentive voting 
system. Let us consider two model situations: What happens when the regime is in need of 
change, for example because the financial incentives no longer fulfil their purpose as they 
have become economically negligible? What occurs when it is decided that the system should 
be abolished? As to the first question – the ₤10 in the British example or the 15,000 euro car 
in Bulgaria may no longer provide a stimulus to voters, and, due to inflation and other 
economic pressures, it is necessary to increase the money which is handed out in order to keep 
the voters still interested. Increasing the incentives should not prove to be the main problem 
but what could become an issue would be that a party could use the proposed increase of 
financial incentives as a bargaining chip during the election campaign. Incentive voting itself 
could be used, or hinted at (even if incentives would be banned from campaigning, parties 
could make their position known through various leaks), during an election campaign in 
which political parties could make suggestions that they would raise the reward for voting, be 
it financial or other. Obviously, it is difficult to say whether an increase from, say, ₤10 to ₤20 
would result in a significant shift in the votes to the party in question, but under certain 
circumstances such claims could have a considerable impact. 
In the Bulgarian general elections in 2005 incentives introduced were seen by ‘the 
media, international organizations and many voters … as being focused on potential 
supporters of the ruling party, the National Movement Simeon II, who were expected to be 
more hesitant about voting in the elections than the supporters of its main political opponent, 
the leftist Bulgarian Socialist Party’ (Balinov 2006: 60). Condemnation poured in from all 
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sides: the president, the opposition, the local electoral commission and even the Council of 
Europe, which criticised this on the grounds that there should be widespread political 
consensus, equal accessibility to all voters (one had to register for the lottery by telephone, 
sms or internet) and that a neutral body such as the Central Electoral Commission should have 
organised the lottery (not a private company as was the case). 
The second question discusses the danger associated with maintaining this type of 
system – one could very well imagine the situation when incentive voting has become 
undesirable but politicians and the authorities are caught in a vicious circle from which they 
cannot get out. Let us picture a model situation where the incentive voting system has been 
used for a number of years effectively boosting turnout. Now, what happens is that the system 
proves to be no longer sustainable, regardless whether this is because it has been outlived or 
whether it proves too much of a burden? The government will probably find it a very difficult 
political decision to make: taking away something which most citizens will see as a benefit 
will surely prove an unpopular move which could cost the party the next election followed by 
a considerable slump in turnout as a way to protest against the changes. The government then 
ends up in a vicious circle where it wants to abolish the incentives but cannot muster the 
political courage to do so. It thus becomes psychologically important to maintain the system. 
Obviously, there could be cases of a countrywide or all-party consensus on bringing incentive 
voting to an end but it seems to me that getting rid of the system will bring too many political 
problems.  
The third point is that people should not be bribed into going to elections but should 
instead feel it as something they must do on their own. To an extent this criticism reflects that 
of compulsory voting which forces citizens to cast a ballot. I believe the inner commitment to 
vote is a crucial democratic concept which cannot and should not be supplanted by incentives, 
monetary or otherwise. But using incentives is even worse than compulsory voting for several 
reasons: firstly, compulsory voting legislation establishes a clear signal that voting is a duty 
whereas incentives seem to make voting a question of individual personal gain; the act of 
casting the ballot may become rid of any meaning and importance which democratic countries 
attach to it. The approach attempting to ‘sell the vote’ is in line with contemporary social 
attitudes and a more market-oriented feel to it but ‘lacks some of the high-minded dignity of 
the case for compulsory voting’ (Baston and Ritchie 2006: 39) or voluntary voting for that 
matter. Whilst incentive voting should increase voter turnout without making people feel 
negative about the electoral system, as opposed to CV, the same criticism which opponents of 
compulsion use could be applied here, too: higher participation even without the citizens’ 
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negative feelings again masks the real causes of the problem for low turnout and incentives 
may act as a means of rectifying the situation but only superficially. ‘As with compulsory 
voting, it is a response based on a misunderstanding of the causes of engagement. It assumes 
that today’s citizens can be motivated only by appeals to their self-interest’ (Power Inquiry 
2006: 217). In my eyes, incentive voting runs the danger that citizens will start seeing 
elections as a business venue from which they can make easy money. The attempt to create a 
‘voting norm’ could come to naught as self-interest would be the prime cause to vote in 
elections.157 In the end, an election could turn out to be nothing more than a form of 
advertising campaign aimed at selling a product which happens to be the very essence of 
democracy itself. Indeed, this is probably why in the Bulgarian case the ‘lottery was seen as a 
deviation from best election practice’ (Balinov 2006: 60). To be sure, incentive voting does 
remove the stigma with which CV brands the non-voters and does away with the penalties (at 
least as directly effecting the non-voters) but it seems that this business-like attitude is as 
dangerous, if not more, than forcing citizens to participate. 
Finally, from the data presented above, it is difficult to see how incentives are any 
more effective than other institutional remedies in increasing turnout (apart from compulsory 
voting): the example of Bulgaria where incentives were offered on a nationwide scale failed 
to increase turnout (which was actually even lower than during the last election when 
incentives were not used) is a case in point. Indeed, in this light, incentives seem as a rather 
unfortunate attempt to coax voters to come to the polling booths and, as opposed to other 
institutional provisions, have rather debateable results. In this light it makes even less sense 
than compulsory voting which at least generates high turnout, and as Hill and Louth (2004: 
19) remark, ‘although the carrots approach might satisfy the objections of voting libertarians, 
it is rarely as effective as sticks.’ 
 
III-3: Summary – Worse Than Compulsory Voting 
Although incentive voting may seem as a perfect middle way between the leniency of 
a voluntary voting system on the one hand and the heavy-handedness of compulsion on the 
other, looks, again, prove to be deceiving. Although evidence seems to suggest that incentives 
could become an effective means of stimulating turnout, the end result of handing out rewards 
                                                 
157 It would be interesting to see how rational choice theory would cope with this problem as voting would then 
become advantageous to most of the society. This could prove intriguing ground for further research. 
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could prove catastrophic for a democracy. Bereft of any meaning, voting could become 
nothing more than a convenient means of increasing one’s personal gain at the expense of 
democratic principles and ideas. For this reason alone incentive voting should be vehemently 
opposed. It would be a mistake to claim that there are not any benefits to this system: there 
are, most importantly of making the non-voter problem irrelevant. However, it would equally 
be foolish to overlook the far reaching negative implications that incentive voting could, after 
some time, engender. Although its aims are to increase and better democracy, there is little 
doubt that using this kind of system is not the way forward. We need not extend the 
consumerism of our society into politics any further than necessary. After all, ideals, not 
money, as it is often the case, should be the backbone of politics. 
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CONCLUSION 
The patterns of turnout in established democracies have changed – high participation 
is no longer an everyday occurrence. Though this does not mean that it has vanished, it is 
evident that it is no longer as prevalent as it was half a century ago. Some, however, are far 
from satisfied with such a situation. Indeed, for a number of people high turnout is the alpha 
and omega of established democratic societies, it is the lifeblood of the democratic system. In 
this light, it should come as no surprise that declining turnout generates a sense of anxiety and 
concern, and in some cases need for action. Probably the most effective way to achieve high 
turnout is to alter the ‘rules of the game’, i.e. to change the institutional arrangements 
themselves. Most reforms will, if properly implemented, result in positive change but only 
one institutional remedy can guarantee near-universal turnout: compulsory voting. 
In recent years an increasing number of theorists and politicians have shown renewed 
interest in CV, which is generally regarded as a successful and easy way of boosting voter 
turnout without spending time, money and energy on projects the effectiveness of which is 
uncertain at best and, as opposed to compulsion, which do not produce automatic results. CV 
has kept participation in countries such as Australia, Belgium or Luxembourg at a constant 
and, compared to states with voluntary voting, overall high level. 
It seems as if compulsory voting is the ideal solution: it dramatically and immediately 
boosts turnout and, so CV proponents claim, brings other benefits (such as increased political 
knowledge on part of the electorate, making politics more civilised in the financial and 
rhetorical aspect, streamlining the whole electoral process, etc.). 
However, as this thesis has extensively argued, such lofty expectations are unfounded. 
Indeed, meticulous scrutiny will reveal that the quick-fix-all solution offered by CV is not real 
gold but fool’s gold. Apart from boosting turnout – and in my study I question whether high 
turnout is always positive for democracy – other ‘benefits’ which compulsory voting is said to 
produce are highly speculative but in most cases utterly false. This, coupled with accusations 
of immoral behaviour of non-voters, make the whole case for compulsion unsustainable. This 
study has argued that typical apologies of CV use several points to forward their claims: for 
the purpose of this work I singled out five steps, all of which lead to the argumentation that 
voting is a citizen’s duty, not merely his right. To give weight to the otherwise controversial 
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argumentation, advocates of compulsion reinforce their normative statement by turning to 
empirical data which they claim supports their assertions.  
The first point usually states that democracies are facing a worldwide problem of 
declining voter turnout. This argument creates a sense of crisis, a crisis which can have 
serious ramifications if not addressed because, as the proponents of compulsion claim, high 
participation increases legitimacy and the health of a democracy, whereas low turnout means 
that there is something amiss with the representative system. To be sure, CV advocates 
illustrate their case in the second point by showing the ill effects that low turnout has: 
representation is biased towards the more educated, wealthier and older social classes (more 
conservative, right wing); as a result, the less educated, poorer and younger people (who 
usually incline to vote the left) will not have their interests promoted in parliament as, were 
they go out to vote, they would otherwise have. This leads to the third point which presents 
compulsory voting legislation as the most effective solution how to dramatically improve an 
equalise turnout without any significant effort from the state. Beside this, it is claimed that the 
institutionalisation of CV brings other benefits, such as, amongst others, increased political 
knowledge of the citizens or less vicious political campaigning (I have classified these spill-
over effects as procedural, party- and voter-oriented). The benefits of compulsory voting seem 
to be so evident and positive that its supporters point out, in the fourth step, that any possible 
infringements of personal liberty are negligible to the profoundly positive effects; these 
effects outweigh the necessity of appearing (not actually voting, as that would be an 
infringement of personal liberty) at the polling booth once every four or five years. When 
viewed in this light, many other laws are far more restrictive than CV. Furthermore, due to the 
fact that it is turnout, not the actual act of voting itself which is required, the right not to vote 
remains intact. In the fifth step the proponents of compulsion put forward the main normative 
argument: voting is, after all, something a citizen is morally required to do because he in fact 
owes his support to the democratic system without which there could be no voting at all. In 
short, voting is thus a citizen’s duty – those that realise it naturally come to vote when the 
time arises; however, the non-voters who choose to free-ride should be forced to change their 
selfish behaviour and be, if necessary, forced to participate on the proceedings of a 
democratic society. Thus, basically, CV proponents work with two normative assertions: (1) 
high participation is good because it increases legitimacy and the health of a democracy, and 
(2) non-voting is bad because it means immoral free-riding. For proponents of compulsory 
voting, citizens ought to vote because it is their moral duty. 
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However, notwithstanding the philosophical statements connected with the concept of 
CV, it is evident that its advocates use concrete empirical arguments to support their claim. 
Fundamentally, philosophical discourse is about ideas, there is no right or wrong, only 
acceptable and unacceptable arguments to certain people. Though I can present normative 
claims, why I feel it is fundamentally wrong to force people to vote and to brand them as 
selfish free-riders, there will be no objective truth to my argument. That much is obvious. 
However, where concrete irrefutable evidence can be presented about the fallaciousness of 
CV is within the domain of political science. That is the reason why this thesis has been 
intensely working with empirical data. So, whilst primarily a normative question, the 
arguments on compulsory voting can, and are, commonly divided into moral claims and 
empirical claims (aimed at supporting the moral strength of the argument). The two assertions 
claiming that high participation is good and non-voting is free-riding, at first glance, seem 
sound. However, as this thesis has argued, the arguments are empirically speculative and 
morally questionable. 
 
Refuting the empirical claims 
This thesis went to great lengths to prove that the empirical evidence proponents of 
compulsory voting use in their defence of CV and/or high turnout has some serious holes. I do 
not wish to repeat here what has already been covered in the pages above, so I will only 
briefly summarise the most controversial claims. 
Firstly, it is a matter of fact that voter turnout is lower than in the past decades but that 
does not mean that high turnout has disappeared. It may not be as frequent as some theorists 
would like, but it must be stressed that there are many more factors other than apathy which 
influence whether voters come to the ballot or not – socioeconomic factors, institutional and 
political-cultural ones. The resulting turnout is a mixture of the interplay between these 
variables. In any case, low voter turnout may be strongly connected to the fact that the 
electorate is becoming more discerning about when and where will it vote. Indeed, there are 
many factors which have an impact on turnout, all of which cannot be simply fixed by making 
voting compulsory; high turnout does not miraculously cure all problems as CV masks rather 
than fixes them. 
Secondly, to support the thesis that high turnout is good, proponents of compulsion 
demonstrate the ill effects low turnout has, namely unequal representation. Detailed empirical 
scrutiny, some of which is actually penned by advocates of compulsory voting, reveals that 
such fears are misplaced: I have shown that low turnout does not change electoral outcomes 
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otherwise generated by high participation, and thus there is not any effect on representation as 
the left does not suffer from low turnout.  
Thirdly, proponents of compulsion state their case in such a way that their arguments 
give off the impression that CV is a unified system which helps 17% of the world’s 
democracies to maintain high turnout. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, it is 
important to keep in mind that not all CV systems are the same: there are significant 
differences amongst individual countries. High turnout is only associated with a strictly 
enforced regime backed by penalties, which is currently restricted to only four states: 
Australia, Belgium, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Indeed, it does not follow automatically that a 
country practicing compulsory voting will have high participation rates, and sometimes states 
with voluntary voting are better at achieving high participation than some CV countries. To be 
sure, this discussion leads us to the claim that CV, if it ensures high turnout, can create 
positive spillover effects. Such an assertion is blatantly false – citizens are not more 
knowledgeable, interested and loyal to the system in a CV country, neither do states with 
compulsion help voters with the best of institutional arrangements and, finally, the political 
parties are also no better than in a voluntary voting system. Though there have been many 
claims made about the benefits of CV, empirical evidence suggests that, if not always pure 
speculation, the benefits compulsion has are either exaggerated or inconclusive. 
Throughout this thesis, I have demonstrated that the only thing proponents of 
compulsory voting can safely claim on the empirical field is the fact that CV raises turnout. 
Nothing more. However, their somewhat speculative reasoning and partially wishful thinking 
leads them to present empirical data, supporting the claim for compulsion, which is, as we 
saw, highly contestable. The benefits lauded by the proponents of compulsion upon close 
scrutiny simply do not hold, and, thus, the whole case for CV and high turnout is cast into 
doubt. 
In this light, it is important to realise that proponents of compulsion base their 
arguments on a system (widely varying from one country to another) which has 
fundamentally remained the same for a number of years. Indeed, Farrow (1998: 41) calls 
compulsory voting a ‘relic’ and an ‘Australian anachronism’ that could hardly be 
institutionalised, if we were to consider Australia as a voluntary voting country, in the 21st 
century and that was established only because of specific circumstances but remained because 
of the political inertia and the parties’ unwillingness to shift the burden on turnout to them, 
rather than the electors. To be sure, I do not claim that compulsory voting is not congruent 
with a democratic system nor propose that it should be abolished around the globe 
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immediately though I believe that it is an inevitable development. The reasons are obvious: 
currently are only four countries with serious administration (CV is embedded in the system 
for various political, historical and social reasons) and that the last system of compulsory 
voting was established in the 1960s in Egypt (which is nowhere near a democratic country by 
current standards). Furthermore, any debate about the introduction of compulsion in 
democracies with a voluntary voting system results in a very heated debate and strong critical 
reactions to such proposals. CV is thus rather out-dated and something of an oddity amongst 
established democracies; in my eyes, it is a static system which has not experienced any real 
progress in the years of its existence – it is a dying-out branch of democratic practice: this 
happened in 1970 in the Netherlands and more recently in Italy or Austria.  
The static nature of the system of compulsion, I believe, also has ramifications vis-à-
vis the distortion-effect on empirical data. When most people vote, this does not give us any 
real feedback to the political environment in the country, other than whether the votes swing 
to the left or to the right; it is impossible to gauge the satisfaction/dissatisfaction with politics 
or the electoral system, its responsiveness to the citizens, various societal factors, etc.  
Furthermore, how is one to know that a political campaign is effective and responsive, how 
important are the political issues at stake when everyone votes? To be sure, by maintaining an 
edifice of high turnout, everything seems in perfect order, whereas that need not be the case 
and the country in question may be going through a crisis of its own. 
This is probably where incentive voting (discussed in Part III) might be argued to cut 
the middle ground: it can be seen as a response to the static nature of compulsion and the 
overtly laissez-faire attitude of a voluntary voting system. However, I remain sceptical to this 
claim. Firstly, incentive voting has been practiced on an official basis only once and with 
questionable results, more likely it was the initiative of individuals and/or political parties. 
When one further takes into account the role of money in politics, it becomes evident that 
such measures may negatively affect each other and irreparably the whole political system – 
and here I am not only referring to money being handed to political parties, but finances being 
used as something which is closely reminiscent of bribing voters. In this instance incentives 
are even more damaging than CV: whereas voting is required by law in a system of 
compulsion, the present state of incentives has no clear and definite rules and therefore is 
open to possible abuse. Furthermore, incentive voting takes away all the importance and 
symbolism an election has – another part of democracy becomes commercialised and abused. 
Connected to this is the fact that whereas compulsory voting with the penalties and the 
stressing of the citizen’s duty underlines the importance of an election, incentive voting would 
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only make casting a poll look like a matter of how to maximise one’s profit. In part, the 
introduction of incentives can be seen as an attempt to modernise the concept of CV. Again, 
as with compulsory voting, though this seems as an impressive achievement, the latent 
dangers are present and quite real. 
 
Refuting the normative claims 
All arguments for compulsory voting ultimately lead to the moral assertion that voting 
is a citizen’s duty, not merely his right. This claim actually works with two arguments: high 
participation is good because it increases the legitimacy of democracy and thus people who do 
not vote are selfish free-riders who take advantage of the democratic electoral system. In the 
eyes of CV proponents, a democracy is dependent on the active participation of its citizens in 
the decision-making process. By not voting my actions are actually undermining the 
democratic system (regardless whether I do this with or without intention) which should be in 
the interest of all citizens to maintain. Indeed, CV advocates maintain that voting vis-à-vis 
other obligations imposed on people by law is a very negligible duty – the claims made by 
proponents of compulsory voting may be seen as arguments from a minimalist viewpoint: 
active and wide engagement in the life of the community is necessary for the health and 
legitimacy of a democratic system but to make any other demands on citizens other than the 
occasional duty to vote would be unreasonable. It seems that the supporters of CV would 
envisage the participation of citizens in other areas of the community, not only voting, but are 
willing to ‘settle’ for the bare minimum which the state can reasonably demand from its 
citizens. However, even such a bare minimum raises important questions vis-à-vis personal 
freedom, legitimacy and morality (I have examined these claims in points four and five in the 
discussion against compulsion). 
As to personal freedom, CV supporters agree that there is some infringement but claim 
that it is only a minor one – compulsion is, according to them, just like any other law (indeed 
maybe less restrictive) and because the right to vote remains intact, there is no real problem. 
To be sure, I demonstrated that this is not so. First of all, the penalties associated with CV can 
be quite severe and lead to imprisonment or disenfranchisement, hardly something which 
could be considered as an adequate punishment for not voting. More than anything such 
practice actually has an authoritative tinge to it. Furthermore, the right to vote does not remain 
intact because, in the end, it is voting that is required, not one’s presence at the polling booth. 
I have shown that Australia actually requires voting and though quite lenient in letting people 
‘off the hook’ for religious beliefs, it adamantly fights against political dissent. To be sure, I 
 167
maintain that the right not to vote is as important as the right to vote in the democratic system, 
because of its connections to the concept of legitimacy. 
This brings me to the second area – legitimacy – where I remain sceptical about the 
arguments proponents of compulsion. First of all, there is the question of the relation of 
legitimacy to high turnout. Advocates of compulsory voting are adamant about high turnout. 
To them it means a better, more legitimate and healthier democratic system. By the same 
token, they see low turnout as something evil, because it strikes at the very heart of 
democracy, particularly the concepts of equality, representation, and legitimacy. To be sure, I 
agree with the thesis that high turnout is more desirable than low turnout. However, I do not 
believe that high turnout achieved by coercion, as is the case with compulsory voting, is 
something to be preferred to genuine, albeit lower, turnout and secondly, I do not think that 
exceptionally high turnout is something good for the democratic system and can, in fact, 
under certain circumstances even be harmful. It is undeniably true that high participation is 
something which is valued in a democratic society but too many voters may take its toll on the 
quality of political life. And there are other outstanding issues connected to the concept of 
legitimacy that CV supporters tend to overlook. Proponents of compulsory voting make an 
error when they equate participation in elections with the legitimacy of the democratic 
system. To be sure, there is an evident link between high participation and higher legitimacy 
of an elected government but the claim that because of falling participation the whole 
legitimacy of the democratic system itself is at risk, is nonsense. To me, this sounds as an 
exaggeration and a false amplification of the question of declining voter turnout. Low voter 
turnout is not bad in itself. The fact that a government is elected not with a large number of 
voters might tell us something about the executive and the electorate but does not directly 
relate to the whole democratic system. Let us not forget, that even if there is an above average 
turnout this does not necessarily mean that the government will have the support of the 
majority of those who voted, most likely the ‘majority’ would have voted against the 
government for various other parties. Another example may be that a party wins by a slight 
majority of, say, one or two percent – who is than to say, that this party has more legitimacy 
to form a cabinet than their rivals who came in a close second? In absolute numbers this is 
surely true, but relatively speaking the legitimacy of such a government could be weaker than 
if it were elected by fewer voters but clearly won the election. But putting these speculations 
aside, the amount of legitimacy bestowed by voters on a government is not in most cases 
(which are normally not extreme examples) directly connected with the legitimacy of the 
democratic system as such. By not going out to vote, I may make a statement about the 
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running candidates, credence of the political parties or about my political knowledge and 
capability to make informed decisions, however, I do not cast into doubt free and fair 
elections as a democratic principle which I wish to uphold and by the same token the 
democratic system as such. Secondly, it is interesting to read so many claims made by 
proponents of compulsion about the legitimacy of the system without giving any serious 
thought to the legitimacy of coerced voting itself. Properly understood, compulsory voting is 
not voting per se, but participation. However, as this thesis has demonstrated, even under such 
a system most people choose to vote rather than wasting time coming to the polling booth just 
to cast a blank ballot and in the end the purpose of a CV regime is voting, not just having 
people turn out. But how legitimate is such a vote? How can there be talk of legitimacy if 
some people are made by circumstance to vote? How valuable a decision is from a person 
who is uninformed an uninterested in politics? And how does this reflect not only on the 
winning party but on the whole system of compulsion itself? In focusing on making 
democracy more legitimate and healthier, CV advocates actually neglect the implications of 
compulsion itself to the concept of legitimacy. Although proponents of compulsion argue that 
every vote cast is valuable, I remain sceptical about this claim. CV forces people who are 
displeased with politics or otherwise do not have any interests in voting to come to the polling 
booth. As a result there can be quite a number of ill-cast votes (protest, random) which have 
no true political value and can hardly be considered as an example of valuable decision-
making. Such a claim does not necessarily mean that under a voluntary voting system there 
are more knowledgeable votes cast; to make such an assertion would be unreasonable. 
However, as opposed to an electoral system based on CV, voluntary voting enables those who 
do not wish to participate or are truly uninterested or without any knowledge to opt out and 
not vote. Although not many people can really be deemed knowledgeable enough to make a 
qualified decision, a voluntary voting system guarantees that those citizens who vote are those 
who, though not necessarily having profound knowledge about political matters, are at least 
somewhat informed and interested in doing what they are doing. On the other hand, 
compulsion in effect forces people without any motivation to attend, because coming up with 
excuses and trying to present one’s case to the authorities why he did not vote may be more 
time and energy-consuming than fulfilling one’s duty and handing in ballot without giving 
any special thought to the choice being made (indeed, it may be just a random donkey vote). 
Such examples seem to make politics dependent on how one looks, rather than what one 
thinks – consider the situation when a citizen who under a voluntary voting system would not 
have voted does not cast a random vote but makes a decision: most probably he would vote on 
 169
personal preference and sympathies rather than political beliefs. Furthermore, evidence seems 
to suggest that compulsory voting and the resulting high turnout it generates has an effect on 
the radicalisation of the political scene. Tangible data points to the fact that high voter turnout 
engenders the rise of strongly polarised political parties which end up being represented in 
parliament paradoxically because of CV: by making people turn out more marginal views 
(even those contrary and in some way hostile to Western liberal democracy), which under 
voluntary voting would not stand a chance, can actually be present in the legislative chamber. 
By focusing on high participation proponents of compulsion could unknowingly be 
undermining the democratic system in another fashion. Compulsory voting is sometimes said 
to be acceptable in newly emerging democracies but again, I do not agree with such a 
statement because I do not see its necessity. The citizens in emerging democracies are most 
likely to be very keen on their newly acquired right to vote and thus will show up in large 
numbers. In the parliamentary elections in 2001 in East Timor an impressive 91.3% of 
electors showed up without being obliged to vote. The introduction of CV would not have any 
real effect in this case. 
Though high participation on its own is surely desirable but forcing it just for the sake 
of high turnout is a different matter altogether, especially whilst non-voting brings with it the 
stigma of free-riding. And this brings me to the moral dimension of the argument. The 
question is, whether such high numbers are worth the price. Proponents of compulsory voting 
would not hesitate in their answer. However, I am convinced that they are deeply mistaken, 
for two reasons. Firstly, before making sweeping statements about the immorality of people 
who do not vote it is necessary to realise that there may be many reasons for non-voting. As I 
have already stated, I do not agree with non-voting out of pure laziness, i.e. without a 
reasonable cause; but on the other hand I believe that no one should be coerced into casting a 
ballot. What do we owe a democracy? Is it only our vote? I do not think so. I have argued that 
there are other different possible ways to be engaged in the life of a society which necessarily 
do not have to translate themselves into voting. After all, voting is just one way to be active 
and thus to call a person, who does not vote but brings substantial benefits to a community by 
his activities, an immoral free-rider means to be blind to other forms of participation. This 
situation with lower turnout may actually be indicative of larger changes within the 
democratic system and trying to keep participation high just because it was like that forty 
years ago and just because some people think it is healthy for a democracy should not be the 
reason for institutionalising CV. As I have pointed out, it seems that compulsory voting is 
more of a tradition than the best way forward; after all, would not there be many more states 
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with compulsory voting institutionalised in their legal systems, rather than a diminishing 
number? Such a change need not be bad. There has been a substantial growth of the civil 
society together with the widening of rights that an individual enjoys. High participation 
numbers, at least in every election, are most probably a thing of the past; citizens will turn out 
in high numbers and prove their sympathies for democracy by coming to the polling booth 
when something important is at stake. However, their absence at the polls does not necessarily 
mean disengagement in other areas: it does not take much to find proof that citizens are 
interested in what is happening around them – numerous civil societies, NGOs, the amount of 
petitions is just the tip of the iceberg. Secondly, CV advocates cannot prove that there is a 
public good that non-voters can actually free-ride on. In my examination whether voting itself 
can be considered such a good, I have argued that this is a highly controversial claim. The 
right to vote, in this respect, is an unproblematic and universally accepted concept which is 
necessary for the survival of democracy both from an individualist and collectivist position. 
However, there is certainly no consensus on whether voting is a duty – indeed, CV is an 
idiosyncrasy confined to several countries rather than a universal principle. And thus it 
follows that if one cannot actually assert that active participation expressed by voting is a 
public good, non-voters cannot be free-riders and thus cannot be immoral. To be sure, 
proponents of compulsion are in a difficult position as I believe it is up to them to demonstrate 
that CV is something which is of an urgent interest to society. At the present this does not 
seem to be the case as the empirical evidence for the benefits of CV is non-existent and in 
states with voluntary voting there seems to be more hostility than enthusiasm about the 
possible introduction of compulsory voting. Compulsion lacks in Key’s (1963: 29) term a 
permissive consensus, i.e. ‘widespread public agreement on a question [that] permits the 
government to act without fear of powerful popular dissent’ and the public is willing to defer 
to elites and experts to make decisions on their behalf. Though Key’s permissive consensus 
was constrained to international affairs, this does not weaken the argument that the case for 
CV lacks the urgency and consensus needed to create such an institution in states that have no 
history of compulsion. In addition, it must be remembered that voting is a political right and, 
as all political liberties, is necessarily constructed in the negative sense. These first order 
rights give citizens the possibility (not the necessity) to do something – vote, run for an office, 
freely express themselves, etc. They are rights, not duties per se. Voting is thus primarily a 
negative right, not a positive one as proponents of compulsory voting seem to think. If we 
start thinking of voting on the grounds that it is something which must be done, which is a 
citizens duty, the ramifications of this approach become clear as we might start to enforce 
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other, previously negatively construed rights. Take for the example the right to become a 
member of a political party. In an absurd exaggeration this might also be taken as something 
which promotes citizen participation in state affairs as much as compulsory voting does. If we 
can make legislation making voting compulsory (or at least turning up) we might as well 
make membership in a political party compulsory and penalise those individuals who do not 
join and brand them as free-riders. Surely, if all people were interested in politics and had a 
say, the system would be more participatory than a voluntary one. However, the question 
remains whether such a system would be democratic in the first place. 
 
Final word: can democracy be enforced? 
It is important to keep in mind that the freedom of choice is an indispensable element 
of democracy and sometimes this freedom brings about effects which may not be pleasing to 
everyone. However, part of what makes a democratic system democratic, is the fact that 
people are to decide for themselves what is right and what is wrong. Although it might be 
desirable to have high turnout the citizens must attend elections out of their own free will; it is 
their responsibility, not the governments, to realise that it is in their own interests to cast a 
vote. Making people drive on the right side of the road is a matter of immediate safety, 
whereas making them vote is not. People are not in any immediate danger when they choose 
to stay home and do not cast a vote. It must be in the public’s own interest to safeguard its 
democracy. But even though there will be classes in school about the political system, parties 
will go out of their way to keep people informed about policies and newspapers will write 
about politics on a daily basis, the greatest contingency will still be the citizen. In the end, it 
will be up to each and every member of the society to recognise his potential and inner 
obligation to vote, recognise why a vote is important and that it is an integral part of the 
democratic process. Democracy is certainly about the freedom to choose but also about 
personal responsibility and the recognition of this responsibility. In other words, the point is 
that, as opposed to a totalitarian regime which forces people to participate, in democracy there 
is choice, free choice. But owing to the very nature of a democracy it is up to the people to 
participate in politics. If the citizens do not wish to become politically engaged, even 
minimally, this is their own choice and it would be wrong and futile for the state to force them 
to vote. Those, who do not vote are not powerless, because they have the power to vote. If 
they do not use it, it is their loss. They will than have to live with choices made by others on 
their behalf even though it will be a minority which will rule over the majority. After all, it is 
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in the power of each of us to protest against such a situation by casting a vote at the next 
election. Our votes are what we make of them. 
So, can democracy be enforced? As one can see, it can. But should it be? I do not 
think so. Compulsory voting is often presented as a perfect solution in the battle against 
declining turnout and voter engagement. However, as this thesis has demonstrated, this is not 
the case. It is a superficial remedy which, by making the numbers ‘right’, does not actually 
provide a cure. Its introduction would undeniably increase the number of voters who show up 
on Election Day, but the overall betterment of democracy is doubtful. 
This thesis primarily wanted to warn against the dangers of CV which is an easy to 
establish quick-fix solution which does not live up to its expectations. Compulsory voting, 
and incentive voting by that matter, should not form the backbone of any election; rather than 
coercing citizens to go to vote or bribing them, they should do so on their own accord and 
because of their own conviction. Realising the importance of elections, or more precisely the 
ideal of representation, is a necessary step to a better democracy but a step which citizens 
must make on their own.  
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